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ABSTRACT
In recent, years, one of the major events in the container 
liner market was the introduction of the Round-the-WorId 
serviceCRTWl, whereby the intensity of competition among 
carriers has been exacerbated.
Consequently, because of its significant impact on the 
market, there have been many arguments which were rather 
superficial, while few have dealt with the subject in 
detail.
However, this study has a different approach based on 
three assumptions. Those are, firstly, the assumption 
that innovation is an essential factor in economic chang­
es, secondly, the RTW concept is an innovation in the 
liner market, and thirdly that the innovation influences 
the future liner market.
With these assumptions, I undertook to explore the fol­
lowing series of questions,
1. What are the major innovations in the liner market and 
the interactions on changes in the liner market?
2. What is the significance of the RTW concept as an 
innovation?
3. What are the core of the RTW concept in its principle 
and its application to the real world?
A. What would the advantages and disadvantages of this 
concept and the result of its analysis be?
5. What would the impact of the RTW concept in a future 
projection be?
The above questions were dealt with in the relevent chap­
ters through various methods;of theoretical, practical 
and analytical access,and summarized, at the end of each
part.
■r
The summary of major findings in these processes are;
1. If we define the core of containerisation as the 
unification of cargo through the change of its charac­
teristics being heterogeneous toward being homoge­
neous, the RTW concept is the unification of both car­
go and trades.
2. If the penetration of containerization in internatio­
nal liner cargo trades represents the level of accomp­
lishment of standardization of the liner industry, the 
standardization in the production process of the ser­
vice commodity in liner shipping has almost completed 
in the three mainstream trades.
3. This means that market integration in a global point 
of view can be realized through the establishment of a 
international marketing strategy.
4. Among various global strategies, the RTW concept is 
categorized as the overall cost-leadership strategy 
which is very effective in penetrating the market with 
its low cost structure and bargaining power in order 
to build up a defensive position to be able to cope 
with the competitive market.
Accordingly, this paper concludes that the RTW concept as 
a global strategy should be built in such a way that the 
concept does not bring about friction with the reality in 
its application, keeping flexibility and adaptability in 
the business entity.
Finally, the study leaves a further discussion concerning 
the behavioristic strategies of rivalry and the economic 
and manageral effectiveness to the market for a future 
study.
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INTRODUCTION
1 . Purpose and Task
The economic situation in liner shipping has changed 
drastically during the last two decades, particularly in 
recent years.
Many refer to the current liner market as a chrcnic 
recession because of the lasting or even aggravated over- 
tonnage situation.
In general, economic changes are affected by internal 
factors within the industry as well as external factors 
from environment, thus the economic system generates 
evolution through the changes of process.
We can not sketch any cf economic status by merely 
reproducing it at constant rates and in a static equi­
librium at any point in time.
Because it is dynamic.
Then, the question is raised ;
What cause the changes in liner shipping ?
There are many factors to consider to answer this que­
stion .
Among the factors, innovation is one of the most impor­
tant factors for economic changes as Professor Joseph.A. 
Bchumpeter pointed out.
Therefore, the prime purpose in this paper is to observe 
the economic phenomena in liner shipping from this per­
ceptive angle and analyse those economic impact on the 
market.
In recent years, the round-the-world service concept has 
been introduced to the liner market as a business strate­
gy whereby a carrier can cover the globally integrated
1
marketing network.
As the title of this paper explicitly refers to the 
Round-the-World concept as an innovation in liner ship­
ping, this new concept has influenced the current liner 
market in various ways,which is discussed in the paper.
Accordingly, the primary concerns as the tasks of this 
paper go to the following questions regarding the RTW 
concept.
First, what is the significance of the RTW concept as an 
innovation in liner shipping?
Second, what are the practical applications of the RTW 
concept to the real market?
Thirdly,the quantitative analysis of the RTW concept com­
pared with the traditional liner service.
Finaly, what would be the impacts of the RTW concept in 
the future liner shipping?
2). Limitations and Scope of the Research
However, in observation of the major economic 
phenomena in liner shipping, the study does not cover all 
factors involved in the changes of the liner market, but 
includes only striking events to varify the ideas which 
is relative to the subject matter.
Furthermore, in the discussions any detailed explanation 
and justification of ideas and thoughts which are gene^ 
rally accepted are excluded in order to avoid the volumi^ 
nous content of the paper.
There are many limitations in collecting proper and 
accurate information and data particularly which are use­
ful for the computer caculation and building a computer
program. Therefore, most of the information was acquired 
from various publications, periodicals and Lloyd's List. 
The information which was not available from any of these 
sources was added by assumptions being relevant in terms 
of values and quantities.
In this study, it is very regretful that the topic regar­
ding the competitors' behaviour in terms of business 
strategy was not fully discussed because of time and spa­
ce constraints.
One of the major concerns in the study lies in the 
analytical approach to business behaviour in the contai­
ner liner market and its global marketing strategy as a 
defensive measure to cope with competitive forces in the 
industry.
However, this topic shall be continued in my future study 
especially from the international marketing point of view 
which I have stressed in the conclusion of this paper.
Finally, the scope of this research is limited to the 
study of liner shipping, praticularly, container liner 
shipping.
Eventhough conventional liner shipping exists in various 
trade routes, the study excludes that area of liner 
shipping.
However, occasionally, the term "liner shipping" is used 
instead of container liner shipping, when it refers to a 
broader sense of container liner shipping.
31. Methodolgy
This research has been conducted mainly through three 
different methods, that is, library research, practical 
research on the case study of the practice of the RTW
concept and computer research on cost comparison and ana­
lysis.
Library research was undertaken at various libraries 
such as World Maritime University, the World Bank Secto­
ral Library and the Federal Maritime Comission in 
Washington D.C. during my on-the-job training in the 
World Bank last April and May.
Practical research was fulfilled during various field 
trips to many countries, such as France, Norway, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and the U.S.A.,collecting several 
practical data and information- which were useful for the 
analytical approach.
The practical research includes personal interviews with 
many experts, visiting professors and technical personnel 
in different organizations.
Lastly, computer research has been done by using the com­
puter model which was built by the Transportation Depart­
ment of the World Bank,to produce the costs for TEU/mile 
of the RTW carriers according to various assumptions. 
Another computer program was built to conduct the compa­
rison of voyage costs.
A).The Plan of this Study
The study consists mainly of three different approaches 
to the subject matter ;
The first is the theoretical approach which was under­
taken in the first part for the justification of the RTW 
concept as an innovation, the second is the practical 
approach of a case study of the. RTW concept and the 
third is analytical approach done in the third part.
A
Figure < 1 - 1 represents the plan of this study in scheme- 
tic form.
The figure shows the flow of discussions and the 
interrelationship between topics which are dealt with in 
different chapters.
Eventually the flow of thoughts feed back to the previous 
discussions so that the conclusion of each part 
highlights the questions raised before.
5
Figure (1-1)
THE PLAN OF THE STUDY
Issues and Problems Theoretical Approach Cas3 Study Analysis, Conclusion
Note:  > Feed back line
>  Flow of research
PART I
INNOVATIONS IN LINER SHIPPING
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As shown by the title of this paper, the round-the-world 
service (RTW) concept is referred to an innovation in the 
evolution of liner shipping.
Therefore, before going to the discussion of the RTW ser­
vice as a main topic of this paper, it is necessary to 
review various innovations which have been involved in 
the process of developing liner shipping, and it is also 
necessary to define what innovation is.
Chapter 1. WHAT IS INNOVATION?
In Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabrid­
ged, the word "INNOVATION" is defined as: 1) the act or an 
instance of innovating: the introduction of something
new;2) something that deviates from established doctrine 
or practice: something that differs from existing forms 
Cl).It refers to the infusion of something new into 
real-world activities; hence it excludes abstractions 
such as new theories or concepts.
Innovations may come about as a result of such new theo­
ries or concepts, as a result of new inventions, or simp­
ly as a result of new ways of implementing previously 
known principles.
In Bccnomics, innovation means one of three things(2):
1) The implementation of changes in production, i.e. 
changes in the production function;
2) The intrdduction of new types of commodities in the 
market, i.e. the appearance of new supply functions;
3) Procedural changes introduced into markets or the 
economy as a whole, i.e. social reform.
Professor Joseph A. Schumpeter stressed that the
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concept
of innovation assumes a position of central importance in 
business cycles, and more generally, the course of and 
the outlook for the capitalist process.
He defined the innovation by means of the production fun- 
tion<3).
This function describes the way in which a quantity of 
a product varies if quantities of factors vary.
If, instead of quantities of factors, we vary the form 
of the function, we have an innovation.
However, this does not limit us to the case in which an 
innovation consists in producing the same kind of pro­
duct which had been produced before by the same kind of 
means of production that had been used before.
The definition INNOVATION as the setting up of a new pro­
duction function covers the case of a new commodity as 
well as those of a new form of organization such as a 
merger, cartel, or the opening up of a new market.
Innovation can also be defined with reference to cost. 
Total costs to individual firms must, in the absence of 
innovation and with constant price factors monotonously 
increase in function of their output.
Whenever at any time a given quantity of output costs 
less to produce than the same or a smaller quantity did 
cost or would have cost before, under the condition that 
price factors had not fallen, certainly there has been 
innovations somewhere. In this case, it follows that it 
would be incorrect to say that innovation causes long-run 
marginal cost curves to fall or makes, with a certain 
intervals, marginal cost negative.
An innovation breaks off the old total or marginal cost
9
curve and puts a new one in its place at the same time.
In a broad sense, reduction in unit costs by the innova­
tion of individual firm favors the growth of an industry, 
which means that an industrial cost curve, as well as 
an individual cost curve is ultimately charged.
Innovation has a pragmatic connotation.Different from 
invention, it implies something, such as implementation 
or introduction of a new concept to reality.
For actions which consist in carrying out innovations, we 
reserve the term entrepreneurship.
The idea of entrpreneurship and the theory of the entre­
preneur are the basic factors for economic development. 
According to Schumpeter, a static economy, characterised 
by a given, undisturbed circular flow of economic activi- 
ty, is disrupted by an innovation, undertaken by an 
entrepreneur.A sucessful innovation will then be imitated 
by others until it becomes absorbed into a new circular 
flow, a pattern which leads to cyclical fluctuations in 
economic activities.
Professor A. Btromme Bvendsen also highlights the impor­
tance of the entrepreneur as a dynamic factor in modern 
shipping .
He explained that the entrepreneurial function is a cen­
tral concept in economics since uncertainty implies risks 
in organising production. It consists in the task of 
co-ordinating the flow of resources to produce and sell 
an CLitput, and it is therefore essentially concerned 
with decisions which establish and change the direction 
of the firm. His approach is rather based on the deci­
sion-taking and the risk-taking function of entrepreneur-
10
ship.
The innovation concept contains the behavioristic con­
notation together with the idea of entrepreneurship.
In the process of implementaton of an innovation, the 
decision-making has been undertaken very much based upon 
fundamental assumptions of business behavior. This is 
because only some firms carry out innovations and then 
act along new cost curves, while others can not but mere­
ly have to adapt themselves.
The business behavior is affected not only by the moti­
vation of the implementation of new cost curves but, more 
importantly in many cases, also by the quality of pro­
ducts to meet the customer's needs. We can identify a 
good example in liner services. The tariff rate in liner 
services is comparatively higher than that of tramp ser­
vices. This is so called the cost for stability, which 
will be discussed in the following chapter.The conference 
system is an innovation to secure the quality of services 
in terms of stability.
Innovations discussed in this paper are classified into 
two categories, one hardware-oriented innovation and the 
other, software-oriented innovation
As we have defined earlier,an innovation covers proce­
dural changes introduced into the market or the economy 
as a whole, e.g. the conference system. Containerization 
and the RTW service concept. These procedural, organiza­
tional and operational changes are categorized as softwa­
re-oriented innovations
The hardware-oriented innovation includes technical inno-
11
vations mainly focusing on the implementation of 
in production functions i.e., propulsion devices.
changes
jp
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Chaptert 2. SOME CONSIDERATION REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF LINER 
CARGO AND LINER SERVICES
As a result of the Industrial Revolution, a system of 
regular, public transport services beween countries, were 
required. Scheduled ocean transport in the form of liner 
services plays an essential role in industrial develop­
ment and international trade through its evolution.
The evolution of liner shipping has been caused by 
various innovations in such ways as introduction of new 
production functions, implementation of new production 
processes and a market reform such as the Conference 
system.
Before discussing innovations having been involved in the 
liner market,it is necessary to review the characteris­
tics of the liner cargo and the liner service, because, 
those are fundamental factors and the basis on which the 
innovations can take place.
2.1 Characteristics of Liner Cargo
General cargo are carried by either liner shipping 
though in less degree, by tramp shipping. This makes it 
difficult to make a strict distinction between the two 
different groups of cargoes, liner cargo or tramp cargo. 
Nevertheless, the following statements are generally 
accepted.
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2.1.1 The main characteristics of liner cargo from the 
view point of its value
a) High value
The most common types of liner cargo are manufactured 
goods which are normally high in value compared with raw 
material cargo. Therefore, safe and fast delivery is 
usually of greater concern to the shipper in liner ser­
vices, which means that the cost for inventory and hand­
ling of the cargo in transit is higher than that of 
tramps,because of the value of the cargo affected by 
financial cost and insurance cost during transit 
time . <5!» .
Table Cl-l) illustrates the major liner commodities with 
a wide range of value per long ton. Among €he range of 
the liner cargo, high value cargo and low value cargo are 
sometimes diverted to airfreight and tramp services res­
pectively.
bl High freight rates
The freight rates of liner cargo are comparatively high 
in level at which the commodity can bear.
c> The proportion of freight to the total price of cargo. 
Despite high freight rates of liner cargo, its proportion 
of freight to the total price of cargo is relatively low. 
Regarding low-value commodities,freight rates can easily 
amount to more than 50 per cent of the delivered price, 
while high value products are rarely subjected to such a 
heavy freight burden. A likely estimate of the proportion 
in liner cargo would be from 5 to 10 per cent which is 
shown in table<l-2!> .
d) Low price elasticity of the demand of liner shipping 
services i
Because of the nature of the characteristics of liner 
cargo as mentioned above,the increment of freight rates 
is not usually subjected to diversion to substitute the 
mode of transportation. However there are competitive 
forces, such as airfreight liners for the high value car­
go and tramp shipping for low value cargo.
2.1.2 Main characteristics from the point of view of 
other than the value of ca,rgo
e>.Liner cargo are typically bulkier and of lower density 
than raw materials
f).In a single voyage in liner services, many kinds of 
cargoes are loaded and discharged in various ports 
from various shippers.
These two characteristics formulate the characteristics 
of liner cargo as being heterogeneous,which decisively 
influences the liner shipping.
15
Tablea-1)
Value per Long Ton of Selected Major Liner
Code
Commodities, 1973 
Description Range Dollars
72 Electrical machinery
Long Ton 
5,891- 5,174
89 Manufactured articles, NES 3,987- 2,643
71 Nonelectrical machinery 3,875- 784
732 Road motor vehicles and parts 3,651-
733 Vehicles, nonroad, and parts 3,584- 2,397
629 Rubber manufactures 2,330- 1,882
121 Tobacco, unmanufactured 2,150- 1,334
821 Furniture 2,038- 806
Oil Meat, fresh, chilled, frozen 1,747- 1 ,456
68 Nonferrous metals 1,478- 963
A 2 Vegetable oils and fats 1,165- 1,075
112 Alcoholic beverages 1,098- 941
263 Cotton 829- 582
211 Hides and skins 806- 762
24 Wood, lumber and cork 694- 224
26 Textile fibers and waste 605- 358
58 Synthetic resins and cellulose 470- 381
411 Animal oils and fats, NES 291- 224
221 Oilseeds, nuts and kernels 269- 224
081 Animal feed excluding cereals 269- 112
251 Pulps and waste paper 224- 67
641 Paper and paperboard 179- 157
*** Source;Gunnar K.Sletmo,Ernest W,Williams,Jr.,
Liner Conferences in the Container age, P.55.
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Table(l-2)
A 1 Values and Rates Per dw Tonne
Trade leg 1 3
Value/Tonne Rate/ Tonne Rate/Value
C^ US'OOO;) ($US'000:) t;2/lxl00)
UK-Australia 4.3 0.29 6.7
Australia-UK 1.4 0.17 12.1
UK-Japan 4.5 0.12 2.7
Japan-UK 6.9 0.28 4.1
UK-Malaysia 2.2 0.11 5.0
Malaysia-UK 1.8 0.11 6.1
UK-India 1.6 0.13 8.1
India-UK 2.9 0.16 5.5
UK-Kenya •*!^ M jiL 0.18 8.2
Kenya-UK 1.4 0.08 5.7
*** Note;Value data are based upon OECD world trade 
statistics for 1982.
*** Source;M.G.Graham, D.O.Hughes, Containerisation in 
the Eighties,p.221
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Characteristics of Liner Shipping.
Liner shipping offers all potential shippers regular and 
scheduled departures on particular geographic routes and 
calling ports with a fixed schedule and fixed sets of 
rates. From this definition, we can derive the two fun­
damental ingredients as its characteristics, that is to 
say regularity and stability.
2.2.1 Regularity
Figure(l-2> represents schematically the factors influe­
ncing the characteristics of liner services in the mar­
ket. From carriers' point of view,, they have to provide 
the regularity of sailing and on the other hand shippers 
have to provide the regularity of cargo loading. Here, 
the criteria of a good liner service are better frequency 
of regular sailing and reliability of regular sailing 
which can be explained in terms of regularity.
However, the regularity rendered by the carrier is res­
tricted by the demand side of the liner market,that is, 
regularity of cargo loading. Because of the characte­
ristics of liner cargo being heterogeneous: various kinds 
of cargoes and volume, different shippers and various 
loading and discharging ports. Therefore when the cargo 
is not sufficient in volume or lacks regularity in gene­
rating cargo, carriers can not provide a good regularity 
of sailings.
The regularity of cargo loading influences the parameters 
of the service configuration which is the ship's,speed, 
ship size, ship number and frequency in the service rou­
tes <6 ) .
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Schematic Representation of Factors Influencing on the Characteristics ofLiner Service in the Market
- Patronage of Shippers
- Marginal Cost is minimal
2.2.2 Stability
Another ingredient characteristic of liner service is 
stability. Liner service is of the nature that with a 
fixed schedule on particular geographic routes, a carrier 
has to deploy vessels regardless of the cargo availabili­
ty in the short-run.
Furthermore, the carriers in liner service should conduct 
huge investments to the route to build market networks 
which means that the fixed costs of liner services are 
inevitably higher than those of tramps. Thus this makes 
it difficult for the liner carrier to withdraw his ser­
vice from the routes.
Therefore liner carriers require the stability of the 
market so as to provide a better regularity of services. 
This is the reason for the introduction of conference 
system to secure the market stability through various 
tying devices.
One of the strong tying devices in conference systems is 
the dual rate tariff system. Despite the monopolistic 
nature of the dual rate in the conference system, the 
dual rate contract was accepted as legal(7) in the U.S.A. 
where the anti-trust spirit is deeply involved in the 
industries.The conclusionC8> of long controversy was that 
the dual rate contract is essential to the conference 
system. Without this tying device, the economices of 
ocean shipping will force lines into rate wars among 
themselves that might result in the destruction of commom 
ocean carriage.
This conclusion implies two dimensions of stability; 
first,market stability and secondly,freight stability.
From the shipper's point of view,stable freight rates are 
of greater concern than low freight rates with a great 
many fluctuations in the long-run. Shippers rely on the 
stability of conference rates<9) which enable them to 
calculate their production cost more accurately.
For the liner carriers, the freight have to be determi­
ned, in the sort-run, by the formula:
Freight rate CRevenue)= cost obsorbing point + reasonable 
profit + cost for stability.
In this formula,theoretically,the the cost for stability 
should be zero in the long run. Because, in order to keep 
relative stability of freight rate, its should be set 
higher as much as the amount of the cost for stability to 
compensate the negative figure of this cost later.
Especially, in the conference system, it takes long time 
to undertake General Rate Increase<GRI) which needs 
various time lags,such as the recognition lag, adminis­
tration lag and implementation lag. The stability of the 
freight in liner shipping can be identified in 
Table<l-3), compared with the tramp time charter rate.
Therefore,as shown in Figure(1-2),the stability of the 
liner service can be formulated by the supports from two 
angles,one the market stability from the carriers' stand 
point,and the other, freight stability from the shippers' 
stand point.
Table(1-3)
The Fluctuation of Liner Freight and Dry Cargo Tramp 
Time Charter Rate
A. Tendency of the Freight Rate Change
Liner freight Dry cargo tramp
rates time charter
(1965=100) (1968=100)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1972 1973 1974 1975
Jan. 131 134 171 201
Feb. 131 134 175 201
Mar. 131 135 179 203 . 79 175 307 159
April 132 136 183 203
May 132 138 185 203
June 132 137 187 203 82 212 322 94
July 131 139 189 205
Aug. 131 139 193 206
Sept. 131 142 194 207 95 267 251 109
Oct. 132 146 194 207
Nov. 132 145 196 207
Dec. 132 154 197 134 358 257 137
Monthly or quarterly Average
132 140 187 98 253 284 125
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E. Freight Rate Indices 1979-19S1
Liner freight Dry cargo tramp Dry cargo tramp 
rates time charter trip charter
C196B=100;) (1976=100) (July 1965-June
1966=100)
1979 1980 1981 1979 1980 1981 1979 1980 1981
Jan. 247 283 308 144 194 225
Feb. 250 284 312 138 254 264 146 210 220
Mar. 254 285 315 158 209 215
Apri 1 259 285 317 156 217 204
May 265 285 315 194 297 221 168 221 200
June 269 284 316 178 226 202
July 274 283 315 196 203 201
Aug . 277 285 315 206 252 174 190 207 177
Sept. 278 286 316 201 201 179
Oct. 277 287 316 203 204 177
Nov. 278 289 319 237 261 142 206 227 178
Dec. 276 292 317 203 241 169
Annual 267 286 315 194 266 200 179 213 195
average
***Source;p 38, Shipping Conference, Amos Herman, 
LL B., Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.
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2.3 The Relationship Between the Main Characteristics of 
Liner Cargo and Liner Services.
The afore mentioned characteristics of liner cargo such 
as,
a) high value; high financial cost for transit,
b) higher freight rate,
c) lower proportion of freight rate to the total price of 
the commodity,
d) low price elasticity of demand for shipping services,
e) bulker: lower density and
f) variety of cargo from various shippers at various 
ports
are creating what the characteristics of the liner ship- 
, ping should be. In other words, those characteristics of 
the liner cargo have deeply influenced the formation of 
the feature of liner shipping and they are involved in 
the evolution of the liner industry as shown in 
f igure(1-2)
The nature of high value cargo requires the the service 
with fast transit time. The characteristics of higher 
freight rates of liner cargo and the low price elasticity 
allows the cost for stability for stable freight rates in 
the market.
In addition to this freight stability from the viewpoint 
of demand side, market stability from the carrier's view 
point is also essential factor determining the characte­
ristics of liner services, because liner carriers have to 
invest in routes with high capital which requires relati­
vely lon'g-term payback period.
Furturemore, in the cost structure of , liner shipping, 
most of costs are fixed costs except few factors such as
cargo handling cost, which means that greater concerns of 
liner carriers lie in the stable market, in which reaso­
nable load factor is guaranteed to cover the fixed costs, 
rather than in the speculative market.
The characteristics of cargo, e), and f) mentioned above, 
require the regularity of liner shipping with a certain 
frequency and scheduling to the various ports offering a 
set of stable tariff rates to the various shippers. 
Furthermore, those characteristics have deeply played a 
part in the advent of a series of innovations in liner 
shipping, which are discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3. HISTORICAL APPORACH OF INNOVATIONS IN LINER 
SHIPPING
The growing demand of the industrialized world for trans­
portation of manufactured goods in international trade 
motivated the specialization of shipping into the form of 
tramp shipping for raw materials and liner shipping for 
manufacured general cargo and passangers.
The specialization in liner shipping had been continued 
by introducing passanger ships through a division of the 
liner shipping market into two segments: 1) passanger and 
mail transport and 2) cargo transport.
The introduction of passanger ships on the North Atantic 
in the second half of the 19th century was based on its 
segment of markets, with the background of the rapidly 
increasing emigration. Up to the mid 1920's, two passang— 
er categories, with separate demands for transport servi­
ces, could be found on the North Atlantic, cabin passang­
ers and steerage passengersdO) .
However, my disussion in this paper excludes the passang— 
er liner shipping.
In the development of liner shipping, a series of innova­
tions have been introduced and the more interesting fact 
is that the characteristics of cargo and liner shipping 
have deeply inspired in the introduction of innovations 
and each of the innovations has influenced the economic 
changes leading to another innovation and so on, conti­
nuous 1 y.
Generally speaking, there has been a tendency towards 
innovations whose nature were rather hardware-oriented at 
the incipient stage and software-oriented later, in the
evolution of liner shipping.
In other words, innovations in the early years were focu­
sed on the tools of the shipping service such as vessels, 
propulsion devices and so on, but, with the passage of 
time, new developments of operational concepts have beco­
me more oriented towards software.
3.1 Hardware-Oriented Innovations
As afore mentioned, the innovations of liner shipping in 
the embryonic stage had take?n place in the ship itself 
because the major tool producing services, the space and 
time utility, in shipping is the'vessel itself.
The first important hardware-oriented innovation was the 
introduction of steamers(11) which improved the service 
to meet the customer's primary needs such as,
1 increased security,
2) less dependency on the weather,
3) shorter transport time,
4) better regularity and
5) increased ship size.
Those are the-fundamantal factors formulating the charac­
teristics of liner shiping in terms of regularity, fre­
quency and reliability of scheduling.
The propulsion devices were the second important techni­
cal innovation, with the advancement of technology, whe­
reby annual plans could be established, and a fixed sche­
dule ecuId be kept.
Deakin and Seward (12) stated that it took a sailing boat 
an average of 60 to 65 days to get from the U.K. to Aus-
tralia. This voyage was shortened by about 15 days bet­
ween 1873 and 1897 with the steamship.
These innovations, however, made liner shipping able to 
improve better regularity in service, but caused to two 
economic changes.
a) Liner shipping became a very capital intensive 
industry not only because, of the high prices of 
steamships but also because the carrier began to 
invest in the routes to establish a international 
marketing network.
b) The trade routes became oyertonnaged. The immediate 
reactions of the shipowners were to lower their 
rates in order to attract customers. This caused a 
chain of reaction.The cut-throat competition was 
very fierce almost murderous.(13) Thus, as a 
result, the innovations for improving the regularity 
jeopadized the stability of liner shipping.
Eventually, these two economic changes caused the intro­
duction of the conference system.(14) The first gathe­
ring took place on the U.K.-Calcutta route in 1875, where 
a few competing shipowners decided to cooperate. They 
established a uniform tariff that secured them reasonable 
profits and allotted sailings for each vessel.(15) 
Currently, there are about 350 conferences operating in 
ocean transportation.(16)
However, through the hardware-oriented innovations, the 
foundation of liner services to meet the customer's pri­
mary needs was accomplished.
3.2 Software-Oriented Innovations
3.2.1 The conference system.
Shipping conference is an nonincorporated association of
mutually competitive liner operators, maintained for the 
purpose of a) controlling competition among its members 
and b) strengthening the members, through co-operative 
action,in their competitive fight against non member 
carriers.(17)
There are two different types of conferences, one is the 
closed conference and the other the open conference. The 
farmer is illegal in the United States; rationalization 
of services in a conference system is not illigal, but it 
requires approval by the Federal Maritime Commission.(18) 
However, there have been many controversies regarding the 
monopolistic behaviour of the conference system. 
The direction of the debate in the United States has 
focused much more on what kinds of conference agreements 
produce the most efficient liner services,as they are 
desirable not only for shipowners but also for shippers. 
This is a rather theoretical approach based on the anti—  
trust philosophy.
My discussion in this subject does not need to go into in 
depth ooncerning the controversies, but it is necessary 
to identify the relationship between the characteristics 
of the conference system and liner shipping.
From the above mentined definition of the shipping con­
ference, the three major pillars of a conference system 
such as the tariff system, the pooling system and tying 
devices can be derived.
As seen in figur (1-2), the stability of the liner ship­
ping consists of market stability and freight stability. 
The former is very much important to the shipower when 
there is severe competition. In the conference system the
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tying devices are the cure of it. The latter is the inte­
rest of the shipper as was discussed in the previous 
chapter. The freight stability is secured by the tariff 
system.
In this point, two questions are raised;
alls the cost for freight stability in the conference 
tariff■system worth while to pay?from freight stability 
point of view.
blCan the system maximise efficiency despite the mono­
polistic nature of tying devices? from market stability 
point of view.
Regarding the first question, I have discussed in terms 
of the cost stability in the previous chapter. My conclu­
sion was that, as far as inherent characteristics of 
liner cargo require freight stability, it is worth while. 
This does not mean that the conference tariff rates are 
reasonably priced. It is a different question.
According to the theory of efficency, whenever monopolism 
exists in a market, it may distort the allocative effi­
ciency. The barrier of entry does not allow the free flow 
of the capital and manpower, to the market, hence monopo­
ly power may achieve monopoly profits.
However, in the reality of the liner shipping market, the 
conferences do not seem to interfere with the free-flow 
of resources and distort the allocative efficiency, Mr. 
Gunnr K.Sletmo and Etnsest W. Williams, Jr. made observa­
tion and ooncluded as follow;(191
"------It is because of these problems of resource allo­
cation in the real world that we have given so much 
attention to the market structure of the liner industry 
and to the constraints that limit the conferences' free-
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dom to use whatever market power they possess. We were, 
indeed, looking for signs that conferences have been able 
to frustrate the functioning of the market for ocean 
transportation of general cargo. Our previous conclusions 
can now be restated by saying that we have found that 
conferences are not capable of interfering with the allo­
cative efficiency.”
This conclusion is supported by the 'study prepared by 
Standard and Poor's Corporation and submitted to the 
Joint Economic Comittee of the ,US congress.
This study gives various profit rates for U.S. liner 
shipping as compared to other-industries for the years 
from 1956 to 1962C2D). The return on capital equity in 
the liner industry averages 7 percent as opposed to 11 
percent for all other industries. This means that the 
monopolistic profits do not exist in liner shipping.
Mr. B.M. Deakin provides intersting figures for the rate 
of return on capital employed in the Europe-Autralia con­
ference group(;21). The data shows a comparatively low 
percentage of rate return ranging from a low of 3 percent 
and a high of 8.6 percent which signifies that conferen­
ces do not make monopolistic profits. The similar conclu­
sions are seen in the so-called Rochdale Repport:
------During the course of our inquiry--- conferences
have been so organised as to give to shippers services 
which are, and can be seen to be, reasonably priced and 
generally efficient.(22)
However, the conference system in liner shipping has not 
distorted the ” allocative efficency” but played a vital 
role in achieving both market stability and freight sta­
bility in liner markets.
3.2.2 The Containerisation
The second important software-oriented innovation in 
liner shipping is the containerisation. In the process of 
containerisation, the physical essence includes the fol­
lowing elements sudch as,
1) container boxes,
2) container ships,
3) handling equipment,
4) special container terminals and assembly 
depots and
5) inland transportation means.
Despite the physical development, containerisation is 
categorised as a software-oribnted innovation. Because 
the advent of containerisation does not merely refer to 
an innovation of a container box itself but more impor­
tantly the revolution of the operational systems in the 
flow of the cargo as a whole.
The large containerships produced a “ tidal wave " effect 
of landing large numbers of containers in a short period, 
which led to a " tidal wave " effect of a physical inno­
vation of container boxes toward the operations! revolu­
tion such as,"through transport concept" together with 
computer technology development.
The organisations in the transport process were logically 
linked to other functions in the distribution chains bet­
ween sea legs and inland transportation with a different 
transport mode mix.
Containerisation also has a close relationship with the 
characteristics of liner cargo. Liner cargo are bulkier 
with lower density and thousands of commodities from 
various shippers are loaded and discharged in various 
ports. Because of these characteristics, the shipowners
have been very much barred from the wav of obtaining 
ef f iciency.
In other words, such characteristics of liner cargo 
distorted the technical efficency and dynamic efficiency 
of the economy, even in the severe competitive market.
In the deep sea liner shipping, in order to obtain higher 
efficiency, the size and speed of ships have to be 
increased. But in reality, it is not practicable, becau­
se, due to the nature of cargo being heterogeneous, port 
days are inevitably long which means that sea days, the 
period to produce time and space utility, are relatively 
short. The more the size and speed of ships are increa­
sed, the shorter the sea days become.
In the cost structure of liner shipping, most of the 
voyage cost is the fixed cost. Therefore, without obtai­
ning a fast turn round, liner shipping can not enjoy the 
economies of scale.
This implies that the characteristics of liner cargo have 
constrained the benefits of the economies of scale. Con­
tainerization changed that and gave the liner shipping 
the chance to benefit from economies of scale to the 
extent that it secured the vital break through.
Table(l-41 shows the significance of the economies of 
scale in containerization with the comparison between a 
break-bulk cargo liner of the mid sixties and a second 
generation containership a mere seven years later.(23)
Through the containerization, liner shipping could rea­
lize the technical and dynamic efficiency of the ecomony. 
The core of containerization is the .unification of the 
heterogeneous cargo to homogeneous cargo. Thus contai-
nerization succeeded the change of the characteristics of 
liner cargo and made the benefit out of it through the 
introduction of intermodalism and door-to-door service 
concept.
Tabled-^)
Containership and Break-bulk Cargo Liner Comparison
B/B cargo liner 
(Antenor class) 
1950-60 '
Capacity
length A91'5”
Balecapacity of cargo 13,687 
{'.tons of 40 cu ft)
HP 8,000
Service speed 16 1/4
Appr.round voyage pa 2.7
Annual capacity 74,000
(tons of 40 cu ft)
Handling Characteristics 11,000
Appr.f reight Cl)tons
carried
Tons handled per 1,000
working daysC2)
Discharging days 14
Loading days 14 28
containership 
(Liverpool Bay) 
1972
950'
60,000
(2,450 TEU) 
81,132 
26
5.4 
648,000 
27,000(TEU) 
57,000
19,000
o
3 6
1) freight ton = tons of 40 cu ft
2) excluding steaming days
***Source:p.18,Containerization in the Eighties,Lloyd's 
of London Press Ltd. M.G.Graham D.O.Hughes
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The? discussion regarding the result cf the conference 
system and containerization is oontinued in the following 
chapter, however, we oan derive,from the above discus­
sion, the conclusion that the hardware-oriented innova­
tions in the early days played a vital role to meet the 
primary needs of cargo owners through the accomplishment 
of the fundamental function of liner shipping as regula­
rity and stability, while the software-oriented innova­
tions have concentrated to improve efficiency and produc­
tivity in liner shipping service through better regulari­
ty and stability. In addition to this, we can find that 
the characteristics of liner cargo have been deeply 
involved in the advent of innovations.
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Chapter 4. THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM AND 
CONTAINERIZATION
We have briefly reviewed major events in the liner market 
and discussed the relationship between the caracteristics 
of liner cargo and shipping and its interaction with 
various innovations so far.
However, it is necessary to discuss the question, "What 
are the results of the conference system and containeri­
zation ? " because this topic is very close to our main 
discussion, the RTW as an innovation in liner shipping. 
Furthermore it highlights current market conditions moti­
vating the advent of the RTW.
In the discussion of this question, the range of events 
and factors is much broader than the phrase covers in its 
literal acceptance. Therefore, most dominating events and 
factors are included in my consideration.
4.1 The Results of the Conference System
4.1.1 The erosion of the market power of conferences
Before containerization, in the liner market, shippers 
had relied on the stable tariff of conference system and 
conferences with its self-regulatory scheme. They were 
dominant the liner routes.
However, with the maturity of containerization, 
conferences were faced with a gradual erosion of the 
market power.
Table(l-5) shows the tendency of market shares between 
conferences and outsiders at the early stage of containe­
rization in 1972 and in 1983 in several routes<24).
This table raises a question why the market power of con­
ferences has become weaker.
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Table. Cl“5!>
The Strength of Outsider -in 1972 and in 1983
A X 
1 X 
B X
1983 
28 X 
23 X
Europe--  Far East Trade.
1972:Only Seatrain and USL by transhipment an Marchessini 
(conventional).Also Russians and East Germans not 
very regularly.
TSR just beginning.
Outsider percentage of total;
Overall, Europe, both ways 
U.K. East 
West
1983:Evergreen, Balt-Orient, YangMing, Norasia,COSCO, 
Sammi and TSR-all are important, 
outsider percentage of total
1982
West 22 X
East 17 X
U.K-ANZ Trade ( South Bound )
1972:Virtually nil outsiders-only POL, not very strong in 
U.K.
1983:ABC, Zim, Eagle & NVOs all prominent.
Outsider percentage total;
1982
U.K-Australia 12 X
U.K-NZ B X
U.K-South Africa
1972:0nly 2 outsiders, both Greek; Hellenic & Meandos.
Their percentage of trade;1-2 X 
1982;Major outsiders:
Africa Europe Shipping Line (AESL)-- Dutch
Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC)-- Geneva Maritime
Container Service (MACS)-- Germany
1983 
IB X 
B X
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Cape Lines / Prodos Maritime Carriers -B. African Their 
Percentage cf trade : 15 % 
irregular U.K.-Middle East Gulf
1972:0nly one outsider had much of an interest in U.K: 
U.K-Middle East Line (Lebance controlled;). 
19S3:0utsiders are very strong sea-land Merzario / NCHP, 
Scancarriers,Norasia, Foss, Hellenic, PNSC, et 
al.Their percentage of trade : 45 %
*¥■* This table refers to the four major trade routes of 
Overseas Container Line.
V
***Sou.rce; p. 41 , M.G. Graham, D.O. Hughes, Containerisation 
in the Eighties.
Major constraints on the exercise of economic power by 
conferences in general and on open conferences in parti­
cular were studied by Daniel Marx, Jr. as follows: 
a)Intraconference competition;
bi'Aotual or potential competition from other lines, which 
perhaps did not intend to join the conference; 
c)Alternative sources of supply or markets; 
d!)Actual or potential competition from tramps; 
e!)The bargaining strength of shippers; and 
f ;) Government regulation or intervention (25 .
In addition to these important factors constraining the 
monopoly power of conferences, my approach has a diffe­
rent angle concentrating on the conference system itself 
which has inherent deficiencies causing adverse effects 
toward its objecetives.
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l)The tariff system as an inherent deficiency.
As menticned earlier,the three main pillars of conference 
systems are the tariff system^- the pooling system and 
tying devices. In the conference tariff system,the 
freight rate structure has inherently cross subsidisation 
among commodities with different value, which is a very 
unique price policy of the liner market. Here, we need to 
discuss further in depth regarding the conference tariff 
system.
In order to minimize the " deadweight-loss triangle " 
shown in Figure(l-S),al1 prices are set equal to the mar­
ginal cost and average cost.
Nevertheless in reality, the conference tariff is imprac­
tical to set freight rates at one price level for various 
valued commodities,because freight rates should vary : 
high value cargo, which has a low price elasticity, for 
high freight rates and low value cargo for low freight 
rates. This means, in other words as shown in the Figure 
(1—A),that cross subsidization from commodity group A to 
commodity group B is undertaken .
This price differentiation is an economic justification, 
for charging- what the market will bear, ,minimizing the 
distortion in resource allocation. Thus the value of the 
tariff structure is often favorably regarded because it 
makes liner service available for low-value commodities 
in the liner routes in less than the average cost P shown 
in the Figured-A).
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■>c
Figue<l-3) 
Monoploy Distortion
P
At the competitive level I, each similar consumer enjoy 
Marshallian consumer's surplus given by the whole triang­
ular area NIR. When monopoly raises P to the maximum pro­
fit point G, the consumer loses to the monopolist that 
part of the consumer's surplus measured by profit rec­
tangle NEGN' and is left only with the consumer's surplus 
triangle N'GR. At the same time, triangular area EIG is 
lost to everybody, both consumers and monopolists.
Thus consumers lose more than the monopolists profits. 
The triangular EGI represents " Deadweight loss " which 
is of no benefit whatsoever to anybody due to the devil 
of inefficiency.
*** source; p 486, Economics, Paul A. Samuelson McGRAN.- 
Hill, International Book Company
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Figure(l-4) 
Differential Rate
*** source :The lecture of Dooter Hans Ludwig Beth, 
at the World Maritime University
A1
The incidence of the price differentiation is well 
i1luslustrated in the study of Gunnar K. Sletmo and 
Ernest W. Williams,Jr.(26) The study stressed that trans­
portation permits producers to take advantage of these 
price differentials and in such instances, but rather an 
integral part of the total value added to the product on 
the way to its final destination^
Certainly, this incidence enlarges liner trade to a cer­
tain extent, and with this incident, liner service takes 
more the benefit of economies of scale, which may result 
in the average cost down accordingly.
Therefore, the conference tariff system should be kept 
according to theoretical and practical reasons as mentio­
ned above. In the meantime this gives outsiders the 
opportunity to cream the market, concentrate on the high 
paying cargo,so that even with rates well below those of 
the conference.
This can be explained in figure.(1-4)
If other factors are equal between conference line and 
outsiders and assuming that the conference tariff is set 
in which the average cost is fixed at the freight rate 
level P,the outsider's price policy to cream the market 
concentrates on commodity group A.
Certainly, this allows outsiders to earn high profits 
even with lower freight rates to attract high paying car­
go by often using the " Box rate " system. This affected 
most of the conferences to take countermeasures such as, 
narrowing the range of freight rate bands and restructu­
ring its tariffs which may create a negative effect on 
the justification of the price differentiation discussed 
earlier. However, we can identify that the conference 
tariff system has an inherent deficiency in competition 
with outsiders.
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2)." Decision Making " in conference system.
Another important inherent defioiency in the conference 
system should be discussed in terms of "Decision Making 
The conference is a self-regulatory body in order to 
exclude unnecessary competition among member lines and to 
protect their interests from outsiders.
Accordingly, in order to obtain their objectives, they 
have to consult or negotiate in a decision making process 
where it inevitably takes time to arrive to a common 
agreement.
As an example, if we discuss th?e procedure for GRI it 
takes at least several months while outsiders may make 
the decision in a short period.
The reason can be clear through the following descussion. 
Liner freight rates are administrated rates. The admi­
nistrative actions conduce toward stability of rates 
which give the reason for justification of conference 
systems as discussed earlier. The conference procedure 
for varying rates consists of three important time lags; 
the recognition lag, the administrative lag and the imp­
lementation lag(27).
The recognition lag occurs because it takes time for cost 
changes to be noted and their effects on overall profita­
bility. The administrative lag takes place inevitably 
because the decision can not be undertaken by one member 
of conference. There are various member companies whose 
cost-absorbing points are different(28).
Each member line differs in cost structure from any other 
members which implies that the response of cost change is 
quite different from one to another.The member line whose 
cost-absorbing point is the highest may start to raise 
the question of GRI and a member line whose cost-absor-
A3
bing point is low enough to still make a profit may be 
reluctant to begin the discussion. This would normally be 
brought before a regular meeting, either of the whole 
conference or of the rate committee. It takes longer 
time to arrive at a conclusion of GRI, especially when 
the market is under severe competition and outsiders are 
strong.
Lastly, the implementation period is inevitable, before 
GRI comes into force. During this period, the oonference 
announces advance notice, which varies among different 
oonferences,30 days, 60 days or 90 days, and they 
sometimes consults with shippers.
Therefore, to make a dedcision of GRI, it takes much 
longer time. This is only one example of how the confe­
rence system has a lack of flexibility and adaptability 
to the change of the market condition.
Taking into account the definition of innovation and the 
idea of entrepreneurship as we discussed earlier,it is 
not a coincidence that the containerization was intro­
duced by an independent, Sea-Land.
Therefore, we can conclude that the conference system 
itself has inherent deficiencies and the objective of the 
conference system to monopolize the market and to exclude 
competition from outsider has been deteriorated by the 
nature of the conference system itself as a paradox.
Table (1-6) shows the outsiders market penetration into 
the main routes.Almost 50 percent of the market share was 
penetrated by outsiders in the main stream trade, trans­
pacific, Far East-Europe and Transatlantic. This possibi­
lity of being deteriorated can be more clearly identified 
with the discussion of indepentent activites.
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Table (1-6)
Non-conference Penetration Report on Main Routes
•1980(a)
Transpacific 30(b)
Far East-Europe 19(c)
Transatlantic 28(d)
Europe-Australasia 10
Far East-Australia -
Europe-South & 3
East Africa
1983 
35—50(e) 
30-AD(f) 
50(g) 
20(h)
30 ( i ) 
very low
*** Source
a) Maritime transport center, the competitive Dynamics of 
Container shipping, 1983.
b) Until March 1980: after that many lines left the confe­
rence, and the outsider's share rose to about A8 per­
cent for a short period.
c) Excluding the Mediterranean.
d) US East Coast and Canada
e) Mitui OSK market research department, reported in Sea- 
trade, July 1983, and Containerisation International, 
October 1983.
f) Seatrade, September 1983,reported 30-40 per cent outsi­
der penetrcition. Containerisation International, May 
1983,reported 30-35 per cent.
g) Containerisation, June 1983; including Canadian 
gateway.
h) Transport Journal, February 27,1983, and Lloyd's Ship­
ping Economist, March 1983.
i) Seatrade, May 1983, The figures of course, vary conti­
nually with registrations and rejoining of conferences 
by insiders as well as the movements of outsiders.
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4.1 Independents' activites
The definition of the word Independent is somewhat dif­
ferent from that of an outsider and a newcomer to the 
market.The essential charaoteristics of an indepentent is 
that they act independently. They are often newcomers and 
outsiders, but not-exclusively so. The independents have 
single "decision making entity" hence they can expand 
their fleet whenever they want to. Very often, develop­
ment of the ship teohnology favors the newcomers more and 
sometimes this encourages the outsiders to enjoy creaming 
the market as mentioned earlier. The most striking featu­
re of recent Independents' activities is that they are 
the expansionists.
Under the conference system, it is difficult for the mem­
ber liners to justify such an expansion. In the liner 
market, most of the major newcomers emerged in 1970s, 
after the introduction of containerisation and expand 
their fleets very fast.
TableCl-7!) shows that most of top rankers are indepen­
dents and they ordered newbuildings more than 10,000 TEU 
slots by January 1987.
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Top 20 Container Service Operators on the Basis 
of Projepcted Total TEU Slots in Service 
by January 1987
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4 • 2 The Result of Containerization
As I mentioned earlier, the topic of the result of 
containerization is so broad to cover in this paper that 
my discussion will only be concentrated on the points 
which are the striking factors.
4.2.1 Severe competition
Containerization caused a cut-throat competition and has 
resulted in oversupply of liner services.
As we discussed earlier, containerization gave liner car­
rier the chance to paticipate in experiencing the advan­
tage of economies of scale which is illustrated in 
Table.(l-4>. This drastic improvement in productivity led 
to a overtonnage situation in the liner market because 
new tonnage of container vessels of larger size with 
faster speed were simply added to the existing tonnage 
and, furthermore, they were very efficient in cargo hand­
ling with larger capacity. The severity of competition 
was very similar to that of the period when the steamer 
was introduced into the liner market.
Another factor causing severe competition is that, 
through containerization, the barriers of entry to the 
market have been lowered.
There are six major sources of barriers of entry; <29;> 
aleconomies of scale,
b) product differentiation,
c) capital requirement, 
dlswitching cost,(30)
e) access to distribution channels and
f) cost disadvatages independent of scale.(31)
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At the incipient stage of containerization, it seemed 
that since container liner services required huge capital 
investments and vertical integration with inland infra 
stractures.the barriers of entry might become higher and 
the market would be monopolized.
However, containerization is not a high technology revo­
lution. The imitators followed it and in a short period 
it was readily available to everyone. Boon after, char­
tering container vessels and leasing container bones 
became very common in the market. The banker's role in 
financing the aquisition of vessels lowered the entry to 
the market.
None of the above sources can be-significant sources of 
barriers of entry to the liner market.
On the other hand, exit barriers are still high because 
of the nature of liner services. Therefore, profitability 
has inevitably been deteriorated by the competition as 
can be explained in Figure <1-5) by taking the simpli­
fied cases in which exit and entry barriers vary and its 
influence on profitability. In the table, we can identfy 
the worst case is the one in which the entry barrier is 
low and the exit barrier is high.
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Figure? Cl-5) 
Barriers and Profitability
Exit Barriers 
Low High
Low
Entry Barriers
High
Low, stable 
returns
Low, risky 
returns
High, stable 
returns'
High, risky 
returns
***Bource;Competitive Strategy, Techniques for Analysing 
Industries and Competitiors Michael E.Poter.
p . 22
The Free Frees, A Division of MacMillan Publi­
shing CO., Inc
A.2.2 Change of the cost structure.
As shown in Table(1-8),the cost structure of celluar con­
tainer ships is different from that of conventional ships 
especially in capital cost, fuel cost and cargo handling 
cost. Those three cost factors are decisive to determine 
the carrier's competitiveness. Thus continuous technical 
innovations have been introduced, particularly for saving 
fuel consumption and scale of the ship in order to mini­
mize the capital and fuel cost per slot. This has been 
more accelerated because containerization break off the 
barrier to draw the advantages of the economy of scale.
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Table Cl-g)
Cost Structure of Liner in 1975
CPer ton carried cargo, in percentage)
Cost items Vessel type
Conventional Cellulra
12,500 dwt 750 1750 2500
TEU TEU TEU
A B A B A B A B
Capital(ship) 16 34 24 29 25 29 25 28
Capital(container) 0 0 •1,0 12 12 14 14 15
crew 4 8 4- 5 '2 2 •F",
provisions 0 0 O' 0 0 0 0 0
M a R 1 3 •^ 1 2 *!> 2 'T*'.4a.. 2
Insurance 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Residual 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel 6 20 5 32 13 30 12 30
Port charge 4 14 5 14 6 14 6
Cargo handling 65 26 28 11 28 12 27 13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
A. Li.K.-U.S.
B. U.K.-Japan
***Source;Laing, E.T.,1975. Containers and their 
competitors, Liverpool.
4.2.3 Differentiation
In the marketing of consumer products, the most decisive 
factor to create consumer preference is product differen­
tiation.
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In the traditional liner service, each carrier had 
different ways of stowing, cargo handling and so on, and 
the trade routes also had different characteristics with 
different cargoes and volumes. Thus even in a single 
geographidcal route, there have been different 
conferences in each direction.
However,containerization changed the situation. The core 
of containerization is the unification of cargoes, from 
heterogeneous cargo to homogeneous cargo. Thus containe­
rization has evolved to such'a degree that the signifi­
cance of an individual liner service has lost its impor­
tance, because all cargoes are carried in much the same 
way; boxes are identical and handling facilities and sto­
wing methods are similar.
Therefore, competition based on quality of service has 
also lost its significance as a dominent factor which 
means that product differentiation has diminished in its 
significance. As being discussed previously, this also 
influenced on lowering entry to the market.
The more important fact is that conatainerization resul­
ted in diminishing not only the significance of product 
differentiation of individal carriers but also the diffe­
rences among the routes.
On traditional conference routes, due to the hetero­
geneous characteristics of cargoes, liner services should 
adapt to the market using different ways of stowage and 
cargo handling with the deployment of different types of 
ships.
But nowadays, after containerization, everything is homo­
geneous except the size of container vessels which are 
mainly determined based on the distance of route and car­
go availability.
B2
Chapter 5.THE ADVENT OF THE RTW CONCEPT AS AN INNOVATION
In the previous chapter, we have observed the result of 
conference systems and containerisation, whereby we could 
identify the reasons why conferences are becoming weaker 
and essential factors which resulted in changes of the 
whole liner market scene.
The task of this chapter, as a conclusion of the part 1, 
is to identify the significance of the RTW concept and 
the reasons why it is defined 'as an innovation; a soft­
ware-oriented innovation.
One of the major container shipping "events" of these 
years is the inauguration of the Round-the-World service 
initiated by independents again<32;) ; Malcon Mclean of the 
US Line and Evergreen Line.
This RTW concept catered for many counter arguments in 
various directions as did the emergence of containeriza­
tion at first.
One claims that the RTW service may just be a device to 
pre-empt further competition from established carriers. 
Another raised the question "Is the RTW service purely 
and simply a marketing 'gimmick'?".
And it was ccnsidered that the RTW service may just be a 
consequence of ship ordering prgrammes of other carriers.
Nevertheless, the RTW concept has came into reality and 
the liner market has entered a new era.
No one would dare to predict whether the RTW strategy of 
a certain liner carrier will succeed or not. It purely 
depends on the individual business firm, because it is 
business strategy.
Therefore, apart from the above question, accepting the
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RTW service as a reality of an economic phenomenon in the 
liner shipping market, my disscussion is rather based on 
the theoretical approach.
5.1 Economic Environment of the Liner Market
As we discussed in the first chapter, the innovation has 
an important influence on the mechanism of economic 
change. However it exists in the economio environment, 
therefore, before going to the topic of the RTW concept, 
we need to review the current aspect of the world contai­
ner liner market.
5.1.1 Chronic recession
The current world container liner market is very often 
referred to as a chronic recession.
The major reasons can be identified in following discus­
sion .
11 Overtonnage
Recently the gap between supply and demand of container 
services has widened rapidly. The analysis was conducted 
by the Economist Inteligence Unit Limited CSS) based on 
the OECD statistics regarding exports and imports of 
manufactured goods.
The OECD statistics(34) summerized the overall average 
growth rate of cargo volume for the main area in which 
container traffic is generated.
Table(1-9) shows the average growth rates per annum 
during 1980-85: intra-OECD area 3.5% , Developing coun­
tries ( imports only) 1.5% and OPEC(imports only) 5.5%. 
Taking into account the level of further penetration of 
containerization in each trade, the study concluded a 
"best estimate" of about 6% for container traffic growth 
between 1980 and 1985.
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A similar study,entitled "Global outlook for oontainer 
trade" by the US oonsu.ltants Temple, Barler & Sloane, 
examined the estimated future oargo growth rates in the 
world's seven largest oontainer trades. These are summe— 
rized in Tabled—10) and the oonolusion of the study is 
that taking all seven trades together, the average growth 
rate in container cargo is put at A.6% during 1983-90.
Table Cl-9)
Average Growth in Trade ' in 
C.1980-85) (percent annum) 
Intra-OECD (imports & exports) 
Developing Countries (imports) 
OPEC (imports)
Manufactured
3.5
1.5
5.5
Goods
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1983.
Table (1-10)
Projected Average Annual Percentage Growth of Container 
Cargo in the World's Seven Largest Trade Routes During 
1983-90
East bound/ West bound/
South bound North bound
North America/Far East 6.5
North America/Europe 2.0
North America/Mid-East 1.5
Europe/Far East A.O
Europe/Mid-East 1.5
Europe/Australasia 2.0
5.5
5.5
4.0
1.8
Far East/Mid-East 3.0
***Note: overall average rate 4.6%
***Source; Temple, Barker & Sloane Inc.
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The study of the Economist Intelligent Unit Limited esti­
mated the supply-demand gap up to 52% oversupply by 1985, 
shown in Table<1-11).
Table <1-11)
Estimated
Shipping
Surplus Capacity in Deep-Sea Container
1 Traffic 2 Fleet 3 Surplus Capacity
index, .index , 2+1
1980=100 1980=100<a) , <96)
1980 100 110 10
1982 114 142 23
1985 133 202 52
3. AEsuming 10 per cent surplus capacity in 1980.
***Source;P.22. Container, Conference and Competition. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit limited.
2) The structural friction
<a) Shipbuilding market: Supply side of the ships
In the cyclical concept, when the shipping market is 
overtonnaged, the shipbuilding market is led to a period 
of low newbuilding activity until growth in cargo demand 
catches up with tonnage supply. This means, in other 
words, the shipbuilding market is very closely related to 
the shipping market and these two different markets 
affect each other directly.
Each of the markets has its own price mechanism regula­
ting the market to lead the balance' point into equili­
brium of supply and demand.
However in reality, the function of this invisible hand
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is distorted by other forces such as, governmental sub­
sidies, aspiration of national shipping, softened bank 
financing and so on.
Coupled with these forces,the rapid development of ship 
technology has also added the same effect. The new ship 
with the new technololgy has always been attractive to 
shipowners and has given them advantages in competiti­
veness .
If the price is going down, the supply should be dimini­
shed, but this simple supply theory is not applied in the 
shipbuilding market.
Table (1-12) and (1-13) show that the trends of prices of 
container ships decreased rapidly after 1980. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, more tonnage was 
increased in the same period. There are many arguments 
why the price mechanism is distorted in the shipbuilding 
market and why governments give subsidies to ship yards. 
The reasons are generally accepted as that, since the 
shipbuilding industry is labor intensive, many developing 
countries have entered the market and for the developed 
countries, because of its significance in economic effect 
as well as social impact, they are obliged to subsidize.
(b) Shipping market; Demand side of the ships
The container shipping market is in the same situation in 
which the price mechanism has lost its function.
Even with a low freight level due to the overtonnaged 
market, the supply has continuously increased as we dis­
cussed earlier.
Therefore the linkage controled by the price mechanism 
between the shipbuilding market and the shipping market 
was broken and caused a structural friction between the
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two markets, whereby the shipping market has been led to 
chronic recession.
5.1.2 The ship technology development together with the 
results of the conference system and containerisation
The ship technology development, coupled with the results 
of the conference system and containerisation, is also an 
important factor leading the market to chronic recession. 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, containerisation 
broke off the characteristics of liner cargo being hete­
rogeneous, thus liner shipping could take the advantage 
of economies of scale. This spurs the ship technology to 
be developed in various directions towards, such as the 
ship's scale, propulsion devices and so on.
The ship's scale reached the fourth generation. As can 
be seen in TableCl-141,the fourth generation of US Line, 
ship with a capacity of 4,500TEU, has almost the same 
scale up to the Panama limit with lengthCbp) x beam x 
depth; 279 x 32.2 x 21.5, as the third generation 
Hapag-Lloyd ship with 271 x 32.2 x 24.0, built in 1981. 
However, the capacity was jumboired up to one and half 
time, while engine bhp became half.
Professor Kept. E.Mangles pointed out the main feature of 
US Line ships as being a cigar type rectangular which 
makes it possible to drastically improve in capacity with 
the same scale, in his lecture at the World Maritime Uni­
versity.
The recent trend of jumboisation was studied by the Con­
tainer Insight,titled "World Container Data";An assess­
ment of the mainstream market, 1976-87 with a forecast up 
to 2001 as shown in Table.(1-15)
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Table (1-16) show us the ship's major operators and their 
jumbos up to 2,BOOTED and above.
Table Cl-12:)
Estimated Container Ship Construction Prices
1,200 TED Ca!) 1,600 TED
pound mn UB$ equivalent US$
1968 4.0 9.6
1969 4.4 10.5
1970 5.0 12.0
1971 6.8 16.7
1972 8,2 20.5
1973 10.0 24.5
1974 22,0 51 .5
1975 25.0 55.5
1976 26.0 46.8
1977 27.5 48.1
1978 28.2 54.1
1979 28.7 60.8 28.0
1980 29.2 68.0 31 .5
1981 30.1 61.1 35.8
1982 30.2 Cc!) 52.9 34.5
1983 — — 28.0
a)Fairplay.
blLloyd's shipping Economist. 
clFirst half 1982.
***Source:The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Con­
tainers, Conferences and Competition, May 1984.
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Table (1—13)
Recent Report Prices for Container ship
Year of delivery Company Ships Price Price
per per
ship TEU
1982-83 UAAC(Kuwait) 9x1,846 42 23
1982-83 APL 3x2,500 58(a) 23
1982-83 Yangming '4x1,845 30 16
1983 ABC 2x1,900 34 18
1983 NSC(Saudi Arabia) 4x2,025 63 31
1983-84 Barber 2x2,400 67 28
1983-84 ACL 5x2,300 53
1983-84 Evergreen 16x2,240 30 13
1984-85 US Lines 12x4,200 48 11
a)Price paid by APL, excluding construction differential
subsidy.
Prices are reported by companies to the shipping press.
***Source:p.48-49 Container, Conferences and Competition, 
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited,
May 1984.
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Table (1-14>
Main Features of Selected Jumbo Container Ships
Carrier Ship
TEU
Year Tons 
built dwt
Length(bp)xbeam 
xdepth
Engine Service 
bhp speed
US Lines 4A82 1984 58870 279x32.2x21.5 28,000 18.5
Maersk 3386 1984 53400 259.3x32.2x19.8 47,500 24.3
Hapag- 3045 1981 51540 271.0x32.2x24.0 65,680 24.0
Lioyd '
APL 2750 1982 30825 246.9x32.2x20.1 432,000 24.4
Yangming 3050 1986 39000 252.6x32.2x19.7 26,330 21.5
NOL 2970 1985 45000 244.0x32.2x21.4 315,000 21.7
OOCL 2900 1985 40560 227.0x32.2x21.1 29,610 22.0
Evergreen2928 1986 46580 225.0x32.2x19.2 25,760 20.4
Line
LykesLine2600 1986 33360 245.0x32.2x18.8 28,800 21.0
Hanjin 2480 1986 36000 224.0x32.2x19.0 30,000 22.0
Line
Sea-Land 2472 1985 34400 258.2x30.6x17.5 30,150 22.0
Service (a)
***Note:Ca) 1980 built as 1,678 TED, jumboized 1985:
reference has been made to Motor Ship 'ship on 
Order' and Lloyd's shipping Index for certain 
vessel tonnages, dimensions and engine /speed 
data, Avalysis:Container Insight.
***source;p,10, World Container Data 1985. An Assessment 
of the mainstream market 1976-87 with a 
forecast up to 2001. Container Insight.
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Tabled-IB)
Evolution of Mainstream Container Ship Fleet by Size 
Range, 1979-88
Size range 1979 1984 1988
3,001 & upwards - 7 36
2,401 / 3,000 TEU 18 23 126
sub total CO 30 162
2,001 / 2,400 TEU 3 36 63
1,801 / 2,000 TEU 24 51 38
1,601 / 1,800 TEU 11 50 42
sub total 38 137 490
600 / 1,600 TEU 263 460 490
Total .319 627 795
Figures:Container Insight: Data for 1979 & 1984 is for
vessel deployment on mainstream trades (. east—  
west arteral routes) only, at year-start < all 
ship types); 1988 figures are Container Insight 
estimate (. on some basis ) assessed from known 
contracts and forecast trends
*** source;p.22, World Container Data 1985 An assessment 
of the mainstream market 1976-87 with forecast 
up to 2001. Container Insight.
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Operators and Their Jumbos (as of Jan.1988)
Table<1-16)
(provisional)
Operator 
US Line 
Maersk Line 
Yangming 
Yangming 
Hapag-Lloyd 
Ben Line Con. 
Korea Shpg Corp 
Maersk Line 
Hapag-Lloyd 
NOL 
OCL 
CGM
Ned 1loyd 
Evergreen Line 
Hapag-Lloyd 
Evergreen Line 
OOCL
East Asiatic 
Swedish East Asia 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 
NOL /NYK /YS Line 
MISC 
APL
Evergreen Line 
Ned 1loyd 
Yangming 
Lykes Lines 
Maersk Line 
Hapag-Lloyd
No. TEU capacity
4482
3 3386
4 3200nc
4 305D
1 3045
3 3032
5 300Dnc
6 (4 > * 3000
2 2986
4 2970
5 2968
1 '2960
2952
4 2948
2 2944
4 2928
6 2900
o 2820
1 2820
1 2820
6 2800nc
2 2770
3 2750
20 2728
1 2714
11 2650nc
6 2600
2600
4 2598
Year of building
1984-85 
1984-85 
1987
1986
1981 
1972-73 
1986-87
1984- 85* 
1972-73
1985- 86 
1972-73 
1973 
1973
1987 
1972 
1986
1985- 86 
1972-73 
1972 
1972
1986- 87 
1979 
1982-83 
1984-85 
1977 
1986*
1986
1982 
1985*
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Note:Only vessels deployed on mainstream east west art­
erial routes are included in the table; 
nc= contracts not confirmed as of time of writing;
*denotes year of jumboisation to 2300 TED and upwards.
Detail as of late-July 1985;Analysis; Container 
Insight
***source: p 22 World Container Data 1985. An assessment 
of the mainstream market 1976-87 with a 
forecast upto 2D01. Container Insight.
Another important ship technology has been developed in 
concerning the saving of fuel costs.
Savings in fuel costs have come from two sources in 
recent years.
These sources are il the move from steam turbine to die­
sel and ii) reduction in ship speed. <:35>
A study made by the Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 
observed that diesel engines generally have a consumption 
of about 130 grams per bhp / hour, about 25 per cent 
below ten to fifteen years ago for steam turbines when 
they were new ( about 170-175 grams, although consumption 
will have risen as these engines aged).
In addition to this, according to the study, fuel savings 
have increased during the period in which diesel engines 
were taken over by improved hull and propeller designs, 
and better surface treatments, particularly anti-fouling 
and self-polishing finishes.
The improvement of propel.lars alone could reduce fuel 
consumption by around 10-20 percent and hull surface 
finishing about 6-7 percent.
Thus the total saving in fuel costs per
6A
ton/ mile due to
technical developments alone, excluding speed reduction,- 
which is examined by the study below probably averages 
about 25 percent over the last ten years i,e. comparing 
fuel consumption of a new diesel engine ship launched in 
1984 with a new steamship launched in 1974).
The study continued regarding slower speed.
TableC.1-17) shows the signficance of reduction of fuel 
consumption by slower speed.
TableCl-17>
Approximate Engine Power Required for Varying Service 
Speeds
Speeds (Knots!) Bhp for 1,800 TEU ship
25 51,000
24 45,000
23 40,000
22 35,000
21 30,000
20 26,000
19 23,000
Comparing this tabel (1-17!> , with table (1-14>, we can find 
an interesting fact that US jumbo with a capacity of 
4482 TEU, has a service speed of 18.5 knots with bhp 
28,ODD,engine while Hapag-Lloyd's ship has a 24 knot ser­
vice speed with a 65,880 engine bhp,which implies a dra­
stic development in ship technology.
This ship technology development was accelerated by the 
oil shock in 1974 and 1979.
As we discussed in the previous chapter, containerization
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resulted in the change of cost structure of liner shipp- 
ping, whereby the capital cost and the fuel cost became 
the most vital factors determining the carrier's competi­
tiveness .
Therefore, we can realize that the continuous improvement 
of ship technology, coupled with the result of containe­
rization Ci,e. the change of cost struture) added the 
influence on chronic recession in container shipping 
eventually. It has been also influenced by the indepen- 
tents' behaviour to expand their fleet with more 
efficient ships, because the most effective way to 
survive under the cut-throat competition is cost 
reduction.
5.1.3 Other factors to characterize the current economic 
environment of liner shipping
Ther are many important factors materializing the current 
aspect of liner shipping such as:
i) the aspirations of national lines, 
ii!) the Comecon group,
iii) Other modes of transportation: Siberian Land Bridge 
and airfeight lines,
iv) US shipping act of 1984, 
v> the Liner Code of Conduct.
All those factors have caused the current market environ­
ment to a state of turmoil,together with political issues 
between developed and developing countries especially.
In this paper, however, my discussion does not go into 
detail on those topics, not only because a vast space 
is needed in order to cover but also because those topics 
are already familiar to us and the discussion done so far
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is sufficient to shape the current picture of the contai­
ner liner market on this small canvas.
5.2 The Advent of the RTW Concept
We have observed the current container liner market in 
which competition .is acute due to overtonnage, structural 
friction and other forces whel^her they are political, 
economic or technological. Furthermore we have identified 
that the current aspect of the • liner market has been 
affected by the result of conference systems and 
containerisation as well.
Based upon our previous understanding, my discussion 
started to discover the factors caused to the advent of 
the RTW concept, as a conclusion of this part, leaving 
the topics regarding the definition of the RTW concept 
and the core of the RTW service which will be coverd in 
the following part.
5.2.1 Industry competition and its strategy 
The RTW concept is a business strategy to cope with 
industry competition. The goal of competitive strategy 
for a business unit in an industry is to find a position 
in the industry where the company can best defend itself 
against the competitive environment forces or can inf­
luence them in its favor.
In the prevous discussion we have reviewed the features 
of the container liner market where individual liner car­
riers should defend themselves through their strategy.
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VProfessor Michael, E.Porter discussed the structural ana­
lysis of industries and generic competitive strategy in 
his 1iterature.(36)
In his work, the five factors, such as;
a) threat of new entrants,
b) threat of substitute products or services, 
c!) bargaining power of buyers,
d) bargaining power of supliers and
e) rivalry among current competitors.
are identified as forces deriving industry competition. 
If we apply this idea to the current container liner mar­
ket, figureCl-6) can be produced. In figure (1-6;), the 
five forces can be explained as follows:
1) competitors existing in the current maket,
2) potential liner carriers,
Sloversupply of the ship building market,
4)competition from other modes of transportation and 
Elpreasure from shippers qr their councils.
In addition to this, forces indirectly intensifying 
the competition of the market are:
6) Political aspiration to the new national lines,
7) Government subsdisation to the national lines,
8) Government subsidization to the ship building mar­
ket ,
9) and 10) influence of technological development on 
the ship building market and the conatainer liner 
market.
Professor Porter continued the discussion that all five 
competitive forces jointly determine the intensity of 
industry competition and profitability, and the strongest 
force or forces are governing and become crucial from the 
point of view of strategy formulation. We have already
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discussed the intensity of industry competition in the 
container liner market.
Here, we encounter a question, that is,"What are the 
strategies available for a individual firm to cope with 
the competition and to maximize profitability?".
Figure(1—6)
Forces Driving Competition in Container Shipping 
Industry
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Three generic strategies
According to the study of professor Porter,three 
internally consistent generic strategies ( which can be 
used alone or in combination) are effective for creating 
a defendable position in the long run and outperforming 
competitors in an industry.
The three generic strategies referred to are :
1) overall cost leadership,
2) diffrentiation,
3) focus.
Figure(1-7) explains the relationship and difference of 
the three generic strategies.
The first strategy is to take position of the overall 
cost leadership in an industry.
Cost leadership requires as, professor Porter says, 
aggressive construction of efficient-scale facilities, 
vigorous pursuit of cost reduotions, tight cost and over­
head control, and so on.
The second generic strategy is one of differentiating the 
product or service offered to the firm, creating some­
thing that is perceived in all industry as being unique. 
The last generic strategy is focusing on a particular 
buyer group, segment of the product line, or geographic 
market, as with differentiation. This strategy may take 
various ways, either the low cost or differentiation 
through focusing on a particular segment of a consumer 
group.
7D
F i g u re C1-7)
Three Generic Strategy
Strategic Advantage
Uniqueness 
Perceived 
by the 
Customer
Strategic Industry 
Advantage wide
Particular 
Segment only
Qoui-ce'
P.39. Competitive strategy, Techniques for Analysing 
Industries and Competitors- Michael E, Peter. The Free 
Press ADivsion of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
DIFFERENTIATION OVERALL COST 
LEADESHIP
FOCUS
Low cost 
Position
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5.2.3 The RTtsI concept as a business strategy
The core of containerisation is as discussed earlier, the 
unification of cargo, whereby the characteristics of car­
go having been heterogeneous was changed as to be homoge­
neous. This led to the change of characteristics of liner 
shipping in various aspects;
first, liner shipping can take advantages of economies of 
scale causing later overtonnage situation, secondly, tra­
ditional end-to-end trade routes having been heteroge­
neous, could also be unified, which means that there is 
no significant difference among different traditional 
end-to-end trades which have been divided into more than 
3DD conference routes because of its heterogeneousity.
The change of the characteristics in liner shipping gave 
the possibility to the container carriers to deviate from 
traditional concepts of vessel deployment and scheduling 
under the conference system toward unifying world trade 
routes into one single route. It is more likely that the 
independents adopt the RTW concept with idea of entre- 
preneurahip.
Taking into account the current container shipping market 
and its intensity of competition, carriers have to 
effectively implement any of the three generic strate­
gies to cope with the competitive forces.
The RTW concept,as a container shipping strategy, can be 
categorized as the overall cost leadership strategy, 
having a low-cost position, deploying jumbo vessels which 
are yielding maximum benefits from the economices of sca­
le. The effectiveness of this strategy, is that ;firstly, 
a low-cost position provides substantial entry barriers
in terms of scale economies and cost advantage, which is 
defensive against potential entrants, secondly, a low—  
cost position usually gives the firm a favourable posi­
tion vis-a-vis substitutes relative to its competitors in 
the industry, thirdly, this strategy usually has very 
strong bargaining power in the aquistion of vessels,con­
tainers and other assets.
Fourthly, the overall cost leadership strategy always has 
a strong competitive position against shippers because 
of the low freight rates.
Thus this strategy protects the carrier against all com­
petitive forces and are extremely effective in order to 
eliminate the marginal competitors who are suffering from 
low-prof itability.
5.3) The RTW Concept as Software-Oriented Innovation
In the first chapter, we discussed that the definition of 
the innovation includes not only the implementation of a 
new production function but also the introduction of a 
new product and procedural changes into the market.
Based on the definition,we can indentify that the RTW 
concept is an innovation in various aspects.
a) An innovation in the area of the production function. 
The RTW concept replaced a new production function.
With the huge Econoship with the maximum scale of the 
Panama limit, it minimize the cost of TEU /mile. This 
topic will be discussed in detail in the next part.
b) An innovation in the area of price setting.
Through this concept, the carrier can offer the lowest 
freight rate based on its low cost structure penetrating
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the market with law pricing policy.
c'.) An innovation in the area of distribution.
The Round-the -World service unified the three mainstream 
routes: Tranapacific, Transatlantic and Far East / Europe 
trade, into one horizontal route with vertical connec­
tions of the feedering system. Therefore it covers, glo­
bally, services in destribution networks.
d) An innovation in the area of communication. The RTW 
service promises shippers a service based on that any 
cargo from any place to any place at any time is availab­
le. This means that this marketing innovation is signifi­
cant enough to create new customers, most likely, low 
value cargo, which leads to more advantages of economies 
of scale eventually.
Furthermore, it may create a change in the long traditio­
nal concept of end-to-end routes scheduling.
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Part II
The CORE OF THE RTW CONCEPT
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Chapter 6. DEFINITIONS AND PREREQUISITES
We have discussed,in the previous part,that the change of 
the characteristics in liner shipping, through container­
isation, gave the possibility to the container carriers 
to deviate from the traditional concept of vessel deploy­
ment and scheduling on segmented geographical routes, 
towards unifying major world trade routes into a globally 
integrated operational network.
In other words this means that two major developments 
have imperceptibly become the vital factors which have 
determined the‘strategic approach that liner shipping 
firms have taken. The two major.developments are; Inter­
nationalisation and The marketing concept. Thus major 
container carriers have begun to establish their strate­
gies based on the international marketing concept.
6.1 Global Strategy
Liner shipping produces a service commodity creating time 
and space utility. Through the evolution of containerisa­
tion, the commodity service has been widely standardised 
so that the producer of container liner services would 
innovate the new m.arketing concept so the container liner 
market itself has become internationalised. In doing so, 
major liner carriers have established global strategies 
whereby each market segmentation, .traditionally divided 
into various end-to-end trade routes, could be integrated 
on a global scale.
As shown in Figure (2-1), traditional liner markets have 
been segmented and isolated.But, in the golbal marketing 
strategy, each segment has been integrated as a single 
comprehensive marketing network.
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Figure(2-1>
The Schematic Represntation of the Liner Market 
Concepts
o O
TW-cfitiVviiil
Ccnic^ pt
( t > ;
Th^ PTW Coo^C£^j?t.
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6 The RTW Concept
The RTW concept is one of the global strategies, and it 
can be defined as the unification of the traditional 
end-to-end trade routes into one overall route through 
the horisonatal connection of the mainstream trade routes 
in the northern hemisphere, via vertical feedering 
extremities.
As shown in Figure (2—1!>, the main stream trade routes in 
the northern hemisphere are the Transatlantic, Transpaci­
fic and the Far East—Europe ' trade routes. The trade 
between the South and North are covered by the vertical 
feedering connections on the regional basis in order to 
accomplish global coverage. Here, horizontal extremity 
implies circumnavigation around the world.
From this concept, we can identify some factors which are 
ingredients of the RTW concept as follows; 
a) Operational aspects.
1) Container ships are circumnavigating along the hori­
zontal mainstream routes toward the same direction;
2) On regional basis, there are transportation centers 
whereby the horizontal and vertical container flows are 
connected. The transportation center has significant 
functions, that is, the linkage between the sea leg of 
the horizontal mainstream and the land leg of the wide 
range hinterland coverage as well as the linkage of sea 
legs with a feedering connection.
For example, in the case of Marseilles Fos as a trans­
portation center,the container flows are connected not 
only to Italy and Spain but also to North and West 
Africa.
3) Vessels deployed in mainstream routes are huge econo­
ships with the range of 3D00-A500 TEU, in order to
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maximize the benefits of economies of scale;
b) Marketing aspect
4) On the other hand, a marketing network should be orga­
nized in such a way that the carriers' global marke­
ting strategy may cover all the trades; in certain 
trades as an outsider, penetrating the market with a 
cost leadership strategy and in other trades as a con­
ference member, with conference freight rates.
6.3 The Prerequisites of the RTW Concept
As the RTW concept is a business strategy, there are pre­
conditions for carriers to build such a strategy.
The prerequisites can be discussed from two angles:exter­
nal and internal.
a) External preconditions
1) The equilibrium of the contaniner cargo flow of the 
major trades:Transpacific, Transatlantic, and
Far-East-Euroupe.
This condition is a fundamental factor on which the RTW 
concept can be built, because the sufficient average load 
factor should be guaranteed in terms of vessel utiliza­
tion in the circumnavigation of the three arterial rou­
tes .
Table<2-l) shows the mainstream trade loaded container 
volumes.This table gives us a brief observation of the 
equilibrium of container cargo volume.
If we add the volume of the container flow of the "Mains­
tream to/from Mid-East & S.Asia" to the container flow of 
the " Orient/Europe/Orient", the three arterial routes 
are very much likely to be in equilibrium.
79
Table C2--1 )
Relative toMainstream Trade Loaded Container Volumes 
World Port Total Box Movement.
C OOD TEU ;>
Trade route 1976 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Cl) 1706 2410 2540 2690 3120 3310 3500 3740
C2) 2123 2296 2245 2387 2695 2855 2920 3010
C3) 960 1302 1400 1485' 1580 1690 1790 1940
C4) 136 1222 1353 1474 1520 1580 1640 1705
(5) 310 532 592 ,658 875 985 1130 1280
(.6') 130 178 195 211 250 285 315 345
T ota 1 5365 7940 8325 8905 10040 10705 11295 2020
C?) 21400 40300 42130 ■^f52D0 51400 !54950 58200 <52400
(1> Orient/NI.America/Orient
(2) Europe/N.America/Europe
(3) Orient/Europe/Orient
(A) Mainstream to/from Mid-East& B.Asia 
<5) Inter-Asia & mainstream to/ from PRC 
('.6> Mainstream to/from Caribbean & C.America 
(.7) Total World Port box movements
***Figure; Container Insight.
***9ource; p.5 World Container Data 1985 
1984:estimated 
1985-87: forecasts.
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Figure (2-2)
Schematic Container Vessel Utilization Profile
1) Utilization of Normal Converence Liner 
(end-to-end trade service)
Utilizaiton
2) The RTW Concept Utilization Profile
Utilization
Parallel Service
Maximum load factor 
' ^ Optimum load factor
Mi 1 es
Source: The lecture of Doctor Hans Ludwig Beth at the WorldMaritime University.
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Fugre(2-2) shows hypothetically a schematic RTW utiliza­
tion profile and that of a normal conference liner profi­
le.
In the circumnavigation of the three arterial routes, the 
feeder system and the parallel system are employed in 
order to keep an optimum average utilization. The feeder 
system has two main economic functions. One is to connect 
the trades of vertical extremities to the mainstream flow 
in order to accomplish a global network and the other is 
to acquire a additional container flow to feed it to the 
circumnavigator in order to keep the desired level of the 
load factor, especially in a particular segment where the 
basic container cargo generated in that trade is not suf- 
f icient.
In figureC2-2), we can identify the segments; <!a) , where 
feeder systems are accompanied.
The parallel system (b) in figureC2-2), is adopted in the 
opposite case of the feeder system, where the cargo volu­
me is sufficient to achieve optimum utilization.
However, the equilibrium of the container cargo flow of 
the mc^ jor trades is the essential factor, because, even- 
though the feeder and parallel systems may mitigate the 
imbalance among each segment tc a certain extent, there 
is a limit to do so in the case of extreme imbalance.
2) The homogeneousity of cargo and trades
Before containerization, liner cargo and trades were 
heterogeneous,thus, even in a single trade route, there 
had been two different conferences in both directions.
If containerization is referred to as a unification of 
cargo through the change of the caracteristics from being
heterogenous to being homogeneous, the RTW concept would 
be referred to as an accomplishment of the unification of 
both cargo and trades, which implies very important eco­
nomic changes of liner shipping.
However, the homogeneousity of cargo and trades is a fun­
damental precondition for the advent of the RTW concept.
The standardisation of liner shipping service, as a ser­
vice commodity, has been matured as can be identified in 
Table<■.2-2;) and (2-3).
Container penetration represents the level of standardi­
zation of the service commodity in the industry and its 
penetration in world liner trade implies the internatio­
nalization of the container shipping service commodity 
from the global marketing point of view.
TableC2-2) shows that container penetration i.e. standar­
dization, between developed countries, has been almost 
completed up to 95 % and globally undertaken up to 75 % 
by 1984.
The more interesting fact is, as Table(2-3) shows, that, 
in the three mainstream routes, such as the Atlantic,the 
Pacific and the Europe-Far East, on which the RTW car­
riers are circumnavigating, the standardization has been 
fufilled to almost 96 percent of each trade. This means, 
thus, that the homogeneousity of cargo and trade has been 
accomplished to the extent whereby the, RTW concept can be 
emerged.
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Table(2-2)
Container Penetrationin of World Liner Trade(1984)
Category of trade % of total % of container
liner trade penetradion
Between developed countries 39 95
Developed to/ from developing 49 65
Between developing countries 12 51
Total 100 75
Notes:
1.Figures are based on IMF Direction of Trade statistics. 
2.OPEC exports, trade with EEC, and table between the US 
and Canada are excluded from this table.
3.Developed countries are IMF 6 Industrial Countries'
together with South Africa, Hong Kong, 
Singapore.
South Korea and
Table(2-3)
Estimates of Container Penetration in 
des (1984)
Some Major Tra-
T rades %
Atlantic 96
Pacific( US-Far East) 96
Europe-Far East 95
OPEC imports from developed countries 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico trades
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with developed countries 60
***Source:p 195 Containerization in the Eighties, M,G,
Graham, D.O. Hughes, Lloyd's of London press 
Ltd.
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3) Intermodalism
Intermodalism is referred to as the efficient combination 
of different transportation mode mix i.e., land, air and 
sea transportation.
The success of the RTW sevice can be realised through a 
efficient combination of land and sea legs,covering a 
global distribution network.
Especially with the transportation center concept,the RTW 
service limits the number of port calls concentrating the 
container flow on the major ports on a regional basis, 
which leads to the fact that the function of inland 
transportation becomes of vital importance.
Therefore, intermodalism is an essential factor as a pre­
requisite of the RTW concept.
However, the RTW service carriers are not protagonists of 
the intermodalism like the Sea-Land and the A.P.L. whose 
marketing strategies are focusing on speed and convenien­
ce rather than costt!37) . This topic will be discussed 
later.
4) Political interference in cargo accessibility
As during previous years cargo sharing and other restic- 
tive practices limiting access to cargo in liner shipping 
have been increased in many parts of the world.
Such political interference of the free market found its 
expression in various ways, including direct measures, 
such as cargo reservation for government-owned cargoes 
and bilateral/multilateral cargo-sharing or even monopo­
lization of transport, and indirect measures, subsidizing 
national lines.
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According to a OECD Report titled "Maritime Transport 
1984", protectionism in one or another form exists in 
about 75 countries and the overall quantity of liner car­
goes falling under such measures, taking into considera­
tion about three quarters of the world's liner trades 
between OECD member countries not being subject to any 
significant protectionism, are estimated to be between 5 
and 10 percent of the total liner traffic; a relatively 
small amount.
One of the most striking events in liner shipping in 
recent years is the "Cede of Conduct for Liner Conferen­
ces" which came into force in 'Octorber 1983, with a 
40-40-20 formula for cargo sharing among trading partners 
and third flag carriers. There are ifs and buts regarding 
the impact of the Code, however, the cargo sharing provi­
sions of the Liner Code have encouraged many countries to 
enhance pctectionism measures and, at least, it gives 
sound reasons to do that as a generally accepted practi­
ce .
These continuously growing non-tariff obstacles and other 
forms of limiting access to cargo affect the RTW service 
strategy as a constraint, because in the RTW concept many 
of the vertical extremities are the trades between deve­
loping countries where protectionism is strong.
Therefore, political interferences in any form of protec­
tionism measures affecting cargo accessibility, especial­
ly in dveloping countries, bar the way to the vertical 
coverage of the RTW concept in a global marketing net­
work .
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b!) Internal conditions.
For individual liner carriers, in order to adopt the RTW 
concept,various preconditions should be satisfied intern­
ally unlike the traditional end-to-end service.
The RTW concept requires a globally integrated marketing 
and operational organisation. The large vessels deployed 
in the horisontal extremity would be sensitive to the 
load factor in saving their economies and they would 
require extensive feeding by subsidiary services in order 
to fill them, which inevitably accompanies transhipment 
activities.
Maintaining a high level of the load factor to save eco­
nomies of scale is indispensable so as to outbalance the 
transhipment cost, which means that if the scale saving 
of going to huge container ships were not sufficient to 
offset the cost of large scale transhipment, therefore, 
the RTW concept could not succeed.
Another important factor to be considered is the manage­
ment information system (MIS).
The management of any activities normally calls for the 
following steps:<38>
Information gathering 
Objective setting 
Operations 
Control Prodedures.
The control prodedures in turn feed back for the next 
cycle.
Hence, in the process of all decision makings associated 
with marketing and operational activities, the adequate 
and comprehensive MIS is of vital impopatnce.
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Lastly, the financial requirement is also an essential 
f actor.
Accurate informaticn regarding the amount invested in 
building the RTW service is not available.
However, about one billion dollar is likly to be required 
to acquire ships, boxes, terminals,trucks, other hardware 
items and facilities(!39!) .
For a rough calculation of the case of the US Lines, 
financial investment seems to be required amounting to 
570 million dollars for the aquisition of 12 jumbo con­
tainer ships and approximately 13A- million dollars for 
container boxes assuming that the pice per box is 2,500 
dollars.
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Chapter 7. THE RTW CONCEPT IN PRACTICE: A CASE STUDY OF 
US LINES AND EVERGREEN LINE
In the previGLis chapter, we defined the RTW concept and 
identified prerequisites which are indispensable con­
ditions in building the RTW strategy in reality. 
Accordingly the task given in this chapter is to review 
how the RTW concept is applied to the practice as the 
case of United States Lines(US Lines)■and Evergreen Line 
inaugurated in April and August, 1985 respectively to 
compare the two different applications.
In the application of the RTW concept to reality, 
various aspects are involved, such as operational, finan­
cial and marketing aspects.
However, my discussion concentrates mainly on the 
operational aspect because this is the most typical 
feature, compared with other liner shipping strategies.
7.1 Operational Aspect
As shown in Figure(1-2),the schematic representation of 
factors influencing the characteristics of liner servi­
ces we discussed,the regularity of sailing of the supply 
side of liner services is constrained by the regularity 
of cargo loading and its parameters of the service confi­
gurations are
1) ship size,
2) ship speed,
3) ship numbers,
4) numbers of calling ports and
5) service frequency.
Therefore, my discussion concerning how the RTW concept
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is applied to the practice by the two liner carriers, 
also includes those parameters of service configuration.
7.2 The Practice in UB Line.
1) Ship size, numbers, slot capacity and its ulilization
McLean Industries Inc< Parent group), led’ by Mr Malcom 
McLean, has two shipping subsidiaries, United States 
Lines(BA) and United States Line Inc which was acquired 
from Walter Kidde & Co. through the transaction of a 
total UB $ 111 million on April 12, 1978(40).
Five years later, on April 21, 1983 McLean Industries
finalised US $ 570 million shipbuilding contract for
12x4258 TEU ships with the South Korean shipbuilder Das 
Woo with 1984-85 delivery.
It meant that US Line was poised to move from the ninth 
largest container operator in the world to the first by 
1985 according to Table(2-4), from the source of Contai­
nerisation International.
On the other hand,a more interesting fact is that, as 
shown in Table(l-13), with the substantial deduction of 
ship price, the price per TEU slot was merely US $ 11,000 
which was the lowest one ever.
The recent McLean Industries' fleet and its deployment in 
trades on January 1, 1986 were listed by Lloyd's List 
July 28, 1986 as shown in Table(2-5) and the ship's par­
ticulars of the new jumbo-eoonoships are shown in 
Table(2-6).
Theoretically, therefore, this jumbp-econoship on a 
weekly eastbound circuit gives the global annual capacity
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sums as being equal to 699,192 TEUC 3k52;x6482 TEU) , 
assuming that triple ulilization per cell in a round 
voyage attainable.
Table (2-4)
Leading Container Operators, Ranked by TEU capacity of 
their Fleets.
1983 Fleet 1983 1985 Fleet •:
'OOD TEU Ranking 000 Rank:
US Line 30 9 ■ 88 1
Evergreen Line 29 12 70 4:1
Sea-Land 60 1 61 3
Hapag-Lloyd 50 oA. 53 4
Maersk A 6 3 51 5
Ned 1loyd 43 ■ 5 51 6
OCL 44 A' 44 7
Mitui-OSK 32 8 33 8
OOCL 33 7 33 9
NYK 30 11 31 10
A.P.L 31 9 31 11
CGM 28 13 30 12
***9ource Containerization International, May 1983.
However, on the basis of the carryings detailed in US 
Line estimate of loaded FEU when all 12 of the 2,241 FEU 
container ships are in the RTW service, filed to the US 
Maritime Administration ( MarAd) on August 23, 1985, loa­
ding and discharging 4,665 FEU per week were expected, as 
shown in Table(!2-7), for one round voyage, which means
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a
that per slot ulilization of these ships are 2,08 FEU. 
This loading estimation, A,665 FEU per week, gives 
total sum per year as being 485,160 FEU (4,665x2x52) in 
TEU equivalent, which means that the target set by US 
Line in its filing with MarAd would represent the utili­
zation of 69.4 percent when assessed in relation to the 
triple usage of the 12-month total of 699,192 TEU as men­
tioned above.
Table(2-5)
THE MCLEAN INDUSTRIES FLEET
Ship Name TEU
Capacity
Year
Built
Deployment 
at 1/1/86
United States Lines Inc
American Alabama 4,458 1984 RTW
American California 4,458 1985 RTW
American 111inois 4,458 1985 RTW
American Kentucky 4,458 1985 RTW
American Maine 4,458 1984 RTW
American Nebraska 4,458 1985 RTW
American New Jersey 4,458 1984 RTW
American New York 4,458 1984 RTW
American Oklahoma 4,458 1985 RTW
American Utah 4,458 1985 RTW
American Virginia 4,458 1985 RTW
American Washington 4,458 1985 RTW
American Apollo 1,300 1970 Transpacific
American Aquarius 1 ,300 1971 Transpacif ic
American Astronaut 1 ,300 1969 Transpacif ic
American Lancer 1,300 1968 T ranspaci f ic(1)
American Lark 1 ,300 1969 T ranspacif ic
American Legion 1 ,300 1968 T ranspacif ic
American Liberty 1,3D0 1968 Transpacif ic
American Lynx 1,300 1968 Transpacif ic C2)
American Marketer* 1,358 1973 Transpacif ic
American Mercham 1,358 1973 Transpacif ic
American Entente 2,326 1973 Transatlantic*; 3)
American Envoy 2,326 1972 T r ansat 1 antic C 3')
American Pioneer 2,326 1979 T ransatl antic ('.3)
American Puritan 2,326 1980 T ransatlantic (3;>
American Monarch 214 1969 MSC
American Spitf ire 214 - 1969 MSC
American T itan 214 1968 MSC
American T rojan 214 1968 MSC
United States Lines SA Inc
American Argo 623 1964 Laid up
American Banker 1,024 1962 Laid up
American Builder 1,02■^ ^ 1961 Laid up
American Reservist 628 1964 Laid up
American Vega 628 1964 Laid up
American Hawaii 1,800 1985 US/S. America
American Michigan 1,800 1985 US/S. Americr-i
American North 1,800 1985 US/S. America
Carolina
American Altair 521 1965 Laid up
American Draco 521 1965 Laid up
American Rigel 200 1965 Laid up
American T ide 200 1962 Laid up
American Veteran 26,456 1973 Pacif ic
ton gross
***SoLirce; Lloyds' List, July 28, 1986. 
*=chartered in. RTW=round the world service. 
Msc= in Military Sealift Command fleet
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NB(1) subsequently deployed on South American trades. 
(2) Switched to North Atlantic.
C3) Being transferred to Transpacific roules. Other 
Pacific vessels probably including American Apollo and 
Legion, will move to North Atlantic as replacements.
Table <2-6)
Ship's Particular cf US Line Jumbos
1. Port of Registry New York. NY
2. Flag U.S.A.
3 - Gross Tons 57,075
A. Net Tons 18,995
5 . Deadweight Tons 58,500
6 > Date of build 198A or 1985
7. Length Overal1(ml 289.52(BB1
8. Length B.P.Cml 279.00
9. Shipbuilder Dae Woo SB. & Heavy Machinary Ltd.
•ID. Breadth extreme(ml 32.26
1-1 . Breadth moulded(ml 32.22
12. Draught maximum(ml 11,677
13. Draught moulded (ml 21 . A9
lA. Type/ Facilities A,258 TEU(11
C.HO.1232/A0'(201c Dk867/A0'- 
(20'1 incl. 1A6 ref.C
15 . No.a Type of engines Oil 2SA 7CY 900x1900
16. Power 23,620 bhp(;17.37AKWl
17. Design Sulzer
18. Engine builder Hyundai SB & Heavy Ind.
19. Fuel bunkers(tonnes1 70
20. Speed 18kn
<1) TEU capacity has been increased up to A,ASS TED 
*#*Source: Register of Ships •198A-85
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Table<2-7)
US Lines Estimate of Loaded FEU 
oarried when all 12 of its 2,241 FEU oontainerships are 
in roLind-theworld servioe.All oapacities are in FEU.
Origin Destination FEU per Loadings Load ings
(load ports) week as % of as X of
2,241 weekly
FEU loadings
US East Coast North Europe 275 12.3 5.9
(Savannah and Mediterranean 115 5.1 2.5
New York)
MSC North Europe* 150 6.7 3.2
MSC Mediterranean* 60 2.8 1.3
Mid-East/India 194 8.7 4.2
Far East 356 11.4 7.6
Total loaded ex US East Coast 1150 51.3 24.7
Total ex US,including 1256 56.4 27.1
the West Coast
Total carried ex US, 1365 60.9 29.3
including FEU
loaded in the Far East for Northern Europe
Northern Europe Mid-East/India 385 9.1 8.6
<:Rotterdam) Far East 440 19.6 9.4
Total loaded ex Northern Europe 825 36.8 17.7
Total carried ex Northern Europel550 69.2 33.2
including FEU loaded in the US for onward destinations
Mediterranean Mid-East/India 270 12.0 5.8
(Marseilles-Fos) Far East 345 15.4 7.4
Total loaded ex Mediternean 615 27.4 13.2
Total carried ex Mediterranean 1990 88.8 43.7
including FEU loaded in the US and
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Northern Europe for onward destinations 
Mid-East/India US West Coast 70
CKhor Fakkan) US East Coast 165
Far East 65
Total loaded ex Mid-East/India 300
Total carried ex Mid-East/India 1441
including FEU loaded in the US,
Northern Europe and the Mediterranean f 
tions
3.1 1.5
7.4 3.5
2.9 1.4
13.4 6.4
64.3 30.8
or onward destina-
Far East US West Coast 275 12.3 5.9
(Singapore,Hong Kong,US East Coast 1285 57.3 27.5
Kaohsiung,Kobe,Yokohama)North Europel00 '1.5 2.1
Total loaded ex the Far East 1660 74.1
Total carried ex the Far East,including FEU
loaded in the Mid-East/India for US 1895 84.6 40.6
US West Coast(Long Beach)
Northern Europe 115 5.1 2.5
Total loaded ex US West Coast 115 5.1 2.5
Total carried ex US West Coast, 1665 74.3 35.7
including FEU loaded in the Mid-East/
India and the Far East for onward 
destinations
♦•tt-^ NQte:*= Military Sealift Command cargo is subject to
competitive bids, therefore US Lines' volumes 
can vary within any six-month period. This 
estimate was based on the contract period 
October 1,1985 to March 30,1986.
*»*Source:p.33 Containerisation International, October
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1985
Based on the filing with MarAd as shown in Table (2-7), 
load factors on departure from each trade region can be 
produced as the following Table(2-S;> ;
Table C2~S;)
Container Balances(FEU/week) and Load Factors
Region Loaded Discharged Balance load factor 
on Departure
US East Coast 1150 1450 +300 56.4 %
Northern Europe 825 640 -185 66.5 %
Southern Europe 615 175 ' -440 88.8 %
Mid East/India 300 849 +549 66.2 %
Far East 1660 1206 -454 84.5 %
US West Coast 115 345 +230 74.3 %
#»*Bource; p 21 Lloyd's shipping Economist December 1985
2) Calling ports and global network
According to the sailing schedule for the week of April 
6-12,1986, issued by UB Lines, shown in TableC2-9), a 
round vayage takes 84 days with 12 ships' weekly service 
and they call 12 ports which are the transpotation cen­
ters on a regional basis.
Among the ports, as shown in Figure2-3) , US Lines' most 
important transportation center in , terms of total FEU 
loaded/ discharged Cl,465 FEU) per week is Rotterdam where 
container flows are connected from West Germany C19Q FEU) 
Denmark C17Q FEU),Sweden C125 FEU), and Ireland C70 FEU). 
The Khor Fakkan also has a significant function for fee­
dering with regional coverage of total FEU carried per 
week, as being 82,4 percent (560 FEU/6S0 FEU), according 
to the filings to MarAd, followed by Singapore and FOB.
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Table (2-9)
United States Lines Vessel Schedule
UWrTH)8WESUNES.Wa
SCHEDULE FOR WEEK OF APRIL 06 - APRIL 12. 1986
SlB fsi« /sis" SI*
Sav |M.T.| iRdaMi FOS
ROUND THE WORLD
D lS
SlB SlB Khor SIb
S.C. Jeddh Fkkan Sing
SERVICE
DueSav DuaN.Y.
WASHINGTON 
K. O'Rourke (1)
VOY.FOS. VESSEL NO.
RH 03 z' AM MAINE 8RW 043. AM UTAH 3
RW 05^  AM WASHINGTON 3
RW 06f AM ILLINOIS 4RW OI^ -AM CALIFORNIA 4RW 08^ AM OKLAHOMA 5RW 09^ AM NEW YORK 8HW 10^  ALABAMA 8
RW liy(XM_IBADE^ 35RW lli^ A^M VIRGINIA 7
RW 13(1 AM NEBRASKA 6RW^4lVAM KENTUCKY 7~RW IS AM MAINE 9RW 16 AM UTAH 4
RW 17 AM WASHINGTON 4RW 18 AM ILLINOIS 5
IW 19 AM CALIFORNIA 5RW 20 AM OKLAHOMA 6RW 21 AM NEW YORK 9
RW 22 AM ALABAMA 9RW 23 z^ PfNEW JERSfi^  9
RW 24 AM ViTOlNlir 8
RW 25 AM NEBRASKA 7
RW 26 AM KENTUCKY 8
1/11 1/15 1/26 2/1 2/6 2/91/18 1/22 2/2 2/8 2/13 2/161/25 1/28 2/9 2/15 2/20 2/232/1 2/4 2/16 2/22 2/27 3/22/8 2/11 2/23 3/1 3/6 3/92/15 2/19 3/2 3/8 3/13 3/162/27 3/3 3/14 3/20 3/233/6 3/10 3/20 3/29 4/1
3/16 3/22 4/2 4/8 4/13 4/163/22 3/26 4/6 4/12 4/17 4/203/30 4/4 4/15 4/20 4/25 4/284/5 4/8 4/19 4/26 5/1 5/44/12 4/16 4/27 5/3 5/8 5/114/19 4/22 5/3 5/10 5/15 5/184/26 4/29 5/10 5/17 5/22 5/255/3 5/6 . 5/17 5/24 5/29 6/15/10 5/13 5/24 5/31 6/5 6/85/17 5/23 5/31 6/7 6/12 6/155/24 5/27 6/7 6/14 6/19 6/225/31 6/3 6/14 6/21 6/26 6/296/7 6/10 6/21 6/28 7/3 7/66/14 6/17 6/28 7/5 7/10 7/136/21 6/24 7/5 7/12 7/17 7/20
2/16 2/25 3/2 3/5 3/82/23 3/4 3/9 3/12 3/173/2 3/11 3/16 3/19 3/233/9 3/18 3/23 3/2.S 3/303/16 3/25 3/29 4/2 6/53/23 4/1 4/5 4/8 4/123/29 4/8 4/12 rlTud) 4/244/7 4/16 4/20 4/27 4/26— - — — 4/29B) 4/214/22 4/30 5/5 5/7 5/124/26 5/6 5/11 5/13 5/175/4 5/13 5/18 5/20 5/245/10 5/20 5/25 5/2V 5/315/17 5/27 6/1 6/3 6/75/24 6/3 6/8 6/10 6/145/31 6/10 6/15 6/i:' 6/216/7 6/17 6/22 6/24 6/286/14 6/24 6/29 7/1 7/56/21 7/1 7/6 7/8 7/126/28 7/8 7/13 7/1."- 7/197/5 7/15 7/20 7/22 7/267/12 7/22 7/27 7/29 8/27/19 7/29 8/3 8/5 8/97/26 8/5 8/10 8/17. 8/16
3/10 3/22 3/30 4/4 4/73/20 4/1 4/7 4/12 4/153/25 4/6 4/13 4/18 4/214/1 4/13 4/20 4/25 4/284/7 4/19 4/27 5/2 5/54/14 4/26 5/4 5/9 5/124/25 5/7 5/14 5/19 5/224/28 5/10 5/18 5/23 5/265/5 5/17 5/24 5/29 5/31B)5/14 5/26 6/2 6/6 6/95/19 5/31 6/6 6/13 6/165/26 6/7 6/15 6/20 6/236/2 6/14 6/22 6/27 6/306/9 6/21 6/29 7/4 7/76/16 6/28 7/6 7/11 7/146/23 7/5 7/13 7/18 7/216/30 7/12 7/20 7/25 7/287/7 7/19 7/27 8/1 8/47/14 7/26 8/3 8/8 8/117/21 8/2 8/10 8/15 8/187/28 8/9 8/17 8/22 8/258/4 8/16 8/24 8/29 9/18/11 8/23 8/31 9/5 9/88/18 8/31 9/7 9/12 9/15
A) AM NEW YORK V-8 ETA KAOH 4/14 SECOND CALL DRYDOCK 4/14-20.'
B) AM TRAD2R V-35 ETA GUAM 4/12 ETS 4/12, ETA KAOH 4/15 ETS 4/17, AT ANCHOR IN KAOH 4/25 ETS 4/29, SECOND CALL KAOH ETA 4/29 ETS 4/29; IDLE
-fc.
PAGE 1
STATUS
USL Main H au l/R elay  Network
I.
UAE
Cochin Thailand
l^ it KhorFakkan
Jeddah
Singapore Hong Kong Kaohsung Kobe
Note: Figures in  c irc le s  denote estim ated t r a n s i t  times
between p o rts .
Source: US L ine F i l l in g  to  MarAd o f August 23, 1985.
E laborated w ith  the data from L lo yd 's  Shipping 
Economist, December 8 5 , p. 22.
Long Beach
Ita ly
Leghorn/ 
Genoa _
s>
Savannah
Fos
Rotterdam
Ovv r5) ©
Spain
Barcelona/
Valencia
Hamburg/Bremen 
West Germany _
Aarhus _____
Denmark
Ireland
Dublin
S«den __ 
Gothenburg UK •> Fiixtows/Southampton____Rtnppmrif
Maximum: 84 days
Steam Time: 
Port Time: 
P ilo t  Time: 
S la c t Time:
Round Voyage
64 days 23 hr 
11 days 7 hr  
4 days 4 hr 
3 days 14 hr
is ta n c e ; (e x c l.
New York
c an a l) =26,336
The transportation centers and its coverage can be broken 
down as follows;
1) Savannah-- South American region
2) New York-- North East America
3) Rotterdam--  West GermanyC Hamburg, Bremen) Denmark
(Aarhus) Sweden/Norway(Gothenburg) Ire- 
land(Dublin) Li.K. (Felixstowe, Southhanp- 
ton Greenock)
A) FOS--- ^^ Italy (Leghorn, Genoa) , Spain (Barcelona,
Valencia North West Africa).
5) Jeddah
6) Khor Fakkan-- Kuwait, SaudiArabia (Muscat), DAE (Co­
chin), West Coast of India( Bombay), 
Paskistan( Karachi)
7) Singapore---- East Coast of India, SriLanka, Bangla­
desh Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia.
S) HongKong----Republic of China
9) Kachsiung---Taiwan
ID) Kobe--------South Korea (Busan)
11) Yohohama--- Japan
12) Long Beach---West Coast of North America
The round voyage distance is known to be approximately 
26,333 miles excluding two channel paths, Panama and 
Suez .
According to Figure(2-3), steam time is allotted some 6A 
days and 23 hours and for port time of- 12 mainline ports, 
some 11 days 7 hours.
Consequently, in order to keep the schedule the ships 
have to cruise at an average speed of 16,9 knots which is 
well below the design speed of 18,5 knots and service 
speed of 17,5 knots.
IDQ
However, recently it was announced that the ports of FOS 
in southern France and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia would be 
deleted from the RTW circuit, according to Lloyd's List 
August 27, 1986.
Lloyd's List said that. It was understood that FOS and 
Jeddah were being dropped because rates and volumes at 
these gateways were no longer considered sustainable by 
the company.
The reduction of ports of call came Just a fortnight 
after the parent group, McLean Industries had announced 
net losses of US $ 76,5 million for the second quarter of 
the year compared with a profit of US $10,4 million in 
the corresponding 1985 period.
Therfore, there is little doubt, according to Lloyd's 
List, that the contraction will be interpreted as a stark 
indication of the company's financial difficulties of an 
enormous debt, which was US $ 1,16 billion according to 
the 1985 annual report, increasing the burden of the com­
pany .
Obviously, 
ef factively 
markets and
however, this revised RTW strategy would 
exclude the Italian, Spanish, Southern French 
North/West Africa, from the global coverage.
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7.3 The practice in Evergreen Line
The Taiwanese independent Evergreen Line now ranks as the 
biggest individual container shipping line; a status it 
has achieved within the relatively short pace of 10 
years.
It was not until 1975, some seven years after Evergreen 
Marine Corp(Taiwan! Ltd (EMC! was first established by an 
entrepreneur, .Mr.Yung Fa Chang,and six years after its 
first conventional liner service between the Far East and 
the Mid East Gulf was inaugurated, that Evergreen entered 
the container liner market.
As shown in Table(l-7), by January 1987, Evergreen Line 
is expected to deploy its container slots totaling 
103,094 in TED terms as the largest container carrier.
The drastic expansion in slot capacity can be identified 
in Table(2-10),the national relationship between Ever­
green carryings and the Taiwanese deepsea container traf­
fic which is the basement of its fleet development.
The analysis of Container Insight indicates the period of 
1976-1978 as a start-up stage.
During this period Evergreen attained a 27,5 % ratio of (
estimated ) carryings when compared with Kaohiung/Keelung
loaded deepsea movement.
<From 1984 onwards the trend is set to change very radi­
cally when Evergreen Line's RTW service entered the mar­
ket .
This can be identified by the study of Mr. R.F.Gibney, 
"Container Lines", as shown in Figure(2-4).
The increase of slot capacity can be explained by the 
expansion of the fleet and the average size of the fleet 
unit.
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Figure(2-A)
Evergreen fleet sire and container carrying capability 
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Source - p.38. Container Lines, R.F.Gibney
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Table C2-1G>
National relationship between Taiwanese deepsea con-
tainer traffic and Evergreen carryings, 1976-88
Year T aiwainese Evergreen % *
traf f ic Cteu) carryings (teu)
1976 370,400 41,576 11.2
1977 417,300 67,730 16.2
1978 589,000 162,097 27.5
1979 763,000 205,116 26.9
1980 903,600 251,674 27.9
1981 946,400 234,731 24.8
1982 984,600 2‘68,722 27.3
1983 u , 24^ ,^ 000 303,008 24.8
1984 1,447,200 572,165 39.5
1985 1,639,400 810,205 49.4
1986 1,775,800 970,782 54.7
1987 1,879,700 1,021,795 54.4
1988 1,988,900 1,081,901 54.1
Figures are estimated deepsea movements at Kaohsiung/Kee-
lung (. projected from 1984 onwards ) and estimated Ever-
green loaded carryings on mainstream trades <. projected
from 1984). * Percentages indicate a purely notional
level of the total Taiwanese deepsea traffic that Ever-
green might have been able and might in the future be
able to cater for if it concentrated all its capacity on
mainstream trades to /from Taiwan. Analysis ;Container
insight .
***SoLirce: Container Insight. No 2.June 1984.
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However, on the other hand, such a drastic expansion 
requires that the group invest nearly one billion US dol­
lars between 1983 and 1986.
Broken down, this amounts to ^700 to $720 million for the 
2A- "Gs", $160 million on containers and so on.
In addition, the group has invested $15 million in Ever- 
master Industrial Corp, which started building containers 
in March 1984, another $!5 million in Evervalor Industial 
corp, which has been producing chassis and prefabricated 
container parts since November 1984, and $50 million in 
Eversafety Container Terminal Corp, an impressive new 
inland terminal.
Of the group's 16 major operating companies, only eight 
could be said to be involved directly with the ocean 
shipping side of the operation.
The remaining units offer a range of related functions 
embracing container manufacture, repair, haulage, termi­
nals and warehousing, trading and computer software.
In the process of expansion, the scale of this invest­
ment, through the latter part of the 1970s and early 
1980s, has inevitably left the Evergreen group with an 
increased debt ratio to equity known to be 3.5:lC4i;i. 
Nevertheless, cash flow as an important factor in finan­
cial structure seems to be maintained healthily backing 
up the continuous profit performance even under the bot­
tom market, different from the finaincial position and 
massive loss in the case of US LinesC42>.
However, my discussion does not need to go into detail 
about the Evergreen group in general, but concentrates on 
the RTW strategy.
1D5
1). Ship's size, numbers, slot capacity
This gradual, but ccntinuous expansion of Evergreen's 
shipboard container capacity has been matched by the con­
sistent growth of its service network, culminating in the 
RTW service which came on stream in August 198A.
Table(2-11) shows Evergreen Line's containership fleet 
and its service routes as of May 1, 1985.
Among the fleet, 20 of 2,728 TEU containerships are the 
so called "Gs" type and A of 29A0,TEU "GL" type are on 
the stream of the RTW service flow.
Four of the "GL" type containerships are the first tran­
che of an eight-ship new building program costing the 
group $200 million in total and each 25 million dollars 
only.
Next year, 1987,four more 2,940 TEU crafts will enter the 
RTW service with relacement of the four "Gs" type contai­
ner ships.(43>
The new 2940 TEU "GL" type ship is known to man with a 
crew of just 14, which has a smaller scale of manning 
compared with the 2,728 TEU "GL" type ships manning 17 
crew.
Another source said that the group has a batch of four 
extra-large 3,428 TEU ships on order at Onomichi in 
Japan due to be handed over during the course of 1987 at 
a reported cost of US $130 million.
The particulars of vessels of "Gs" type are shown in Tab- 
leCl-12) .
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Table(2-ll)
Evergreen Maritime Corporation Fleet
Tabic. 1: Evergreen Line's containerst.ip fleet, showing vessels in 
service and on order es o f May 1. 1985
V««m I Capacity
(TEU)
Tirp« Boretcm
mpmmB
Built/
convurtuii
Pimg Service
f  Guanf 2 728 / FC 20.5 June 1963 Pen RTW
Ever Guide 2 728 . FC 20.5 July 1983 Pan RTW
Ever Going 2 728 FC 20.5 Sept 1983 Pan RTW
Ever Glory 2 728 FC 20.5 Feb 1964 Pan RTW
Ever Grede 2 728 FC 20.5 Mar 1984 Pan RTW
Ever Gether 2 728 FC 20.5 May 1984 Pan RTW
Ever Gient 2728 FC 20.5 June 1984 Pan RTW
Ever Globe 2 728 FC 20.5 June 1984 Pan RTW
Ever Grece 2 728 FC 20.5 July 1984 Pan RTW
Ever Gerden 2 728 FC 20.5 July 1984 Tai RTW
Ever Genius 2 728 FC 20.5 July 1984 Tai . RTW
Ever Greet • 2 728 FC ' 20.5 Aug 1984 Pan RTW
Ever Gentry 2 726 FC 20.5 Aug 1984 Pan RTW
Ever Gentle 2 728 FC 20.5 Sept 1984 Tai ■ RTW
Ever Gifted 2 728 FC 20.5 Sept 1984 TaJ RTW
Ever Crend 2 726 FC 20.5 Oct 1984 Tai RTW
Ever Growth 2 728 FC 20.5 Feb 1985 Tai RTW
Ever Golden 2 728 FC 20.5 Apr i985 Tai RTW
Ever Gleemyf 272C FC 20.5 Jun1985 Tai RTW
Ever Govern 2 728 FC 20.5 Aug 1985 Tai RTW
Ever Goods •2923 FC 20.5 Sept 1985 • Pan RTW
Ever Guest 2 928 fC 20.5 Jan 1986 Pan RTW
Ever Croup 2 926 FC 20.5 Apr 1966 Pan RTW
Ever Given 
"Tver Lyric
2 928 FC 20.5 Jul 1986 Pan RTW
1 810 FC 21.0 Oct 1979 Tai FE/Cal
Ever Level 1 810 FC 21.0 Jan 1980 Tai RTW
Ever Living 1 BIO FC 21.0 May 1980 Tai FE/Cat
Ever Leurel I 810 FC 21.0 Sept 1980 Tai FE/Cal
Ever Linking 1 810 FC 21.0 Jurur 1983 Pan FE/Cal
Ever Loading 1 810 FC 21.0 Aug 1983 Pan RTW
Ever Valiant* 1 174 FC 21.0 Apr 1977 Pan FE/Cat
Ever Vahr 1 214 FC 21.0 Aug 1978 Pan FE/Cal
Ever Value 1 214 FC 21.0 Nov 1978 Pan FE/Cal
Ever V ita! 1 214 FC 21.0 Apr 1979 Tai FE/Cal
Ever Vigor 1 214 FC 21.0 ■ June 1979 Tai FE/Cal
Ever Spring 878 FC 20.0 1975/77 Pan MedUSEC
Ever Sum m it 878 FC 20.0 1975/77 Pan MedOJSEC
Ever Superif 878 FC 20.0 1976/V7 Pan MedOJSEC
Ever Shine 878 FC 20.0 1976/77 Pan Mad/USEC
Ever Breeie S10 FC 14.0 Jan 1984 Pan Carib
Ever Bridge 510 FC 14.0 Jan 1984 Pan Carib
Ever Better 510 FC 14.0 Jan 1984 Pan Carib
Ever Ocean 1 170 CC 15.0 1982/85 Tai FE/Med
Ever Oasis 1 170 CC 15.0 198Z*35 Tai FE/Med
Ever Order 1 170 CC 15.0 1932/85 Tai FE/Med
Ever Onward 1 182 CC 14.8 - 1982/85 Pan FE/Med
Ever Orient 1 182 CC 14.8 1963/85 Pan FE^ed
E ver Obtain 1 182 CC 14.8 1983/85 Pan FE/Med
Uni-f*ioneer 522 sc 16.0 Aug 1973 Pan SE Asia
Uni‘ Promoter 522 sc 16.0* Dec 1973 Pan S£ Asia
Uni-fortune 956 sc 17.0 Sept 1978 Tai FE/Med
Lini’ Forward 956 sc 17.0 Dec 1978 Tai FE/Med
Ur>i-fOrever 956 sc 17.0 May 1979 Tai FE/Med
Utii-Hufuenity 680 BC 15.5 Nov 1975 Tai SE Asia
I Uni-Hondsome 680 BC 15.5 May 1976 Tai SE Asia
Uni-Morai 816 CC 16.0 1976/84 Pan FE/PNW
Uni-Modest 818 CC 16.0 1976/84 Pan FE/PNW
Uni-Master 818 CC 16.0 1977/84 Pan FE/PNW
Uni-Mercy 61.8 CC 16.0 1976/84 Pan FE/PNW
1 Not»; FC u. tut! conutner: CC m c e n r tn td  to eentotnor SC - aerru container: BC ^I —-w------
* Ifrcsk ttjn  nndcont»/ntr*;set to b t
!
Source*  ^ »
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Tablef.2--12:)
Ship's Particulars of "Gs" Type of Container Ship
C Ever Greet)
1. Port of Registry
2. Flag
3. Gross tons
4. Net tons
5. Dead weight tons(tonnes)
6. Date of build
7. Length overall Cm)
8. Length of B.P.Cm)
9. ship builder
10. Breadth extreme Cm)
11. Breadth moulded Cm)
12. Draught MaximumCm)
13. Draught moulded Cm)
14. Type /Facilities
15. No & Type of engine
16. Power
17. Design
18. Engine builder
19. Fuel bunkerCtonnes)
20.Speed
***Source: Register of
Panama 
Panama 
37,042 
18,995 
43,198 
1984
230.,82CBB)
216. ob4
Onomichi Zosen KK 
32.24 
32.20 
11.594 
18.67 
2,728 TELI
C.No. 1412/20'C40')C.DK 
1316/20'C40)'
Oil 2 SA 6CY 900x1900 
21,600 bhpC15885KW)
Sulser 
l.H.I
225.5Cd.o.)
20.5Kn
ships 1984-85.
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Currently, the size of Evergreen deploying ocean going 
slots is more than 1,5 million on an annualized 
basis(44).
According to Table(2-4),the total of TEU capacity dep­
loyed in the RTW service is 66,320 TEU with 24 of "Gs" 
and "GL" types This figure is much larger than that of US 
Lines' totalling 53,784 TEU(12k4482 TEU).
Taking into account the service speed of vessels of 
Evergreen Line being 20 knots compared with that of US 
Lines, 17,5 knots, the product .volume of Evergreen is, by 
far, almost 40 % larger than that of US Line on the 
stream of the RTW circuit.
2) Calling ports and global network
The deployment of the ships of the Evergreen Line is very 
much subject to change depending on the market situation 
in each segment and introduction of new ships, which 
makes it difficult to pin it down at any given moment. 
However, the principlal idea is that the large ships, 
with the replacement, will be introdced to the RTW ser­
vice which needs just 11 vessels sailing in each direc­
tion of circumnavigation on a 77-day round trip with 
weekly frequency.
Table(2-13) shows services operated by Evergreen group.
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Table C2-13'.)
Services Operated by Evergreen Group
j Table 2: Services operated by Evergreen group
S arv ica Fraquancy N o o f 
v a ssa ls /
TEU ca p a c ity
D ira c t p o rt calls T o ta l aniH ial 
TEU  cap ac ity  
o ffe re d
Round-tha>world 
□  Evergreen Line
Weekly 20  X 2 7 2 8 ' 
2 X 1 810
WB QTokyo. Osaka, Busan, Keelung. Kaohsiung, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Hamburg, Felixstowe. 
Rotterdam. Antwerp. Le Havre. New York. 
Norfolk. Charleston. Kingston’ .'Tokyo 
EB □  Tokyo. Kingston’ , Charleston. Baltimore, 
New York. Le Havre. Antwerp, Rotterdam. 
Felixstowe. Hamburg. Port Kelangi Singapore. 
Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Keelung, Busan. Osaka, 
T okyo '
412  620 ’  
41 2  620*
F a rE a it/C a l 
□  Evergreen Line
8  days 4 X 1 810 Los Angeles. San FrstKiseo. Kaohsiung. Hong 
Kong'. Keelung
162 900
Far E att/C e l
□  Evergreen Line
' 6  days 4 X 1214  
1 X 1 174
Los Angeles. San Francisco. Busan. Osaka, 
Tokyo
73 324
Far East/PNW  
□  Evergreen Line
11 days 4 X 818 Seattle. Portland, Tokyo. Osaka. Kaohsiung, 
Hong Kong. Keelung
S3 988
Mad/USEC
□  Evergreen Line
weekly 4 x  878 Leghorn, Marseilles-Fos, Barcelona, New York. 
Norfolk. Savannah
91 312
FE/Med
□  Unigiory Marine Corp
6 days 3 X 1 170 
3 X 1 182 
3 X 9S6
Tokyo, Osaka. Busan, Keelung. Hong Kong. 
Singapore. Jeddah, Limassol. L eghorn jienoa, 
Msrseilles-Fos, Barcelona, Valencia/de^aK,^ 
Singapore. Hong Kong, Keelung, Tok^D ^
99 180
Caribbean
□  Evergreen Line
weekly 3 X 510 Houston. New Orleans, Kingston, Puerto Limon, 
Cristobal, Curacao. Santo Domingo. San Juan, 
Houston
53 040*
S E A s ia
□  Unigiory Marine Corp
21 days 2 X 522 Kaohsiung. Keelung. Bangkok. Singapore, Cebu, 
Manila, Kaohsiung
17 748*
S E A s ia 21 days 2 X 6 8 0 Kaohsiung. Keelung. Manila. Singapore, Port 23 120*
OUniQlory Amarine Corp '  Kelang, Singapore. Bangkok. Kaohsiung
Note: '  ¥^€n  20th G-type in August 1985; ’  epp»eity based on triple utiHsetinn n t slots per einumnevigetion; * Cristobet writ’  be subpitu ted h r  Kingston this summer;
*inch/des relay bottes end h ce t traffic
S'OL'^'X : P,^ / i-loyds Gcc■n^ o'n^ \Sii ^ MiK\cU fi%.
IID
According to TableC2-13), the direct port calls made by 
Evergreen's two RTW servicies are as follows:
Westbound
Tokyo
Osaka
Busan
Keelung
Kaohsiung
Hong Kong
Singapore
Jeddah
Hamburg
Felixstowe
Rotterdam
Antwerp
Le Havre
New York
Norfolk
Chalston
Cristobal
Total 17 ports
Eastbound
Tokyo
Cristobal
Chalston
Baltimore
New York
Hamburg
Felixstowe
Rotterdam
Antwerp
Le Harvre
Jeddah(alternate
ges)
Singapore
Hong Kong
Kaoshiung
Keelung
Busan
Osaka
Total 17 ports
voya-
***Note:The Jeddah call is added after Evergreen's 
reshuffle, introducing one "GL" type ship in 
March 1986.
This itenerary signifies that the global network of 
Evergreen Line concentrates very much on particular 
regions such as Far East Asia, the North East coast of 
America and Northern Europe.
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7.4. The Comparision of the Two Practices
Two different application of the RTW concept have been 
discussed so far, regarding mainly the operational 
aspect, whereby we can easily recognise that those two 
have many similarities as well as differences. 
Accordingly, we need to compare the two different practi­
ces in order to clearly identify its similarities and 
dif ferences.
7.4.1 Similarities
As far as those two practices are categorised as the RTW 
concept, the two practices have basically many similar 
f rents.
Therefore, these similar fronts goes to the major ingre­
dient factors of the RTW concept which has already been 
discussed in the previous chapter.
Besides, what should be pointed out is that both of the 
RTW carriers exercised the bargaining power in the acqui­
sition of the ships.
As we discussed in the first part regarding the RTW 
concept as a overall cost leadership strategy having a 
low-cost position is of prime importance, giving cost 
advantage to obtain a defensive power against not only 
potential entrants but also existing rivalry and custo­
mers. The low-cost position can be realised in such ways 
as jumboization and saving fuel cost through various 
ways, as discussed earlier.
Furthermore, in this connection, bargaining power through 
the aquisition of numbers of ships, at one term of 
package contract is most effective, especially to save
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the capital cost of the assets.
The following TableC2-14) shows the cost effectiveness of 
the two RTW service carriers.
The Ship
TableC2-14) 
Prices and its TEU Proportion
Year of Company Ships , Total Price Price
delivery Price per per
mill ion ship TEU
’( $ ) mill ion ('000)
( $ ) ( $ )
1984-85 US Lines 12x4482(1) 570 47.5 10.6
1983-84 Evergreen 12x2728 360(2) 30 11
1985-87 Evergreen 8x2940 200(3) 25 8.5
**»Note:
1) The scale of capacity was reviced from the initial
capacity of 4,218 TEU.
2) The initial rating of 2,240 TEU was jumboized to take
2,728 TEU in June 1984.
3) Eight new ships are being built at US « 25 mill ion
each, according to Lloyd' 5 List, July 1986.
Comparing these figures with Table(l-13), we can iden­
tify the substantial reduction of capital cost, for 
example, the price per TED of APL's 1982-83 year built is 
US $ 23,000, while that of Evergreen's "GL" type 2,940 
TEU ship is only US $ 8,500, being almost one third.
This package contract, which gives the RTW carriers the 
bagaining power, would be justified by the reason that
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the RTW concept necessitates a large number of circumna­
vigators with the same particulars such as size, capacity 
and speed, which gives the equality in terms of quantity 
and quality of value in various areas of management; pro­
duction, marketing, financing and personnel management.
7.4.2 Differences
There are many factors which make the two applications of 
the RTW concept to reality different. Some factors are 
closely relative to other factqrs. Those factors are dis­
cussed as follows.
1> Ships
From the incipient stage of the RTW service, US Lines has 
deployed huge container ships of 4,482 TEU, while Ever­
green Line planned to deploy much smaller vessels rating 
of 2,240 TEU, although they were half of US Lines' jum­
bos, and later increased the ship's capacity up to 
2,940, even still less than 3,000 TEU.
By contrast, the number of vessels in the US Lines' prac­
tice is half of that of Evergreen's.
The speed is also an important factor.
Evergreen's craft has a service speed of 20.5 Kn, while 
US Lines' has 17.5Kn, which makes a difference in dura­
tion of round-the-world voyages, as it takes US Lines 84 
days and Evergreen 77 days.
The three major differences, concerning scale, number and 
speed of ship, postulate different effectiveness in app­
lication of the RTW concept to the real market in terms 
of economy of scale, load factor and transit time.
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The practice of US Line focuses on the maximisation of 
the advantages of economies of scale, following the doc­
trine of the RTW concept. The introduction of the ship of 
4,^82 TEU to the market is phenomenal, whereas the opti­
mum scale in the mainstream trade is known to be less 
than 3,000 TEU in a traditional end-to-end multiport ser­
vice pattern.
By contrast. Evergreen Line has a different approach 
they are more practical and realistic rather than logical 
whereby more flexibilty to respond guiokly to the change 
of market can be kept in the strategy.
This resilient power can be exercised whenever they 
change their strategy to withdraw the RTW service and 
reshuffle the deployment of circumnavigators to the tra­
ditional way without much friction of its reshuffle.
The adaptability and flexibility are the best assets in 
the balance sheet of Evergreen's RTW practice.
However, this topic will be discussed again in the next 
part when we observe the advantages and disadvantages of 
the RTW concept.
2!> Direction of circumnavigation
US Lines are only eastbound in circumnavigation.
There is no evident information why US Lines made the 
decision like this.
However, we can assume two major factors constraining the 
decision-making, one is financial factors and the other 
is cargo availability.
If we assume that weekly service is the best frequency in 
the mainstream trades, it is very difficult for US Lines 
to aquire 24 ships of 4,482 TEU to cover east and west
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circuits weekly, frcm a financial viewpoint.
It becomes more evident with the following brief observa­
tion concerning financial terms studied by Lloyd's Ship­
ping Economist, September,1983.
US Line aquired the twelve ships without injecting any 
of its own equity, by combining shipyard credits the 
second mortgage) guaranteed by the consortium of banks ( 
the first mortgage), that provided the letter of credit 
of US * 303 million, with the Prudential Insurence Compa­
ny of America and General Electric Credit Corporation, 
providing a 20 percent downpayment amounting to US $ 114 
million.
Consequently,US Lines'repayment schedule on the container 
ship deal is formidable.
The study observed that in the peak repayment years of 
1986 and 1987 US Lines will have to find around US $ 93 
million and $ 89 mi 11 ion(unadjusted for inflation) as 
well as maintaining the cash balances and liquidity posi­
tion required by the banks, which imposed several con­
ditions to improve working capital and cash position.
In addition to this, US Lines had to carry out further 
investment in container boxes, terminals among other 
things.
This looks like, said the study, being a tough proposi­
tion for a company whose pre-tax profit was US $ 3,1 mil­
lion in 1980, $ 35,6 million in 1981 and f 59,9 million 
in 1982.
The current situation of US Lines is more desperate as a 
result of the successive deficits, US $ 66,7 million 
deficit in 1985 and US $ 72,17 million in the opening 
quarter of this year, which eventually obliged them to 
modify to loan agreements which provided for a moratorium
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of approximately US $ 139,5 million of principal revenue 
sharing and container box mileage payments over the next 
two years(45).
The next alternative is to circumnavigate either 
eastbound or westbound.
According to the filing with MarAd, we can observe that 
US Lines' initial plan projecting cargo flows by regions 
was heavily dependent on domestic-related trades, lifting 
imoport cargo to the U.S. at the rate of 1,795 FEU per 
week ( mainly from the Far East,) and export cargo, targe­
ted to 1,265 FEU per week ( mostly destined for Europe). 
Thus the total of U.S based volume was projected at 3,060 
FEU per week which meant that around two thirds of the 
over all traffic was domestic-related trade, leaving only 
one third for the cross trade.
Among this domestic-related trade, military sealift cargo 
has an important portion which is ^eastbound.
With the assumption that US Lines established the strat­
egy based on US trade then we need to observe the con­
tainer flow of US trade.
The following tableC2-15) is extracted from Table(2-16), 
showing estimated container movement on U.S.-related tra­
des eastbound and westbound.
According to Table(2-15),there is little doubt that the 
eastbound circumnavigation has more chance to ensure suf­
ficient load factors which are of vital importance, espe­
cially taking into accout the massively increased capaci­
ty.
The Evergreen Line's approach has a quite different ang­
le.
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With a similar whole investment of US $ 1 billion, the
group acquired 24 craft which can sufficiently cover 
both directions with a relatively faster transit time of 
round-the-world voyages.
This is very much likely to be just an extension of the 
traditional end-to-end service with the RTW concept.
This can be clearified by the discussion of the trans­
portation center concept in the two practices.
TableC2-15)
Estimated Container Movement on the U.S.Trade Routes 
< million TEU— Loaded Containers)
1962 1983 1984 1985 1986
U.S./Asia-eastbound 1.31 1.55 1.92 2.11 2.20
westbound 1.22 1.21 1.27 1.33 1.39
N.Am./Europe-eastbound 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.91
westbound 0.86 0.92 1.12 1.25 1.35
Total---- eastbound 2.29 2.40 2.80 3.02 3.15
westbound 2.07 1.77 2.39 2.78 2.74
IIS
Table<2-16:)
Estimated Container Movement on the Main Arterial Routes
(. million T.E.U.—  loaded containers )
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
U.S./Asia— eastbound 1.31 1 .55 1.92 2.11 2.20
— westbound 1.22 1 .21 1 .27 1.33 1.39
2.53 2.76 ■ 3.19 3.44 3.59
North Am. (1) (1) (1) (1)
Europe Mid. East 1.07 1.10 1.20 1 .30 1.40
Far East
N.Am./Europe
— eastbound 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.95
— westbund 0.86 0.92 1 .12 1.25 1.35
1.74 1.77 2.00 2.16 2.30
Europe/Far East
-- eastbound D. 33 0.37 0.41 0.46 0.50
-- westbound 0.70 0.75 0.84 0.91 0.95
1 .03 1.12 1.25 1 .37 1 .45
Total
-- eastbound <2) o c o 2.77 3.21 3.48 3.65
-- westbound <2) 2.77 2.88 3.23 3.49 3.69
Total(3) 6.37 6.75 7.64 8.27 8.74
♦**Note; projected world GNP growth < real)
:C1) about 9Q X into the Middle East 
<2) exclude Middle East cargo 
C3) include Middle East cargo 
***Source:P.6 Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc. Research Contai- 
nership Industry Special Report.July 1984.
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3) The Transportation center concept
As we have discussed earlier, the transportation center 
concept has an essential function in the concept of the 
RTW, which is different from traditional multiport servi­
ce .
Theoretically, the number of calling ports should be 
minimized so as to obtain maximum advantages of economies 
of scale.
Following this principle, US Lines offers the schedule 
calling only twelve ports which are the transportation 
center, as discussed in the previous chapter.
Figure<2-5) shows the ports of call used by both Ever­
green and US Lines service and the obvious difference in 
terms of the transportation center concept.
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Figure (2 -5 )
The Comparison o f T ran sp o rta tio n  Centers in  the Two
P rac tices
R.O.C.
Far East Region
Taiwan Korea
Keelunq Busan
Notes: Dotted L ine = US lin e s
Normal Line = Evergreen L ine
Flxstw  Hamburg_____ Rdam
South
France
In  the US Lines c i r c u i t ,  Fos and Jaddah 
c a ll  are  d e le ted  from September, s a i l in g  
o f American V irg in ia .
L lo y 's  L is t ,  August 2 7 , 1986.
North West Germany Benelux 
France__________Scandinavia-------------
U.K.
Ire la n d
Europe Region and North & West A fr ic a  Region
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In the pattern of US Lines, there are clear distinctions 
in the coverage of the marketing area, which means that 
it is very much logical.
Only one exeptional case is the Far East Region as shown 
in Figure(2-5). The line pays four calls.
The pattern of Evergreen Line has a different approach 
which does not stick to the principle of the RTW concept. 
Paying port calls to the west coast of the U.S.A. is 
intentionally omitted while the east coast of the 
U.S.A.and the north-western Europe have 16 ports in both 
directions which is almost the same number of ports used 
in traditional end-to-end trade routes in the same 
region.
In the region of the Middle East and the region of South 
East Asia, conversely. Evergreen pays only two calls 
there while US Line makes three.
In general, the way of approach of Evergreen seems like­
ly to be very much practical, while US Lines' is referred 
to as a logical one.
However, these patterns are closely related to the paral­
lel and feedering system.
A) The parallel and feedering system
As can be seen in Table<2-5) and Table(2-13), the two 
lines have their own parallel systems based on their own 
marketing focus.
Commonly, both lines have the parallel system in the 
region of Transpacific and Transatlantic trade. 
Furthermore, each parallel system has an important func­
tion to complement their global marketing network as a
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whole.
For example, in the RTW service of Evergreen Line, Long 
Beach calls are omitted, because the line has three ser­
vice routes in this region.
In the case of the US Lines,the parallel system in the 
two regions is more important because the Line's RTW ser­
vice is only eastbound.
Recently US Lines reshuffled its fleet between the Trans­
pacific and the Transatlantic trade in the lights of 
rationalization to save cost and to increase revenue as 
shown in Table(2-17!> .
Table(:2-17)
Annulaised Capacity Changes by New Vessel Deployment.
Routes Annualised
Old
Transpacific 173,888
Transatlantic 218,400
US/South America 172,480 
East Coast
two-way TEU capacity
New
192,712
182,000
140,800
Increase
18,824
(36,400)
<31,680)
Percentage
10,8
(16,7)
(18,4)
According to the analysis made by Containerisation Inter­
national, this change focused on the increase of the 
capacity of Transpacific trade with the cost of Transat­
lantic trade and on the increase of the load factor of 
the RTW service in the segment of transatlantic route 
with the reduction of US Lines' end-to-end transatlantic 
capability.(46)
Evergreen's parallel system is rather complicated, com­
pared with US Lines' RTW service concentrating on the 
U.S. trade-related trade routes.
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The parallel systems of Evergreen Line include three ser­
vices of Far East/North West America region, Med/USEL 
Trade,Far East/Med, Caribbean and South Asia region as 
can be seen in TableC2—13).
In general the parallel system of Evergreen Line seems to 
be more comprehensive because of its vessels, deployed in 
the RTW srevice, is of relatively smaller scale.
Feedering systems in both Lines has also contradictory 
features because of the nature of different approaches 
to the reality such as vessel size and transportation 
center concept.
With relatively higher speed and smaller size Evergreen 
can pay muliple port calls where a direct call has an 
advantage in terms of transit time and transhipment cost 
which are the merits of traditional end-to-end service, 
which means that the feedering system in the Evergreen 
case is not as important as the case of US Line.
5) Marketing segmentation
Naturally, the cost leadership strategy has a very low 
cost position, which leads to the fact that the strategy 
can easily penetrate lower freight markets.
In US Line case, as shown in TableC2-9), the transit time 
is long and in addition to this, in some regions, the 
cargo should be transhipped to the sea legs for its 
destination.
Therefore, the service rendered by US Lines is not 
attractive to high paying cargo.
Another factor to be considered is the problems with its 
equipment. The line is keen on using AO ft containers 
rather than 20 ft units because of the economies of scale
12A
offered, not the least in loading and discharing opera­
tions (47) .
The ship was designed to carry more suitably 40 ft con­
tainers as can be seen in the ship's particulars.
However, both the Middle East/lndian subcontinent and 
Europe—Far East trades are predominantly a " weight tra­
de", with a preponderence of 20 ft units.
Especially in the case of the Europe—Far East market, 
market sources estimate that there is a 60/40 ratio in 
favor of 20 footers.
Therfore, it is very much likely that US Lines may be 
obliged either to offer 20ft units and use 40ft units to 
carry 20ft cargoes at 20ft rates, or to follow 40ft car­
goes which consist of low-density goods to fill 40ft 
units.
However, Evergreen Line has a different position in pene­
trating the market.
The transit time, multiple port calls, ship's speed, 
ship's design and its equipment all these factors are 
effective to focus on the market segment of high paying 
cargo.
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PART III
THE ANALYSIS OF THE RTW PRACTICES AND CONCLUSION
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Chapter 8 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE RTW 
CONCEPT
Previously, we have discussed the definition of the RTW 
concept and its practical application to the real market. 
Thus the task given in this chapter is to identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of the RTW concept.
Some of the topics in this connection were conducted very 
hypothetically without any elaboratiofi of statistical and 
analytical study mainly due to lack of time to collect 
relevant data.
Nevertheless, the major factors which influence the RTW 
concept significantly are included in the comparison 
of costs with a computer model in the next chapter.
The advantages and disadvantages which are discussed, are 
broken down as follows :
1. Advantages
1) Cross-subsidization
2) Imbalance of trade
3) Market penetration and cost reduction
4) Bargaining power
2. Disadvantages
1) Transit time
2) Feeder costs
3> Optimum Service configuration 
4) Flexibility and adaptability
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8.1 Advantage
1) Cross-subsidization
The RTW concept has an advantage of cross-subsidization 
among the segments of the global routes.
This cross-subsidization can be explained with two 
different aspects,namely, operational and revenue.
The operational advantage comes from its circumnavigation 
of several traditional end-to-end routes. which means 
that as shown in figure<2-2), in the end-to-end service, 
most of the cargo is discharged at the two extreme ports, 
while the circumnavigators do not.
Accordingly, the utilization of the ship can be kept at a 
maximum level in any port of trade theoretically, while 
that of the end-to-end service is decreased in each end 
of the trade route.
Another important aspect is the cross-subsidization of 
revenues among different trades.
Because of various factors, the trade volumes are 
fluctuating, which means that one trade is booming while 
others are not and vice versa later.
However, hyphothetically, the RTW service as an 
integrated global marketing activitiy can stabilize its 
revenues through the cross-subsidization among different 
trades.
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2). Imbalanced trade
As showen in Table(3-1), substantial imbalances of con­
tainer flows exist in both directions of the main stream 
routes.
The imbalanced proportions in the three main arterial 
routes can be derived from the estimated container flows 
as follows ;
Table(3-1) ,
Estimated Imbalance Container Flows
1984 1985
U.S./Asia eastbound 100 100
westbound 63 63
N.America/Europe
eastbound 100 100
westbound 137 142
Europe/ Far East
eastbound 100 100
westbound 197 190
*** Note:! The container flow of westbound traffic a 
trade is compared with that of traffic by 
using eastbound traffic by using 100 percent.
2 This comparison was produced based on 
Table<2-15>.
This table shows the significant problems of end-to-end 
carriers in empty conatainer handling caused by the imba­
lance of the trade in different directions.
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Statistics shows that in 1982 just over nine million out 
of the total 42.25 million port TEU movements involved 
empties and Container Insight has pointed out that for 
the world's container carriers, the phenomenon of such 
huge negative volume for the transportation service meant 
a very considerable logistic problem and the paying out 
of the US $ 450-500 million to the port to enable the
system to work .
However, the RTW concept especially in the case of the 
two-way direction deployment is effective to solve becau­
se the handling of empty containers in the RTW concept 
has more options, such as putting the boxes to the next 
leg of the trade, which gives a great advantage to the 
RTW carrier in operational and marketing aspects.
3) Market penetration and cost reduction
The RTW concept defined as being an overall cost leader­
ship strategy requires an aggressive establishment of 
cost effective scale faci1ities,thus vigorous pursuit of 
cost initiative is exercised through the low cost posi­
tion of the strategy in such a way that the firm harvests 
above-average returns in its industry destpite the pre­
sence of intense competitive forces.
Such a strong defensive cost position of the RTW concept 
lies certainly on its economies of scale and low cost 
structure.
Therefore, the benefits of economies of scale in the RTW 
concept can be realized at the area of marketing penetra­
tion and cost reduction .
13D
Further discussion regarding the cost effectiveness of 
the RTW concept is made in the next chapter by using 
a computer model.
4) Bargaining power
In the previous chapter, the price of ships and per TEU 
slot have been compared between the ships of the RTW 
carriers and others.
Such a significant low price of the RTW carrier could be 
obtained not only from the situation of the shipbuilding 
market as it is a buyer oriented market, but also more 
effectively also from the bargaining power when ordering 
the same type of ships at once.
The bargaining power can be exercised not only in the 
aquisition of assets but also in many areas such as the 
special contract for port tariffs and terminals.
In many of the major ports where the RTW carriers are 
calling, it is easily identified that the allocation of 
the berth and the location of container storage area are 
very favorable to the RTW carriers, because of their lar­
ger volume of trade.
The bagaining power gives the carriers other benefit in 
financial terms. They may be granted financial credit on 
a longer term by the contractors, the port company,or 
terminal operator.
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8.2 Disadvantage
1) Transit time
In the RTW circuit compared with the end-to-end service, 
the transit time would be longer in certain segments of 
trades.
For example,in the trade between the Mediterranean/ Midd­
le East and the U.S.A., the end-to-end service offers 
direct carriage of cargo without calling ports of a third 
country such as Rotterdam in the RTW circumnavigation, by 
deviating from the shortest geographical route, which 
means that a longer transit time is inevitable conside­
ring the feedering coverage,so the trade between the 
north and the south takes much longer transit time in the 
RTW concept.
However, we may find contradicting cases like the 
transatlantic trade where Hapag-Lloyd line offers a 
27-day round trip calling 13 ports in both regions.
In this route, it takes around 2D days to carry cargo 
from Halifax to Greenok because the ships are calling 
all 12 ports during the round trip to arrive at the 
destination in another extremity as shown in Figure in 
the appendixes.
Therefore, the longer transit time could be one of disad­
vantages of the RTW concept only in a general context.
2) Feeder costs
One of the major drawback of the RTW concept is the fee­
der costs which are inevitable an accomplishment of the 
global market network.
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As discussed earlier, the basic elements cf the RTW con­
cept in operational aspect are the horizontal extremity 
and vertical feeder connection. Thus the costs involved 
in feedering coverage would be an important factor by 
which the carrier should determine the number of port 
calls in circumnavigation by comparing the benefit of 
economies of scale at sea.
Because of the significant adverse effect, the feeder 
costs are included in the voyage cost comparison in the 
next chapter.
3!) Optimum service configuration-
In the traditional end-to-end service concept, the 
optimum service configuration has been determined through 
widely different solutions in terms of vessel size, speed 
and among other reasons, because of the heterogeneous 
characteristics of cargo and trade in the particular rou­
te concerned.
The study done by the Maritime Transport Center at the 
University of Liverpool(48) identified that an optimum 
sized ship for an end-to-end north west Europe /Far East 
trade at a weekly frequency might be of the order of 
2,700 TEU while the Middle East /Far East trade could be 
as low as 700 TEU and moreover, at a lower frequency. 
Accordingly, ships optimized in one trade route may not 
be suitable for another trade route which has different 
characteristics.
Therefore, the RTW concept certainly does not have advan­
tage in the trade where its service configuration, such 
as the size of ships and speed, are not favorable.
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However, this would be easily compensated by the 
cross-subsidization among the trades as mentioned before, 
because the shorter trade route is included as a part of 
a larger segment of coverage in the RTW concept.
4) Flexibility and adaptability
The advantage of economies of scale comes from the scale 
of the ship and its fleet, which means that hypothetical­
ly, the larger scale benefits are involved, the more 
benefits are gained, provided that cargo is available. 
However, the operational flexibility deploying ships 
either to the RTW circumnavigation or to the traditional 
end-to-end service, would decrease, if the size of ships 
are phenomenal, which means that the adaptability to the 
change of the market conditions would become rigid.
This is not the case of Evergreen line but the case of US 
Lines.
The reason is obvious and this is why one shipping 
industry source said, in the Lloyd's List dated July 28 
1986, that up-to-date valuation of the jumbo econoship of 
US Lines, on a willing seller/wi11ing buyer basis is of 
around US $ 33 million only and in case of a distressed 
seller, eventual prices could be even lower, particularly 
as the number of potential buyers is relatively limited.
Therefore, the RTW concept should be constructed in such 
a way that flexibility and adaptability are well balan­
ced .
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Chapter 9. CASE STUDIES ON COSTS COMPARISONS
As discussed in the previous chapter, the RTW concept has 
advantages and disadvantages compared with the traditio­
nal concept of the end-to-end trade service.
Certainly, the most important advantage consists in the 
advantage of economies of soale which should be obtained 
sufficiently enough to cover the disadvantages whose 
major factors are transit time and transhipment costs.
Therefore, the task given in tlfis chapter is to elaborate 
the comparison of costs between the RTW service and the 
traditional service as a case study.
The case study includes three approaches:
Dthe comparison of the cost at sea in terms of TEU mile 
between the containerships of US Lines, Evergreen Line 
and Hapag-Lloyd Line,
2) the comparison of average voyage costs between US 
Lines' RTW service and Hapag-Lloyd service in the segment 
of transatlantic trade route and
3) The conclusion of the comparisons.
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9.1 The Comparison of the Cost at Sea in Terms of
TEU Mile between the Containerships of US Lines, 
Evergreen Line and Hapag-Lloyd Line
The advantage of economies of scale can be gained in 
various areas, such as purchasing, production, marketing 
and distribution of products i.e. service products in my 
discussion.
However, among the various areas, the advantage of econo­
mies of scale gained, in the area of production process 
is most significant.
Hence the costs per TEU mile are.compared between the RTW 
service of Evergreen and US Lines with a traditional 
end-to-end service carrier, Hapag-Lloyd Line.
The comparison was undertaken by using a computer costing 
model which was developed by The World Bank,titled "A 
Vessel and Voyage Costing Model for Project 
Appraisal"<A9>.
The computer costing model includes the vessel-costing 
module, the voyage-costing module and the fleet module. 
The voyage-costing module and fleet module are not suit- 
table to compute the RTW service concept because they 
were designed to provide the analysis for traditional 
roundtrip voyages.
However, the vessel-costing module of the computer model 
can be used in a stand-alone mode to determine the dailly 
costs of a vessel in port and at sea.
Therefore, this module is used to obtain the cost per TEU 
mile of each carrier's container vessels.
a) Input data and the ship's particulars
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In the process of preparation, before running the compu­
ter model, collecting adequate data and information from 
the reality were so diffcult that some data were put down 
as assumptions.
The data concerning the ship's particulars are based on 
Table(2-6)and (2-11) discussed in the previous chapter.
1) However, the case of Hapag-Lloyd containerships need 
some detailed explanation
There are three reasons why Hapag-Lloyd containerships 
are selected in this comparison;
First, the vessels are currently deployed in one of the 
main stream trades, the transatlantic route, secondly 
Hapag-Lloyd Line is one of the typical traditional con­
tainer liner carriers deploying the vessels in the multi­
port trade route, thirdly, the containerships built in 
1977-78, were jumboised from the rating of 1758 TED to 
2594 TEU with the converting cost of D.M.5D mill lion 
from 25 July to 12 December 1985.
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The particulars of these vessels are sumerined as fol­
lows ;
Name Built D.W.T. Length Breath dft. TED Power Speed.
(bhp)
Dussel 1977 40,900 202.42 32.21 11.0 2594 33300 21.5
dorf
Express C2) (1)
Koln 1978 
Express 
Stuttgart 
Express 1977 
Nurnburg
Express 1978 " " " " " “ "
Note:(I) Jumboised from d.w.t.of 32,470 to 40,900.
C2) As being jumboised in 1984, the remaining life 
of the ship is also assumed increase up to 18 
years, therfore, the data column of "Year Built" 
is 1984.
Source: Motor Ship "Ship on Order".
21 The fuel cost per tonne.
Data regarding the fuel cost per tonne is based on the 
Rotterdam sport bunker price at the end of February 1986 
quoted from Lloyd's shipping Economist of March 1986, and 
calculated in such a viay that the ship consumes the bun­
kers, 20 percent of "DO" and 80 percent of "HVO". 
Accordingly, the fuel cost per tonne comes out with the 
following formula:
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US $179 ("DO" price per tonne)x20 % = US $ 35,8 -A 
US $ 95 ("HVO" price per tonne)x80 % = US $ 76,0 -B 
A + B = US $ 111,8 per tonne.
3) The scrap price is base on the price of the Taiwan 
breaker market in April 1986.
A) The assumption for the crew costs in US Line is US $ 
3,108,000 on an annual basis with 21 crew, which makes 
the daily crew costs to be US $ 8,500 per crew.
In the Evergreen case, the annual crew costs are assumed 
as US $ 581,000 with 17 crew,' which is one fifth of the 
cost of the US Line case.
Regarding the Hapag-Lloyd case, the crew cost is assuemed 
to be three times of the cost of the Evergreen.
The types of data and its value in the case of US 
Lines,Evergreen Line and Hapag-Lloyd Line are shown in 
the following tables (3-2) , (3-3) and <3--A) .
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TABLE (;3"2;)
Data, for Computer Analysis (US Lines)
DAILY COST FOR CONTAINER SHIP,
19S5 VESSEL COSTING MODLLE FOR CONTAINERS VESSELS
TYPE OF DATA VALUE 1 FORM I UNITS
REQUIRED INPUT DATA 1 1
CAPACITY IN TEU 4482 IXXXX 1 TWENTY FOOT EQUIVALENT UNITS
YEAR BUILT 1984 119XX 1
DEADWEIGHT 58.6 IXX.X I THOUSANDS OF DEADWEIGHT TONNES
VESSEL UTILIZATION 355 IXXX IDAYS PER YEAR
NATIONALITY OF OFFICERS 1 IX 11. Li.S.A. 2. EUROPE’S. GREEK
NATIONALITY OF CREW 1 IX 14.K0R/SIf^G/PHIL 5.INDIA
ENGINE/FUEL TYPE 1 IX 11. MSD 2. LSD 3. STEAM 4. GAS
LOADED SPEED 17.5 IXX IKNOTS
FUEL COST 112 IXXX.X It PER TONNE’EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 8 IXX.X H FINANCIAL RA-;E EXCL.INFLATION
EX'PECT. RATE OF RETURN 14 IXX.X iX FINANCIAL RATE INCt.INFLATION
CURRENT SCRAP PRICE 115 IXXX if PER TONIE
PRICE OF CONTAINERS 2500 IXXXX ICOST OF BOX IN t PER TEU
-ASSLINED VALLES-
REPLACEKNT COST OF VESL 
REMAINING LIFE OF VEBSL 
RESALE VALLE OF (ESSEL
A7.5D IXX.XXXI MILLIONS OF t
IS IXX I REMAINING YEARS OF USEFUL LIFE 
47.50 !XX.XXXI MILLIONS OF f
■! MAX 
! 54.6 
I 31 
i54.63
I MIN 
i 40.4 
I 16 
135.11
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL 
NO. OF OFFICERS 
NO. OF RATINGS 
COST PER OFFICER
47.50 IXX.XXXmiLLIONS OF $ 154.63
7 !XX !N0. OF OFFICERS IN SHIP'S CREW i 12
14 IXX iNO. ABLE-BODIED SEAMEN IN CREW I 21
14S.D IXXXXXXiS GuO'S/YEAR FOR ONE CREW SLOT 1162.S
140.38 
1 ID 
1 17
1133.2
COST PER RATING 
LENGTH (LOA)
BEAM
SLIM)'£F DRA.FT 
DESIGN SPEED 
ACTUAL LOADED SPEED 
ACTUAL SPEED IN EAlLAST 
SHP (SHIP HORSEPOWER) 
INSUR. COST (P8I + HiM) 
REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE 
STORES
PROVISIONS (DA.ILY) 
ADMINISTRATION 
VESSEL LITILIZATION 
VESSEL LIFE
FUEL CONS-AT SEA LOADED 
-IN PORT 
COST FOR rEW CONTAINERS
148.0 iXXXXXXlINCL. BENEFITS,ASLlHE 2 M£N/SL0T1162.8 1133.2 
2S0 iXXXX I METERS(IF FEET THIN ft./ 3.28)1 269 1 220
32 IXXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28)1 33 1 30
11.6 IXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28)1 12.8 1 10.4
18.0 IXX.X IKNOTS 1 23.0 1 14.0
17.5 iXX.X IKNOTS: LOW VALUE FOR DEADWEIGHT! - 114.30
17.5 IXX.X IKNOTS:HIGK VALUE FOR DEADWEIGHTil8.20 1 -
28000 IXXXXX IS.H.P. FOR MAIN PROPULSION SYST155345 113171
1.0 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS S OF REPLAC.C05TI 1.3 1 0.7
2.0 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS S OF PIPLAC.COST! 2.5 I 1.5
0.5 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS % OF REPLAC.COSTI 0.7 1 0.3
9.5 IXXX It PER CREW MEMBER PER DAY 1 12.5 1 7.5
10.0 IXX.X !AN?TJAL COST AS S OF CREW AND RSI 13.0 1 7.0
355 IXXX 1 AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS PER YEAR! 408 I 302
20 IXX JNO. OF YEARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I 30 1 15
70.0 IXX.X ITON.NES FUEL PER DAY (24 HOURS) I 64.0 1 59.5
2.5 IXX.X 1T0N1€S FUEL PER DAY (24 HOURS) 1 3.0 I 2.0
28.01 iXX.XX ItMN FOR 2.5 SETS:5 YR OLD B0XEBI22.70 I
I
I
I
I
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T A B L E ( 3 ~ 3 )
D a ta  f o r  CoiTiputer A n a l y s i s  ( E v e r g r e e n  L i n e )
DAILY COST FOR CONTAINER SHIP,19B5 VESSEL COSTING NODLLE FOR CONTAif€RB VESSELS
TYProrOATA" '“T'vS!LlE"’T'FORin” UMITS
REQJISED IKPLIT DATA 1 
CAPACITY IN TEU I
YEAR BUILT I
DEADVEIGHT I
vessel UTILIZATION I 
NATIONALITY OF OFFICERS 1 
NATIOfWLITY OF CREW 1 
ENEINE/FUEL TYPE I 
LOADED SPEED 1
FUEL COST 1EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 1 
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 1 
CURRENT SCRAP PRICE 1 
PRICE OF CONTAINERS 1 '----- ASSUMED VALiJES
replacemnt cost of VESLI 
REMAINING LIFE OF VEESl! 
RESAi-E VALLE OF VESSa 1 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL I 
NO. OF OFFICERS I
NO. OF RATINGS 1
COST PER OFFICER 1 
COST PER RATING I
LENGTH (LOA) I
BEAM 1
BJMfER DRAFT I
DESIGN SPEED I
ACTUAL LOADED SPEED iACTUAL SPEED IN BALLAST 1
BHP (SHIP HORSEPOlfER) 1 
INSUR. COST (Pil + HSM)I 
REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE 1
STORES IPROVISIONS (DAILY) 1
ADMINISTRATION I
VESSa LITILIZATION 1
VESSEL LIFE 1FUa COfffi-AT SEA LOADED 1 -IN PORT I 
COST FOR NEW CCBfTAINERSl
2726 IXXXX I TWENTY FOOT EQUIVALENT UNITS ___ I
196A I19XX 1 'A3.A IXX.X ITHOUSANDS OF DEADWEIGHT TONNES i
3S5 IXXX I DAYS PER YEAR IA IX 11. U.S.A. 2. EUROPE 3. GREEK I
A IX lA.KOR/SlNG/PHlL 5.INDIA I
1 IX II. MSD 2. LSD 3. STEAM A. GAS !
20.0 IXX IKNOTS. I
112 IXXX.X !$ PER TONNE I6 IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.lNaATlON I
lA IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE INCL.iN'LATlON 1
115 IXXX It PER TONNE >2AD0 IXXXX ICOST OF BOX IN $ PER TEU ----___________________________I MAX I MIN I
30.00 IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF $ ' 3*i.5 I 2s.5 I
18 IXX I REMAINING 'YEARS OF USEFUL LIFE I 31 I It I
30.00 IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF $ I3A.5D 122.17 I
30.00 IXX.XXXI MILLIONS OF t . !3A.S0 125.50 1
7 IXX INO. OF OFFICERS IN SHIP'S CREW I 12 1 10 i
10 IXX INO. ABLE-BODIED SEAI'EN IN CREW I 21 I 17 I
3A.2 IXXXXXXit DOO'B/YEAR FOR ONE CREW SLOT 1 37.6 I 30.8 I 
3A.2 IXXXXXXIINCL. BENEFITS,ABUME 2 MEN/SLOTl 37.6 I 30.6 1 
230 IXXXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28)1 269 1 220 1
IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28)1 33 1 30 1
IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28)1 12.8 I 10.A I
IKNOTS ' 23.0 1 lA.O 1
I nw UAIUE FOR DEADWEIGHT! -
32 IXXX 
11.6 IXX
20.5 IXX.X
'yR.n nry.x H A - a H  !20.0 IXX.X IKNOTStHlGH VAIUE FOR DEADWEIGHT 118.20 I " >
■2A000 IXXXXX iS.H.P. FOR MAIN PROPULSION SYST1A5A22 I1D933 1
1.0 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS X OF REPLAC.COSTI 1.3 I 0.7 I
2.0 IXX.X IAN?-rUAL COST AS I OF EPuAC.COSTI 2.5 I 1.5 I
0.5 IXX.X lANT'liJAL COST AS X OF REPLAC.COSTI 0.7 1 0.3 I
9.5 IXXX It PER CREW MEMBER PER DAY 1 12.5 I 7.5 1
10.0 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS X OF CREW AND RJl 13.0 I 7.0 1
355 IXXX iAVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS PER YEAR I AOS I 302 1
20 IXX INO. OF N'EARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I 30 1 15 I
65.0 IXX.X ITONNES FUa PER DAY (2A HOURS) 1 76.0 1 55.3 1
2.0 IXX.X ITONNES FIEL PER DAY (2A HOURS) 1 2.5 1 1.5 1
17.05 IXX.XX ItMN FOR 2.5-SETSsS YR OLD B0XESI13.82 1 !
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TABLEC3-4>
Oats, for Computer Analv&is (Hapap-Lioyd Line)
DAILY COST FOR CONTAINER SHIP,’19EE VESSEL COSTING NODULE FOR CONTAINERS VESSELS
TYPE OF DA.TA i VALUE 1 FORM I UNITS 11
FEOJIREO INPUT DATA 1 1 ] 1
CAPACITY IN TEU 1 259A IXXXX ITWENTY FOOT EQUIVALENT UNITE 1
YEAR BUILT 1 i9BA S19XX 1 1
DEADWEIGHT 1 22.5 iXXiX ! THOUSANDS OF DEADWEIGHT TOIWES !
VESSEL UTILIZATION 1 3E5 IXXX IDAYS PER YEAR 1
NATIONALITY OF CFFICERSI 2 IX ii. U.S.A. 2. EUROPE 3. GREEK i
NATIOt^LITY OF CREW 1 2 !X lA.KOR/SING/FHIL S.INDIA 1
ENGINE/FLEL TYPE 1 iX 11. NSD 2. LSD 3. STEAK A. GAS I
LOADED SPEED 1 21.0 iXX I KNOTS 1FUEL COST 1 112 iXXX.X i5 PER TONNE 1
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 1 8 IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.INFLATION i
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 1 lA IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE 1NC».INFLATION 1CURRENT SCRAP PRICE 1 115 IXXX If PER TONNE 1
PRICE OF CONTAINERS 1 2500 IXXXX 1 COST OF BOX IN f PER TEU MAX 1 MIN----- nbiiJrcU  VHLutb'
REPLACETNT COST OF VESL! 30.00 IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF $ 34. S I 25.S
FaiATNINS LIFE OF VESSLl 16 IXX I REMAINING YEARS OF USEFUL LIFE 31 1 16
RESALE VALLE OF VESSEL ! 30.00 IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF f 34.ED 122.17
ORIGIILAL COST OF VESSEL 1 60.00 IXX.XXX!MILLIONS OF $ 69.00 151.DO
NO. OF OFFICERS 1 7 IXX IND. OF OFFICERS IN SHIP'S CREW 12 I ID
NO. OF RATINGS I lA IXX INO. ABLE-BODIED SEAMEN IN CREW 21 I 17
COST PER OFFICER 1 102.6 iXXXXXXIS OOO'S/YEAR FOR ONE CREW ELO’ 112.9 1 92.3
COST PER RATING 1 1D2.6 IXXXXXXIINCL. BENEFITS,ASUrE 2 NEN/SLOT112.9 1 92.3
LENGTH (LOA) 1 202 IXXXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28) 269 1 220
BEAII 1 32 IXXX IHETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26) 33 1 30
SLr:NER DRAFT 1 11.0 IXX IMETEHSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26) 12.6 1 10.4
DESIGN SPEED 1 21.5 IXX.X 1 KNOTS 23.0 I 14.0
ACTUAL LOADED SPEED i 21.0 IXX.X 1 KNOTS: LOW VALUE FOR DEA.DWIEIGHT - 113.70
ACTLIAL SPEED IN BALLAST 1 21.0 IXX.X IKNOTS:HISH VALUE FOR DEADWEIGnT!20.30 1. -BMP (SHIP HORSEPOWER) 1 33300 IXXXXX iS.H.P. FOR MAIN FROPLtSION EYSTI37577 I 9164
INSUR. COST (P&I + H&H)1 1.0 IXX.X iANffJAL COST AS X OF REFuAC.COST! 1.3 1 0.7
REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE I 2.0 IXX.X lANNLiAL COST AS X OF REFLAC.COSTI 2.5 1 1.5
STORES 1 0.5 IXX.X !ANNUAL COST AS X OF REPbAC.COSTI ,0.7 i D.3
PROVISIONS (DAILY) i 9.5 IXXX If PER CREW KEr£ER PER DAY 12.5 I 7.5
ADKINISTRATION 1 10.0 IXX.X IA.NNUAL COST AS X OF CREW AND R&1 13.0 i 7.0
VESSEL LTILIZATION 1 355 IXXX 1 AVERAGE NUISER DAYS PER YEAR 405 1 30C2
VESSEL LIFE 1 20 IXX- INO. OF YEARS OF ECONDMIC LIFE 1 30 1 15
FUEL CONE-AT SEA LOADED 1 131.9 IXX.X 1 TONNES FLEL PER DAY (2A HOURS? 1156.3 1112.1
-IN FORT 1 3.0 IXX.X !TONf€S FUEL PER DAY (24 HOURS) 1 3.5 1 2.5
COST FOR NEW CONTAINERS! 16.21 IXX.XX IfMN FOR 2.5 3ETS:5 YR OLD B0XESI13.14 1
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b> The results of running the computer model include the 
daily cost for containerships and a summary of daily 
costs at sea and in port based on the various methods of 
computation as shown in Table(3-5),C3-6) and (3-7>.
With the outcomes of the computer run,the cost for TEU 
mile was calculated as follows;
1) Summeries of the daily costs at sea and in port based 
on the method of the Fixed Depreciation.
Lines At sea In port
US $ US- ^
US Lines 51,5QG 43,900
Evergreen 3D,400 23,300
Hapag-Lloyd 55,000 40,600
2) The cost for TEU mile at sea with the assumption of 
the operation at sea for 2SQ days per year.
Lines Daily Operation Ship's Speed Total Cost per
cost days capacity TEU TEU mile
US $ TEU Kn mile Cent(A)
(Mil lion)
US Line 51 ,500 280 4,482 17 .5 527 2.7
Evergreen 30,400 280 2,728 20 366.6 2.32
Hapag-Lloyd 55,000 280 2,594 -21 366 4.2
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Table C3-E:)
Output of Computer Running for Ve el Costs(US Lines)
DAILY COST FOR CONTAINER SHIP,
OUTPUT VALLES EXPECTED 1 
1
i i 
1 !
HIGH LOW
FUEL COSTS - IN PORT 1 0.3 i ITHOUS. OF 1 PER DAY ! O.A ! 0.2
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.8 1 ITHOUS. OF $ PER DAY i1D.3 ! 6.0
ANNUAL COST OF CREW 1 3108 1 ITHOUS. OF $ PER YEAR 13A19 2797
ANNL. COST OF PROVISION 1 71 1 ITHOUS. OF * PER YEAR 1 107 ! AS
ANNL. COST OF INSURANCE! A75 1 ITHOUB. OF t PER YEAR 1 710 285
A,NtiL. COST OF R 8 M 1 950 1 ITHOUS. OF % PER YEAR !1366 ! 606
ANNL. COST OF STORES 1 236 1 ITHOUS. OF $ PER YEAR 1 382 1 121
ANNL. COST OF ADMIN. 1 AD6 i ITHOU^S. OF * PER YEAR 1 622 ! 238
ANNL. NON-CAPITAL COSTS 1 52A7 1 ITHOUS. OF $ PER YEAR(EXCL FUEL)! 6606 !A092
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 1 1 I !
IN FINANCIAL TERMS i 10236 ! !1.FIXED DEPF.EC1ATI0N-DECLIN BAL 111771 !8700
IN THOUSANDS OF U.B. 1 3300 1 12.RETURN ON ESALE VALUE 1A370 !2609
DOLLARS PER YEAR 1 7008 i 13.ANNUALIZED RESALE VALUE i£736 !5093
BASED ON THE ! 7691 1 !A.ANNUALIZED EPlACE VALUE !9655 16075
METHODS LISTED 1 5526 1 15.SINKING FUND-REPLACEMENT COST! 7£91 1A521
IN COLUMN 5 1. . . .  f 1 1 ! 1
LAYUP COSTS 1 31 1 ! THOUSA.NDS OF $ PER MONTH ! 37 ! 25
SCRAPPING PRICE 1 1.29 1 ! MILLIONS OF S (LESS ISX DELIVE! 1.A2 !1.16
ETURN ON SALVAGE 1 
!
103 1 
!
! THOUSANDS OF $ PER YEAR ! 
! !
198 1
!
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■ABSUfED CONSTANTS---------
EST FOR CONTAINERBHIP,
VESSEL COST SUNNARY TABLE 
(THOUSANDS OF US« PER DAY AT SEA AND IN PORT)
hETHOD
--- AT SEA---- IN PORT!------------------------
51.5 ' A3.9 11. FIX DEPREC. (DECLIN BAL.) + OPER. C
10.3 2.8 12.-AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAMIP (EXCLUDES C
19.1 11.5 13. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (INCLUKS C
22.8 15.1 lA. OPERATING COSTS
33.3 25.8 !5. RETURN ON RESALE VALUE + OPER. COST
A1.3 33.6 16. km. EBALE VALUE+OPER. COSTS-LAYUP
22.9 15.A 17. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALUE + OPER. COS
A2.A 3A.6 16. Al^ UALIZED EBALE VALL€ + OPER. COS
AA.3 36.7 19. ANN-UALI2ED REPLACE VALl£ + OPER. CO
38.2 3D.6 110. SINKING FUND-EPLACEENT COST + OP
Table(3-6)
Output of Computei' Running for Ve&Eel CoBte 
(Evergreen Line)
DAILY COST FOR CONTAINER SHIP,
O'JTPLiT VALUES
FUEL COSTS - IN PORT I 0.2
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.3
ANNUAL COST OF CREN 1 561
A.NNL. COST OF PROVISION 1 57
ANM. COST OF INSURANCE! 300
ANf^. COST OF R 8 M 1 600
AN>(L. COST OF STORES 1 150
ANNL. COST OF ADMIN. 1 118
ANM. NON-CAPITAL COSTS 1 1607
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1
IN FINANCIAL TERMS 1 6391
IN THOUSANDS OF U.B. I 2ADD
DOLLARS PER YEAR 1 A37A
BASED ON THE 1 A792
METHODS LISTED 1 3A90
IN COLUMN G 1
LAYUP COSTS 1 29
SCRAPPING PRICE 1 l.OS
RETURN ON SALVAGE 1 67
EXPECTED i
1______________________
iTHOUS. OF % PER DAY
ITH0U5. OF $ PER DAY
ITHOUS. OF i PER YEAR
ITHOUS. OF % PER YEAR
ITHOUS. OF i PER YEAR
ITHOLIS. OF % PER YEAR
ITHOUS. OF % PER YEAR
ITHCXJS. OF $ PER YEAR
ITHOUS'. OF i PER YEARCEXCL FUEL)
I
II .FIXED. DEPRECIATION-DECLIN B.AL 
12.RETURN ON RESALE VALUE
IS.ANNUALIZED RESALE VALUE 
lA.ANfTJALlZED REPLACE VALUE 
IS.SINKING FuND-REP^ ACEKENT COST
ITHOUSANDS OF $ PER MONTH 
MILLIONS OF $ (LESS ISS D 
THOUSANDS OF $ PER MAR
1 HIGH ! LOH 
1 1
1 0.3 1 0.2
1 9.6 1 5.6
1 6AD 1 523
1 67 1 36
1 AA9 1 179
1 663 1 383
1 2A2 1 77
1 195 1 63
1 2A7A 1 112631
1 73SD 16A32
1 2760 1177A
I 5A59 13171
1 6023 13780
1 A9BA
1
1
1
2662
1---
1 35
■I*
23
1 1.19 i0.97
1 167 1 136
-ASSUMED CONSTANTS--
EST FOR CONTAINERSHIP, ..
VESSEL COST SUMMARY TAEtE 
(THOUSANDS OF USt PER DAY AT SEA A.ND IN PORT)
METHOD
--- AT SEA---- IN PORT!-------------------------
30.A 23.3 II. FIX DEPREC. (DECLIN EAL.) + OFER. C
6.6 1.5 12. AV01DAS.LE COSTS - LAYUP (EXaUDES C
10.2 3.2 13. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (INCLUDES C
12.A 5.3 lA. OPERATING COSTS
19.1 12.1 15. RETURN ON RESALE VALUE + OPER. COST
23.7 16.7 16. ANN, P£EALE VALUE+OPER. COSTS-LAYUF
12.6 5.6 17. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALUE + OPER. COB
2A.7 17.6 IB. AfiNUALIZED RESALE VALUE + OPER. COS
25.9 18.8 19. ANNUALIZED REPLACE VALUE + OPER. CO
22.2 15.1 IlD. SINKING FUND-REPLACEMENT COST + OP
■ 1A5
Output of Computer Runninq for Vessel Costs
Table <3--7;)
(HaDag-Lloyd Line!
WILY CO-T FOR CO'TAINER SHIP.
OUTPUT VALUES EXPECTED ; 
1
1 1 
1 1
HIGH 1 LOW 
1
FUEL COSTS - IK PORT 1 0.3 I ITHCUS. OF S FER DAY 1 C.A 1 C.3
- AT SEA LOADED 1 1A.8 1 ITHO'JS. OF $ PER DAY 119.5 1 11.3
ANNUAL COST OF CREv'! 1 2155 1 ITHOUS. OF S PER YEAR i2370 I 1939
ANIL. COST OF PROVISION! 71 1 ITHOUS. OF % PER YEAR 1 107 1 A8
AKlxL. COST OF INSURANCE i 3DD 1 ITH'OUB. OF $ PER MAR i AA9 1 179
ANNL. COST OF R S H 1 600 1 ITriOJS. OF $ PER YEAR 1 E63 1 383
ANN-. COST OF STORES 1 150 ! ITKO'JS. OF ¥ FER YEAR 1 2A2 ! 77
Al^NL. COST OF ADMIN. 1 275 1 ITHOUS. OF ¥ PER YEAR 1 A2D 1 163
ANNL. NON-CAPITAL COS'S! 3551 1 ITHOUS. OF t PER YEAR(EXCL FUEL)! AA50 1 276?
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 1 I ! 1
IK FINANCIAL TERMS i 107SA 1 11.FIXED DEPRECIATIOK-DECLrv BALH23AA ! 9i2A
IN THOUSANDS OF U.B. 1 2ADD 1 12.RETURN ON RESALE VALUE !2760 1 177A
DC'LLARS PER YEAR i A3C7 1 !3.A;^(JA..I2ED RESALE VALLE 15362 ! Sill
BASED ON THE !1 A7C7 1 lA.ANNUALIZED REFuACE VALUE 15925 1 3705
METHODS LISTED 1 3A9D 1 15.SINKING FUND-REPLACEMEKT COST! A95A 1 2562
IN COLUMN G !1  1 ! i » .. 1 1--------- - ]
LAYUP COSTS 1
1  « ---\
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including3) The cost for TEU mile in the whole voyage 
the costs in port.
Lines Daily Port cost for Total Total cost per %
cost days port opn. TEU TEU with
in port days cost mile mile (A)
(US f) ("ODOfl (Million$)(Kn) (cent)
US Line 43,900 75 3,292 17.71 527 3.36 124
Evergreen 23,300 75 1 ,747 10.26 366. 6 2.8 1 2 0
Hapag- 40,600 75 3,045 18.44 366 5.03 119
Lloyd
These figures in the above 2)1 and 3) show a significant
reduction of the operating costs of the RTW carriers com-
pared with Hapag—Lloyd.
Eventhough, the Hapag-Lloyd containership was drastically 
jumboised up to 50 % in TEU capacity, the RTW carriers 
still have a significant advantage in terms of the cost 
per TEU mile.
Furthermore, these results reflect a very important fact 
namely that the advantage of economies of scale in the 
vessel operation is obtained only at sea.
In the comparison of the above summeries, 2 ) and , we 
can identify that the cost which comes to 3.36 cent in 
case of US Lines after including the cost in port, being 
increased by 24 percent, while the cost TEU mile of 
Hapag-Lloyd is increased only by 19 percent.
The result of the TEU mile cost comparison is very much 
similar to results of the analysis made by Alex.Brown & 
Sons, Inc(50).
Eventhough, some data, especially the ships capacity of 
US Line, are different, the results show the same reflec-
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■bion of cost advantage of the RTW service.
The research team compared the RTW carriers with a Euro­
pean flag containership built during •1980-81 period and 
its results are summerized as follows;
Cost Per Container Mile
( cents )
European flag Evergreen US Line 
100 % Utilization 6.7 3.0 3.4
70 % Utilization 9.6 4.3 4.9
However, we have to take into account important factors 
by which the RTW carrier can gain such a low cost level. 
Those are the reductions of capital costs per TEU slot 
and the fuel costs as discusssed in the previous chapter.
As shown in Table(l-13), the containership, with the 
range of a capacity of 2500 TEU, was around US $ 60 mil­
lion in building price.
Therefore, using the computer cost module, various cost 
comparison per TEU mile are conducted with the assumption 
of different price levels of US Lines' and Evergreen 
Line's containerships.
The results are broken down as shown in the following 
Table<3-8).
148
Table(3-8)
Cost Per TEU Mile with Various Ship Prices
A. US Lines
Assumed ship price Cost per TEU mile Ratio
( Million $ ) ( cent ) ( % )
A7.5 3.36 100
SB 3.6 107
60 3.8 113
65 3.97 118
70 4.1 122
75 4.3 . 128
B. Evergreen Line
Assumed ship price Cost per TEU mile Ratio
< million $ ) ( cent ) C % )
30 2.8 100
35 3.0 107
40 3.3 117
45 3.6 128
50 3.8 135
55 4.0 142
60 4.3 153
***Ncte: The results of the computer work are attached in 
the appendixes, p.2-23..
The table shows that the cost per TEU mile increased 
with the increase of the price level.
The price level of US $ 60 million Evergreen ships mar­
ked 4.3 cent per TEU mile while US $ 70 million of the US
Lines' ships made 4.1 cent, however, this means that with
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the same level of ship prices they still have an advanta­
ge compared with Hapag-Lloyd vessels.
Obviously, as having been discussed so far, the RTW ser­
vice liners have significant cost advantages due to the 
scale economies.
However, what should be discussed further is that feede­
ring costs, one of the major factors giving disadvantage 
to the RTW concept, are involved in the total coverage of 
the RTW network.
Therefore, the voyage cost including a feeder operation 
should be observed.
Nevertheless, concerning this question, my observation 
encounters many difficulties when comparing the voyage 
cost of the RTW service with the cost of the traditional 
trades, because the RTW concept is totally different from 
the traditional end-to-end service concept especially in 
terms of vessel scheduling.
Therefore, the transatlantic segment of the RTW service 
is seleted to compare the voyage cost of this segment 
with that of the Hapag-Lloyd Line which is one of the 
major liners in this segment.
There are two main reasons why the transatlantic trade 
route was selected as a sample case.
First, this trade route is the shortest one among the 
three mainstream trade routes, which is a disadvantage 
for the RTW carriers from the view point of economies of 
scale.
Secondly, this trade is a typically traditional multiport 
trade route where Hapag-Lloyd has deployed 4 container- 
ships with 13 port calls in a 27-day round trip, while US 
Line is calling only two ports. New York and Rotterdam, 
which is an obvious contrast.
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9.2. The Comparison of Average Voyage Costs between the 
RTW service of the US Lines and the Hapag-Lloyd Line 
in the Segment of Transatlatic Trade Routes
Before programming this voyage cost comparison, the data 
input are based on the results of previous computer work 
concerning operating costs per TEU mile and additional 
information for variable costs.
a) [lata input
1) US Lines
A) Fixed costs per year.(Thousanads of US Dollars) 
Non-capital costs ---5,2A7
a) Annual cost of crew 3,108
b) Provision 71
c) Insurance 475
d) Repair & Maintanence 950
e) Stores 238
f) Administration 406
Captial costs --- 10,236
< With fixed depreciation method )
B) Port costs
Port costs are assumed at US $ 15,000 in US ports and US 
$ 10,000 in European ports
C) Handling costs
US Ports --- US $ 150 per box
Europe ports --- US $ 80 per box
D) Feeder service costs
Feeder services are assuemed as being covered by commer-
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cial contracts with regional feeder service operators.
US coast contract rate --- US $ 385 per TEU
European region   US $ 335 per TEU
Another assumption is the proportion of feedering among 
the entire cargo loaded and unloaded in both regions, US 
East coast and Europe.
US region   60 percent of cargo by feeder
European region   A2 percent of cargo by feeder
E) Inventory costs
US $ 9.06 per TEU/day is assumed as inventroy cost for 
the voyage of 10 days in cross atantic and feeder connec­
tions .
F) Fuel costs
a) at sea : 17.5 Knots for 9 days using 70 tons per day
b) in port : port time 2 days using 2.5 tons
c) slack time : lAhrs using 2.5 ton
at the fuel price of US $ 112 per ton.
2) Hapag-Lloyd Line
A) Fixed costs per year C thousands
Non- Capital costs --- 3,551
a) Annual cost of crew --- 2,155
b) Provisions --- 71
c) Insurance --- 475
d) R a M --- 950
e) Stores --- 150
f) Administration --- 275
Capital costs --- 10,734
( With the Fixed Depreciation method )
Dollars )
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B) Port costs
a) port costs
UB region   5 ports/per port UB $ 15,ODD
European region --- 7 ports/per port UB $ 10,000
C) Handling costs
UB Ports --- UB $ 150 per box
European Ports --- US $ 80 per box
CO Feeder service
Twenty percent'of the cargo, is served by feedering 
coverage in the European region.
E!> Inventory costs
Inventory costs per day --- US $ 9,06
for an average of 11 days on board a round trip,both 
ways.
F) Fuel costs
Fuel costs are assumed as the following
various speeds •and voyage duration.
Speed C)ay and Hours Consumption
(tons!
18 Knots 17 days lAhrs 83
15 3 " 1 1 ■ A8
Pilot time 1 • 3 " ■ 5
Port time 3 " 15 ■ 3
Slack time 1 " 3 '• 3
Total 27days
summeries with
per day
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The service schedule cf Hapag-Llcyd Line in the Transat­
lantic route is attached in the appendixes<p.28). 
According to the schedule of the service route Hapag- 
Llcyd, published in the Newspapers, "The Journal of Com­
merce" of May 2-25, 1986, the speeds of each voyage from 
one port to another should be varied as shown in Table 
(3-9),taking into account the distances between ports and 
the ETA/ETD of each port in the published schedule.
Table<3-9>
The Service Shedule of Hapag-Lloyd Line 
(. adjusted service speeds )
voyage distance service speed duration
c kn/mi le!) Ckn ) (days
N.Y—  Southempton 3,254 18 7.13
—  Le havre 105 15 0.7
—  Antewarp 244 15 0.16
—  Rotterdam 260 15 0.18
—  Hamburg 307 IS 0.17
—  Bremen 151 15 0 . 1 0
—  Greenokk 485 15 1 . 8
—  Halifax 2,625 18 6 . 2
—  New York 600 18 1 . 1 0
—  Norfolk 292 18 0.16
—  Baltimore 172 18 0 . 1 0
—  Philadelphia 95 18 0.5
—  New York 235 18 0.13
Voyage duration with the speed of 18 Knots :17 days lAhrs 
Voyage duration with the speed of 15 Knots : 3 days llhrs 
Port time C 6hrs- 8hrs in each port ) : 3 days IShrs
Pilot time : 1 day 3hrs
Slack time : 1 day 6hrs
15A
b). Programming the voyage cost module.
With the data and information input, the program is 
designed so as to produce the average voyage cost per box 
of various utilisations and the quantity of containers 
carried(Appendixes, p.2A-25).
In order to simplify the computer work, some assumptions 
were set as follows;
lithe RTW service is segmented into the Transatlantic 
route so that the voyage costs for this segment can be 
compared with the Hapag-Lloyd service.
21The cargo is assumed to be carried only from the east- 
coast of the US region and the European region with 
different les^ el of uiti 1 iration.
3)Feeder services are assumed in terms of percent of 
total volume of cargo carried as mentioned earlier.
c). Results of the computer running
Based on the data and assumptions, the computer program 
was built as shown in the appendixes, and outcomes were 
produced as the following graphs, shown in Figure (3-1) 
and (3~21.
From the two figures,we can derive an important conclu­
sion that:
Deventhough the RTW concept has the significant advan­
tage at sea in terms of the cost TEU mile as discussed 
earlier, its voyage costs including feedering costs are 
higher than the traditional multiport service in these 
given conditions.
2)in the case of US Lines, because of the larger scale,
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there is the advantage that the voyage cost per box 
rapidly decreased with the increase of utilization,
3)therefore up to 50 percent of utilization, the voyage 
cost per box of US Lines is lower than that of Hapag~L— 
loyd Line,
AlUS Line has a disadvantage from the utilization of 
50 percent because of the feedering costs which are 
variable costs,
5) if the freight level is set in point "P" in 
FigureC3-2),the profit zone of US Lines,"A", is much 
larger than that of Hapag-Lloyd, "B", which means that 
there are two options for US Lines to choose,
6) one is to make the profits maximize with keeping the 
level of freight rate "P" and another is to offer a 
lower freight level up to point "Pl" maintaing the same 
area of profit zone of Hapag Lloyd when the market is 
competitive.
7) however, in these graphs, US Lines obviously has a 
higer cost structure because of the feedering costs.
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FIGURE C3-1)
VoyaaE' Cost CofppariBon with Various Pejrcentace
of Uti 1 iza.tion Between USE! Lines and Ha.pag.Lloyd
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FIGURE C3-2!'
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9.3 The Conclusion of the Comparisons
The comparisons of the voyage costs have been discussed 
through the two different approaches so far.
Based on these comparisons, we identified the fact that 
the RTW concept certainly has a disadvantage in a given 
level of the feedering coverage.
Then, we need to observe how the cost structure is chang­
ed when the feedering costs are excluded in the voyage 
costs of US Lines service.
• \
Figure(3-3) and (3-41 were produced, using the same data 
and information and only changing the feedering costs 
which are excluded in the computer program attached in 
the Appendixes, p.26-27.
Those two figures show the apparant advantage in the 
case of the US Lines.
Therefore, through these comparisons some conclusions can 
be generalised as follows;
1) There are significant advantages for the RTW concept in 
terms of operating costs at sea.
Hence, to maximize the advantage, the number of port 
calls should be minimized, and furthermore it can be 
realized when line haul service distance is long 
enough.
2) Minimizing the number of port calls implies the incre­
ment of disadvantages in terms of feedering costs
3) The' larger coverage of the feedering service eventually
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diminishes the advantage of economies of scale.
4)Thus, in the application of the RTW concept to the real 
market, the flexibility, which means a more practicable 
approach, is one of the most important factors in 
establishing the service configuration.
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FIGURE C3 -3:)
Voyage Cost Corriparison v^ ith Various Perccritaige-s of Uti­
lisation Between US Lines and Hapag—Lloyd Line in Tran­
satlantic Segment, Excluding Feedering Cost
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Chapter 10 CONCLUSION
10.1 The Impact of the RTW Concept on Future Liner 
Shipping
Based on the discussion carried out so far, the conc­
lusion can be derived concerning what the impact of the 
RTW concept on future liner shipping would be.
This future projection of liner shipping in this regard 
is predicted by the hypothetical approach as the 
following subject matter including the external and 
internal impact on the industry.
External impacts
1) Liberal ism and protectionism in liner shipping
2) Changes of the role of the ports by the transportation 
center concept and
3) Changes of the structure of general cargo traffic 
through widening containerizable cargo.
Internal impacts 
A)New marketing concept : internationalization of service 
commodity,
5) Impact on the conference system,
6) Competitors' behaviour,
7) Structural changes of the liner shipping industry and 
exchanges of the geographical routes of cargo flow.
1>. Liberalism and protectionism in liner shipping
Liner shipping has been influenced not only by the 
economic environment but also, more signifcantly, by 
political interferences in various ways such as non-ta-
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Any form of such measures of protectionism are detri­
mental to free accessibility to cargo.
The RTW concept, by its nature, is cross-trade, may pro­
voke the increment of non-tariff barriers in a great many 
countries whose national lines are suffering from the RTW 
carriers' domestic market penetration with low freight 
rates.
riff obstacles which were discussed earlier concerning
the subject of the prerequistes of the RTW concept.
This phenomenon may occur not only in developing coun 
tries but also in traditional maritime countries, because 
the latter has keen concerns more directly in this res­
pect .
Recently, these typical defensive measures were taken by . 
the Italian and Spanish governments.
According to Lloyd's List of July 21 1986, the two
governments were joining forces to protect their national 
shipping fleets against Evergreen line.
Figures produced by a recent investigation by the govern­
ments show that Evergreen has lifted its share from Italy 
and the US East coast market from 2.7 percent in 198A to 
8.37 percent last year and almost 12 percent in the ope­
ning six months of 1986.
This market penetration led to the introduction of new 
legislative measures, entitled " Measures for the Defence 
of the Italian Merchant Marine" in the case of Italy, to 
protect the national fleet in both countries.
Therefore, the controvercy concerning liberalism and pro-
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•bectionism would be bound to be severe in the future pro­
jection of liner shipping in this connection except the 
UB related trade routes such as, the Transatlantic and 
the Transpacific trade.
Accordingly, in order to avoid such non-tariff barriers, 
the carriers may establish either multi-national liner 
shipping companies like other international industries or 
muti-national co-operation in various manners to mitigate 
the protests.
\
2). The transportation center concept
The new large container vessels which are deployed in 
circumnavigation, are calling ports which are the load 
centers on a regional basis so as to connect the vertical 
extremities of feedering coverage with the horizontal 
mainstream line, which means not only that the compe­
tition among the ports become intensified but also that 
being a load center in that region gurantees florishing 
business due to the concentration of the cargo flow.
The advantages of rationalizing port calls by shipping 
lines have also added to the significant bargaining power 
over the lower port tariff rates.
However, on the other hand, it may also bring benefits to 
the ports.
Savannah, which is a South Atlantic load center,and FOS 
are good examples as the case of other ports, such as 
Rotterdam, Singapore and New York.
About two years ago, US Lines signed a 21-year agreement 
with the Geogia Ports Authority of Savannah port which 
meant that the line's Savannah liftings, according to
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forecasts, would be boosted from A2,D0D containers in 
1982 to 175,000 this year. The impact of US Lines on 
Savannah is selfevident.
Acccording to Lloyd's List dated August 18 1986, con­
tainer tonnage of this port in recent years has increa­
sed at about 20-30 percent annually and this seemingly 
relentless expansion has continued in the last fiscal 
year ending June 30.
This transportation center concept as an impact of the 
RTW concept implies another important fact by which the 
role of the port in the future would be drastically 
changed in terms of its connecting function not only bet­
ween the sea legs and the land but also between the sea 
legs.
Thus, concentration of cargo flow on the transportation 
centers with a wide range of sea legs and inland coverage 
is continuously enhanced in the future liner market.
3).Changes of the structure of the general cargo traffic
Since the introduction of containerization about two 
decades ago,the containerizable cargo has rapidly wide­
ned the trade among industrialized countries and the tra­
de between developed countries and developing countries, 
which are also now in the way to container penetration 
to more than 60 percent.
This trend is very much likely to be accelerated by the 
introduction of the RTW concept fostering low value cargo 
to be containerized, because the overall cost leadership
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strategy has a strong position to offer lower freight 
rates and consequently this attracts low value cargo to 
flow into the container shipping market.
Traditionally, the freight rate has been determined at 
the level which the liner cargo can bear, hence the 
freight rate has been considered as one of the major bar­
riers for low value cargo to be carried by container 
liner shipping.
However, the recent trend of freight level shown in the 
following TableC3-10), illustrates the significant reduc­
tion of rates in Transpacific westbound trade for examp­
le.
Table <3-101 
Sample TWRA Rates 
< 40ft containers at 1985 dollars ')
Westcoast rates 1979 1985 % chang
Wastepaper-Japan 2 ,352 325 -86
Cotton -S.Korea 3,569 990 -72
Hay Cubes -Japan 2,194 350 -84
Wood pulp -Japan 1,826 630 —65
Scrap metal-Taiwan 2,956 400 -86
Oranges -Japan 6,867 2,800 -59
Source ; Lloyd's List, May 19, 1986.
This trend of lowering the rates has been influenced by 
various environmental and internal factors in the 
industry, however,the price leadership by the RTW
strategy can be explained as one major factor.
167
Therfore, the RTW concept, as the overall cost leadership 
strategy, initiates the reduction of transportation cost 
in international trade, which may lead not only to enhan­
ce the volume of trade, but also more importantly to 
widen the range of containerizable cargo, which means 
that ultimately the container shipping industry itself 
receives benefits from it.
. New marketing concept
Through the evolution of containerization, the service 
commodity which is the product of liner shipping has been 
globally standardized, whereby the internationalization 
of the new marketing concept of liner shipping has gra­
dually become perceptive.
This trend is very much likely to be continued in the 
future in such a way that the liner shipping industry 
would be developed in the international dimension 
through the stimulus of the international marketing 
concept. The traditional concept of liner shipping has 
limited the scope of its marketing on a regional basis 
especially in particular trade routes which have been 
isolated from others.
However, having indroduced the global strategies in one 
form or another by integrating the traditionally segmen­
ted markets, major liner carriers began to exploit the 
new international marketing concept.
In this context, the internationalization process may 
lead liner shipping firms to become international com­
panies which can be easily identified in other indus­
tries, such as automobile and computer industries e.g.. 
General Motors and IBM.
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Certainly, parallel to this development, the way of 
approach to study liner shipping has to be altered in 
this connection.
5). Impact on conference system
In the current trends, the traditional conference power 
has been deteriorated both in closed and open conference 
systems as discussed previously.
Furthermore, this tendency may be continued especially by 
the RTW carriers whose nature is independent rather than 
conference-minded.
Particularly, in the US related trade routes, by the inf­
luence of the Shipping Act of 1984, the relationship bet­
ween shipping lines and shippers has been drastically 
changed.
According to Lloyd's List of June 14, 1986, 75 percent of 
Du Point's goods were moved under service contracts. 
Successive, reckless independent actions are blamed for 
having led to lowering freight rates for the change of 
the current role of many conferences being just a " rate 
registration bureau ".
There are many controversies among the pros and cons 
regarding the Shipping Act.
However, the RTW concept, as a price leadership strategy 
and its indepentent characteristics would continuously 
influence the ercsion of conference market power, which 
may result in diminishing the number of traditional con­
ferences and instead introducing a super conference 
system which has practically no regulating power.
169
6. The behavior of competitors
a) Antagonism
As we have discussed earlier the RTW concept is the ove­
rall cost-leadership business strategy in liner shipping, 
the RTW carriers' major concern is concentrating on the 
investment in building up an all-water service configura­
tion .
Therefore, by nature, the RTW carriers' market segmen­
tation is likely to be widened to the low value cargo, 
which does not require the fast transit time, with a low 
freight rate.
Nevertheless, the intermodalist, as an antagonist of the 
RTW concept, makes its capital investment in the establi­
shment of intermodal operations, which can offer the car­
riage of containers, for example, from Asia to the East 
Coast of the United States anywhere from eight days to 
more than two weeks faster than an all-water carrier ser­
vice sending its ships through the Panama Canal.
This intermodal concept can be categorized as being 
a " Differentiation " strategy rather than being an 
" Overall Cost Leadership " strategy which were discussed 
in the chapter regarding the three generic strategies, 
because this concept has the strategic advantages of 
being uniquely perceived by the customers especially tho­
se whose cargo need fast transit time, and of effectively 
tying up high-valued cargo, such as television sets, 
stereos, personal computers, designer fashions and so on. 
Why the two different strategies exist in liner shipping 
can also be explained in relation with the introduction 
of containerization.
We have previously discussed that containerization
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changed the characteristics of liner cargo in such a way 
that the liner carriers could take advantage of eco­
nomies of scale which eventually led to the establishment 
of the RTW concept.
However, simultaneously containerization gave the liner 
carriers the opportunity to change the traditional way of 
transportation to the door—to—door service by the intro­
duction of the through-transport concept.
This intermodalism is very much effective in the United 
States related trade routes where inland transportation 
is a major part of the total carriage in terms of both 
costs and transit time.
b) Protagonism
Considering that the RTW service is one of the global 
strategies, there are various types of global strategies 
among major world liner carriers in one form or another 
which integrate the markets globally.
Barber Blue Sea which is one of initiators of the RTW 
concept and other lines, such as Maersk line and Yang 
Ming Line which have built their own business strategies 
based on their resources.
This study does not include those global strategies of 
the abvoe protagonists and leave for furture studies.
One intersting caseCSl) is that recently a Germany mana­
gement company is planning to enter the RTW service with 
deployment of vessels which are all chartered from the 
Banks with considerable cheap charter rate as explained 
in the appendixes p.29-30.
This phenomenon is a good example to justify my
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argument
in this paper, regarding the barriers of entry to the 
market being lowered.
Chartering vessels and container boxes with very much 
favorable contracts and concentrating on management and 
marketing promotion are of great benefits for this new 
comer,as far as the market is overtonnaged.
However, obviously, there would be more new-comers buil­
ding their business strategies in terms of global inte­
gration in one form or another depending upon their stra­
tegic conditions.
7). The structural change of the-liner shipping industry
Coupled with the hypotheses, the change of the conference 
system and the new development of the intermational mar­
keting concept which were discussed earlier, the structu­
ral change of liner the shipping industry is likely to 
occur in such a way that the scale of a unit firm is 
enlarged.
Shipping is in a state of constant change, particularly 
by the introduction of innovation being a vital factor of 
the economic cycle.
Conference system and any form of co—operation among 
liner firms, like consortia, have been introduced by the 
changes of the economic conditions in the market as we 
discussed in the first part.
The RTW concept necessitates a globally integrated 
marketing network and its operational tools, which means 
that the scale of a unit firm should inevitably be 
increased.
This tendency has already taken place.
Many major liner carriers which established global 
strategies have increased their scales of unit firms.
In addition, there would be new-comers into the RTW ser­
vice with bigger scales, while the existing should with­
draw their services from the market.
Huge, multi-national, liner carriers would offer inter­
nationally integrated liner services with large scale 
service entities dominating marketing shares which may 
lead to a structural change of the liner shipping indus­
try .
8). Changes of the geographical routes of the cargo flow
Together with the transportation center concept, the 
geographical routes of the cargo flow have been changed 
by the RTW concept.
Different from the traditional end-to-end multiport ser­
vice, the two elements of the RTW concept are the hori­
zontal extremity and the vertical coverage.
Here, the vertical coverage implies a fundamental change 
of geographical economics, for example, the trade between 
the South and the North.
The two practices of the RTW concept in US Lines and 
Evergreen line do not include the direct call to any port 
of Australia whose trade is covered by a feeder connec­
tion in Singapore.
On the other hand, in the horizontal extremity, the tra­
ditional trade routes were also influenced by the trans­
portation center concept, diminishing the number of port 
calls and connected by feeder coverage.
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10.2 Conclusion
The dynamics of liner shipping has been influenced by 
various factors of economic changes among which the inno­
vation is of vital importance in the process of its evo­
lution .
As having discussed earlier in chapter 1 regarding the 
definition of innovation, innovation inplies not only the 
changes of production function but also, more important­
ly, procedural changes introduced into the market.
In this connection, the idea of entrepreneurship should 
be considered as an essential ingredient in the evolution 
because the entrepreneur is the- one who implement an 
innovation in the real world.
Here, the supreme importance comes to the behavioristic 
connotation of the innovation concept.
The RTW concept as a business strategy in liner 
shipping has been defined in my discussions, as a 
soft—ware oriented innovation and its business behaviour 
centers on the overall cost leadership strategy formula­
ted to cope with the intensity of industry competition in 
the container liner market.
As the theory of economics is based on the assumption of 
the scarcity of resources, a unit firm has to establish 
the best strategy out from its limited resources to 
obtain the objectives.
This means that the business strategy should be built in 
such a way that the focus of the strategy is clearly 
defined so that all the investments undertaken by the 
firm are aimed at its focus, whereby the effectiveness of 
the strategy is guranteed.
In this point of view, the RTW concept is a cost leader-
17A
ship strategy penetrating the maket with a low cost 
structure,a bargaining power and the advantage of scale 
economies.
However, the strategy also has disadvantages which have 
been pointed out before. Its adverse effects discussed 
in the voyage costs comparison should be also analyzed 
in the establishment of the strategy.
What can be derived as a conclusion of this cost 
comparison is that in the application of the RTW-concept 
to the real market, the practical aspect should be scru-- 
tinized so as to minimize the friction between the doc” 
trine of the concept and the reality, which may lead to 
the maximization of flexibility and adaptability of the 
business entity.
Finally, the study does not imply that the RTW concept is 
the best strategy involved in liner shipping.
There are various patterns of business strategies whether 
they are globally integrated or not.
Especially the intermodalism as an antagonism of the RTW 
concept is also considerablly effective in certain market 
segmentations as well as many other patterns of global 
strategies.
Therefore, this study leaves a further discussion concer­
ning those behavioristic strategies of rivalry and the 
economic and managerial effectiveness to the market for 
future study.
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lAS.O IXXXXXXIINCL. BENEFITS,ASUKE 2 O/5L0T1162.6 1133.2 I 
2ED IXXXX IKETERSCIF FEET THEN ft./3.2E)i 269 1 220 1
32 IXXX IKETERSCIF FEET TI€N ft./ 3.28)1 33 I 3D I
IP£TERB(IF FEET THEf^ ft./ 3.26)1 12.8 I ID.A 1
IKNOTB I 23.0 I lA.D 1
IfO^TS: LOW VALUE FOR DEADW^ IGHTI - I1A.30 I
IKNOTSiHIGH VALLS FOR DEADWEIGHT 118.20 I
I ANNUAL COST AS X OF REPLAC.COSTI 
lAWJAL COST AS X OF PIR-AC.COSTI 
lANNUAL COST AS X OF PfPLAC.COSTl 
l» PER CREW KEKBER PER DAY I 12.5 
lA^iNUAL COST AS X OF CREW AND Ril 13.0 
lAlERAGE hPU«.ER OF DAYS PER YEAR I 
INO. OF YEARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I
1.3
2.5
0.7
ADS
30
ITONlxES FUEL PER DA.Y (2A HOURS) 1 6A.0 
ITONNES FUEL PER DAY (2A HOURS) I 3.0 
 l$KN FOR 2.5 SET5:5 YR OLD E0XESI22.7D
I
113171 I 
I D.7 1
1.5 I 
0.3 I
7.5 I 
7.0 1 
302 I
15 I 
I 59.5 I 
I 2.0 I 
I I
6
Output.
DAILY COST FDR CONTAINER SHIP,
OITFUT VALUES EXPECTED 1 
1
I
1
1 HIGH 
1
1 LOW i 
1 1
FUEL COSTS - IK PORT 1 0.3 1 ITHOUS. OF % PEP. D.AY 1 D.A 1 0.2 1
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.B 1 ITHOUS. OF 1 PER DAY 1 10.3 1 6.0 1
PiiKM COST OF CREW 1 31 OS 1 ITHOUS. OF $ PER YEAR 1 3A19 1 2797 1
ATM. COST OF PROVISION 1 71 1 ITHOUS. OF $ PER YEAR 1 107 1 AB !
AWL. COST OF INSURANCE! 650 1 ITHOUS. OF t PER YEAR 1 972 1 367 I
ANNL. COST OF R i H 1 1300 1 ITHOUS. OF t PER YEAR 1 1669 1 629 1
ANNL. COST OF STORES I 325 1 ITHOUS. OF i PER \XAR 1 523 1 166 1
AN.W. COST OF AD.NIN. 1 AAl I ITHOUS. OF « PER YEAR 1 667 1 25A 1
ANNL. NON-CAPITAL COSTSI 5B95 1 ITHOUS. OF « PER YEARCEXCL FUEL),! 7577 1 AABD i
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 1 1 1 1 1
IN FIKANTIAL TERMS 1 12625 1 ll.FIXED DEFFECIATION-DECLIK EALI1A7A9 11D9D1 1
IN THO'JSAKDS OF U.S. 1 5200 1 12.RnURN ON RESALE VAlLiE 1 5960 1 36A3 1
DOLLARS PER YEAR 1 6755 1 IS.AKN'UALIZED P£SALE VALUE IllOlD I 6233 1
EASED ON THE 1 9A7A 1 1A.ANNUALIZED REPLACE VALUE 112006 I 7396 1
METHODS LISTED I 7562 1 i5.EIK*.;iNG FUNO-F£PLACEKE!<T C0STI1D796 1 6201 1
IK COLUMN G 1 11 1. 1 . 1 1 I
LAYUP COSTS 1 31 1 1 THOUSANDS OF 1 PER KO:aH 1 37
1 I
1 2S 1
SCRA.PFING PRICE 1 1.29 1 1 MILLIONS OF S  (LESS 151 DELIVEI 1.A2 1 1.16 1
RETURN ON SALVAGE 1 103 1 1 THOUSANDS OF t PER YEAR 1 198 1 162 1
__ I I I
■ASS‘J«ED CONSTANTS-
EBT FOR CO'TAir<EF.SHlP.
VESSEL COST BLl^ MRY TAE.LE 
(THOUSANDS OF US$ PER DAY AT SEA. .AND IK PORT)
'■ PiZTHDD
----AT SEA---- IN FORT I-------------------------
£.0.6 53.0 II. FIX DEPREC. (DECLIN BAL.) + OPER. C
11.6 A.D 12. AVOIDAEtE COSTS - LA.YJP (EXXLUI'EB C
2D.3 12.B !3. AV01DAE.LE COSTS “ LAYUP (IKCLUDEB C
2A.A 16.9 lA. OPERATING COSTS
39.1 31.5 15. RETURN ON RESALE VALUE + OPER. COST
AE.l - AD.5 16. ANN. EEALE VAILE+OPER. COSTE-LAYUP 
2A.7 • 17.2 17. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALUE + OPER. COS
A9.1 A1.5 IB. AKNJALIZEO RESALE VALIE + OPER. COB
51.1 A3.6 19. ANNUALIZED REPLACE K'PL'JE * OPER. CO
AS.7 3S.2 IlD. SINKING FUND-REPLACEKEKT COST + OP
7
Input Data with the Aesunnpticn of
Ship price: US$- 70 Million
DA.ILY COST FOR CON'TAIt€R SHIP,,
19£5 VESSEL COSTING KOD'.LE FOR CONTAINERS \'EBSELS
TYPE OF DATA 1 VALUE 1 FORM 1 UNITS
REOJIRED INPUT DATA 1 1 1
CAPACITY IN TEU • 1 AAS2 IXXXX 1 TWENTY FOOT EOUIVAIENT UNITS
YEAR BUILT 1 196A I19XX 1
DEADWEIGHT 1 5£.6 IXX.X 1 THOUSANDS OF DEADWEIGHT TONNES
vessel LTILI2ATI0N 1 35E IXXX IDAYS PER YEAR
NATIONALITY CF OFFICERSI 1 IX 11. U.S.A. 2. EUROPE 3. GREEK
NATIOI.'ALITY OF CREW 1 1 IX K.KOR/SING/PHIL 5.INDIA
ENGINE/FlEL TYPE 1 1 IX 11. MSD 2. LSD 3. ETEAM A. GAS
LOADED SPEED 1 17.5 IXX IKNOTS
FUEL COST 1 112 ix):)'.); IS PER TONNE
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 1 6 IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.INrLATION
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 1 lA IXX.X IX FIKAVCIAL RATE INCL.INFLATION
CURRENT ECFAP PRICE 1 115 IXXX IS PER TONNE
PRICE OF CO'TAINERS 1 lEDO IXXXX ICOST OF BOX IN t PER TEU
'------ AS5UY£[i VALUES-
REPLACEflNT CCST Cf VESl! 
REGAINING LIFE OF VESS.I 
RESALE VALUE OF VESSEL I 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL! 
NO. OF OFFICERS I
NO. OF RATINGS I
COST PER OFFICER I 
COST PER RATING I
LENGTH (LOA) I
PEAK I
SLtLNER DRAFT I
DESIGN SPEED 1
ACTLiAi LOADED SPEED I
ACTUAL SPEED IN EAILAST! 
SHP (SHIP HORSEPOkER) 1 
INS'JR. COST (Pil HSK)I 
REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE I
STOP£S I
PROVISIONS (DAILY) I
ADMINISTRATION I
VESKL UTILIZATION I
VESSEL LIFE I
FUEL CONS-AT SEA LOADEDI
-IN PORT I
COST FOR NEN CONTAINERS!
------------------------------ 1 I I
7D.DD !>:x.>:):>;iMILLIONS OF I I £0.5 ! S9.5 I
IB IXX I REMAINING YEARS OF USEFUL LIFE I 31 I 16 I 
7D.C0 IXX.XXXiMILLIOIo OF i lEO.SD lEl.ZA i
7D.DD IXX.XXXiMILLlONS OF *  IBD.5D 159.50 I j
7 IXX !N0. OF OFFIdRS IN SKIP'S CREW I 12 I 10 ! i
lA IXX INO. APtE-EODIED BEA^ £N IN CREW I 21 I 17 I ^
lAE.D iXXXXXX!? ODO'S/YEAR FOR ONE CREW BLOT !162.6 1133.2 I ' 
lAB.O IXXXXXXUNCL. BENEFITS,ASUME 2 MEN/SLOT 1162.6 1133.2 I 
2B0 IXXXX I METERS (IF FEET THEN lt./3.2£)l 269 1 220 1 , 
32 1XXX IKETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 33 1 30 1'
11.6 IXX IKETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)i 12.6 I ID.A I !
16.0 IXX.X IKNOTB 'I 23.0 I lA.D I j
17.5 IXX.X IKNOTS: LOW VALLE FOR DEADWEIGHT! - I1A.3Q 1 '
17.5 IXX.X iKNDTS;HIGH VALUE FOR DEADWEIGHT 116.20 I - I
26000 IXXXXX IB.K.P. FOR MAIN PROPLESION SYSTI553A5 113171 I
1.0 IXX.X l/WNUAL COST AS X OF REPLAC.C05TI 1.3 I 0.7 I
2.0 IXX.X lA.NNUAL COST AS S OF REPLAC.COSTI 2.5 I 1.5 I
0.5 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS S OF REPLAC.COSTI 0.7 I D.3 I
9.5 IXXX 11 PER CREW MEMBER PER DAY I 12.5 I 7.5 I
ID.D IXX.X IA?MIAL COST AS 1 OF CREW AND R&l 13.0 I 7.0 1
355 IXXX • IAVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS PER YEARI m  I 302 I
20 IXX INO. OF YEARS Of ECONOMIC LIFE I 30 I 15 I
70.0 IXX.X ITONNES FUEL PER DAY (2A KOLIRS) I 6A.0 I 59.5 I '
2.5 IXX.X ITONNES FUEL PER DAY (2A HOURS) I 3.0 I 2.0 I •
2B.D1 IXX.XX IIMN FOR 2.5 BETS:5 YR CLD B0XESI22.70 I 1
6
Out, put
DAILY COST FOR CONTAINER SKIP, 
O'JTPLIT VALUES EXPECTED I
1
FLEL COSTS - IN P0F.7 1 D.3 1
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.B 1
ANKUAI COST Or CREW 1. 3105 1
ANNl. COST OF PROVISION 1 ■ 71
AN'<L. COST OF INSURANCE) 70D I
ANNL. COST OF R 8 M 1 lAOD
A.N!t. COST OF STORES 1 350
ANNL. COST OF ADMIN. 1 AS!
f^L . NON-CAPITAL COSTS 1 60ED
LESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1
IN FINANCIAL TERMS 1 13S65
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. 1 5600
DOLLARS PER YE*R 1 925S
EASED ON THE 1 9963
METHODS LISTED I BIAA
IN CCfJm G 1 .. \
LAY'U? COSTS 1 31
SCRAPPING PRICE 1 1.29
RETURN ON SALVAGE 1 
1
103
ITKDjS.
ITHDUS.
ITKOLlS.
ITHDUS.
ITHDUS.
OF « PER DAY 
OF i PER DAY 
OF i PER YEAR 
OF < PER YEAR 
OF * PER YEAR 
ITHO'JS. OF i PER YIAR 
ITKOUS. OF $ PER YEAR 
ITKOUE. OF * PER YEAR 
ITHOUB. OF S PER YEARCEXCL FUEL)
I 1'11. FHED DEPF.ECIAT10!H)ECL!K BAU1S59?
12. RETURR Oi'l RESALE VALUE I tAAD
IS.AisNJALIZED RESALE VALLE 
IA.AKRJALI2ED REPLACE VALUE I12E77
IE.SUD:IK5 FUIvD-REPLACEKEKT C05THlt2£ 
1 '
I D.A 
I 10.3 
1 SA19 
I 107 
I 10A7 
I 2053 
I S6A 
1 70S 
7655
0.2 
6.0 I 
2797 I 
AE I 
A57 I 
B93 1 
179 I 
1 25E I 
1 A591 1 
I I 
111530 I 
I A129 I 
I 6559 I 
I 777A I 
i 6677 1
---------------------- 1---
! TKOUBA'DE OF $ PER f.OKTH 1 37
I KILLIONS OF * (LESS 151 DElILEI 1.A2 
1 THDJSAIiDS OF * PER YEAR I 198 I
I I____I
1--- 1
25 I 
1.16 1 
162 I
•ASSUMED CON'STAMTS-
EBT FOE COKTAINERSKIP,
LESSEE COST SUMMARY TABLE I
(THOUSANDS OF USl PER DAY AT SEA AND IH PORT)
METHOD
--- AT SEA---- IK PORTi-------------------------
6:,2 55.6 11. FIX DEPREC. (DECllK EAL.) + OPER. C ^
11.9 A.A 12. AVDIDAKE COSTS - LAYUP (EXCLUDES C '
20.7 13.1 !3. AV01DAE.LE COSTS - LAYUP (INCLUEtS C •
25.0 17.A JA. OPERATIN-3 COSTS
• A0.7 33.2 15. RETURN RESALE VALUE + OPER. COST
50.0 A2.A 16. ANN. ESALE VALUE+OPER. COSTE-LAYLIP
, 25.3 17.7 17. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALUE + OPER. COS
51.0 A3.5 IB. ANNUALIZED RESALE VALIE + OPER. COS
53.1 A5.5 19. AtWLlALlZED REPLACE VALUE + OPER. CO
A7.9 AC.3 110, SINKING FUND-F;EPLACEM£NT COST + OP
9
input Dc.t-eT. with the AEsumptiDn
Df Ship Price: 7E hillic'-i
DAILY COST FOR CWTAINER SHIP,
19£5 VESSEL COSTING MOO’JLE FOR COMAINERS VESSELS
TYPE OF DATA I VALUE I F0P.1 i U.\ITS I
F£OLiRED INFlIT DATA 1
CAPACITY IN TEU I
YEAR E'JILT 1
DEADhtlGHT I
VESSEL UTILIZATION I 
NATIONALITY OF OFFICERS! 
NATIONALITY OF CREW 1 
ENtlNE/FUEL TYPE 1 
LOADED SPEED I
FUEL COST I
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 1 
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN' I 
ClIRREN'T SCRAP PRICE I 
PRICE OF CONTAINERS I
'------ ASS’JrED VALUES
REPLACED COST OF VES.i 
RENAININ5 LIFE OF VEBBLI 
PIEALE VALUE OF VESSEL 1 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL!
NO. OF OFFICERS I
NO. OF RATINGS I
COST PER OFFICER I
COST PER RATING 1
LEN’GTK (LOA) 1
EEAYi 1
SL^ '.MER DRART I
KSIGN SPEED I
ACTLVi LOAKD SPEED I 
ACTLlAL SPEED IN BALLAST!
I i I
AAE2 IXXXX I TWENTY FOOT EOUIVALENT UNITS 1___ I
19SA !19XX I I
SE.6 IXX.X !THOLISAMiS OF [CADR-EIGHT TOIvI^S I
3S5 IXXX I DAYS PER YEAR I
1 IX II. U.S.A. 2. EUROPE 3. GREEK I
1 IX IA.K0R/E1N3/PHIL 5.INDIA 1
1 IX II. USD 2. LSD 3. STEA^  A. GAS • I
17.5 IXX I KNOTS 1
112 IXXX.X 1$ PER TON!£ I
6 IXX.X II FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.INFLATION I
lA IXX.X IS FINANCIAL RATE INCl.INFLATION I
115 iXXX 11 PER TONIiE 1
25DD IXXXX ICOST OF BOX IN i PER TEU -----
------------------------------. I KIN I
7S.CD IXX.XXXIKILLIONS OF « ’ I 65.3 1 63.6 I
16 IXX IREKAININS YEARS OF USEFUL LIFE I 31 I 16 I 
7S.DD IXX.XXX'MILLIONS OF % iS6.25 155.A3 I
75.00 IXX.XXXIKILLIONS OF S 166.25 163.75 I
7 iXX INO. OF OFFICERS IN SKIP'S CREW I 12 I 10 I
lA IXX INO. ABLE-BODIED SEAMEN IN CREW I 21 I 17 I
lAS.D IXXXXXXil COD'E/YEAR FOR DICE CREW SLOT 1162.6 1133.2 I 
1A6.0 IXXXXXXIINCL. BE^ EFITB,ASL^ E 2 McN/Sl0T1162.6 1133.2 I 
260 IXXXX IKETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 269 1 22D I
32 IXXX IKETERSCIF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 331 301
11.6 IXX IKETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 12.6 i ID.A I
le.D IXX.X IKNOTS 1 23.0 I lA.O I
17.E IXX.X IKNOTS: LOW V/LLE FOR DEADvEIGHTI - tlA.30 i
17.5 IXX.X IKNOTS:HIGH VALUE FOR DEADLEIGiTT 116.20 I - I
i
I
SHP (SHIP HORSEPOWER) I 
IN5UR. COST (P6I + K6M)1 
REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE I
STORES I
PROVISIONS (DA.1LY) I
ADMINISTRATION 1
VESSEL LTILI2ATI0K I
VESSEL LIFE I
FIEL CONS-AT SEA LOADEDI
-IN PORT 1
COST FOR NEW CWTAIKERBI
26D0D IXXXXX iS.H.P. FOR MAIN PROPULSION SYSTI553A5 113171 I . 
l.D IXX.X lANNLlAL COST AS I OF REPLAC.COSTI 1.3 I 0.7 1
2.0 IXX.X lANlfJAL COST AS I OF REPLAC.COSTI 2.5 I 1.5 I
0.5 IXX.X IANNUAL COST AS I OF P£PLAC.C0B7! 0.7 I 0.3 I
9.5 IXXX 1$ PER CREW MEMBER PER DAY I 12.5 1 7.5 1
10.0 IXX.X lANI-ILlAL COST AS 1 OF CREW AND Ril 13.0 I 7.0 I i
355 IXXX lAVERAGE lOlBER OF DAYS PER YEAR! AOS 1 302 I I
20 IXX INO. OF YEARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I 30 I 15 I !
70.D IXX.X ITONNEB FUEL PER DAY (24 KOLIRS) I 6A.D I 59.5 I '
2.5 IXX.X ITONNES FIEL PER DAY (24 H(XJRS) I 3.0 1 2.0 I '
26.01 IXX.XX ItMN FOR 2.5 BETE:5 YR OLD E0XESI22.7D I I
I D
Out put
liAlLY COST FOR CONTAlt^IR EHIP, 
C.riF'JT VALUES E>'PECTED
I
FUEL COSTS - IN' PORT 1 0.3 1
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.6 1
ANNLlAL COST OF CREU 1 SIDE 1
ANNL. COST OF PROVISION! 71 1
ANN.. COST OF INSURANCE 1 7ED 1
ANN- COST OF R i M 1 1503 1
ANNL. COST OF STORES 1 375 1
AN‘t. COST OF ADMIN. 1 A61 1
ANNL. NON-CAPITAL COSTS 1 6265 1
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 1
IN FINANCIAL TERMS 1 1A335 1
IN THOUSANDS OF U.5. 1 6000 1
DOLLARS PER YEAR 1 975A 1
BASED ON THE 1 1W92 1
METHODS LISTED 1 6725 1
IN COLUMN G 1 1-1
LAYUP COSTS 1 31 1
SCRAPPING PRICE 1 1.29 !
RETURN UN SALVAGE 1 1D3 1
I
HHOUS. OF J PER I'AY 
ITHO'JB. O' * PER OAY 
ITHO'JS. OF t PER YEAR 
ITKOUS. OF i PER YEAR 
ITHD'JS. OF i PER YEAR 
ITHO'JB. OF « PER YEAR 
ITHO’UB. OF f PER YEAR 
1TH0J3. OF S PER YEAR
I HIGH I LOU
I___1___
I D.A 
1 iO.3 
1 3A19 
1 i07 
I 1121 
1 2156 
I 60A 
I 725
ITHOUS. OF t PER YEARCEXCL FUEL)! 6132
I 'II .FIXED.DEFRECIAT10!K)ECLIU BAL11EAEO
12.RETURN ON REBALE VALUE I 69D0
!3.A:<NJALI7ED FIBAIE VA':.L!E 112509
lA.AN'vJALlIED REPLACE VA'.LE I133A9
15.B1KKING FUND-REPLACE^ ‘£NT C0BT112A59 
I 1
-I---------
i 0.2 
1 6.0 
I 2797 
1 AS 
I AA6 
I- 956 
I 191 
1 263 
1 A7D1 
I
112159 
I AA35 
I 655A 
I 6151 
I 715A
THOUBANDB OF t PER K.O:<TH 1 37 1 25
MILLIONS OF S (LEBB 15X DELIVEI 1.A2 1 1.16 
Tri-XIBANDB OF * PER YEAR 1 19S I 162
1
I !
-ABBJMED CONETANTB-
EBT FOR CONTAIKlRBHIP, :
VESSEL COST SUMMARY TABLE !
(THOUSANDS OF UBl PER DAY AT SEA AND IN FORT) |
fETHOD !
--- AT SEA---- IN PORT I-------------------------
65.8 56.2 11.'FIX DEPREC. (DECLIN BAL.) + OPER. C
12.3 A.7 12. A'v'OlDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (EXCLLTCS C j
21.0 13.5 13. AV01DAB.LE COSTS - LAYUP (INCLUDES C
K.5 17.9 lA. OPERATING COSTS i
A2.A 3A.8 15. RETURN ON RESALE Vtt.UE + OPER. COST j
51.9 AA.A 16. /UxN. RESAIE V/LUE+OPER. COBTS-LAYUP ;
2.8 16.2 17. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALLE + OPER. COS
53.0 ' A5.A IB. A*(NUALI2ED RESALE VALLE + OPER. COB
55.0 A7.5 19. ANNUAL12ED REPLACE VALUE + OPER. CO
50.1 A2.5 110. SINKING FUND-REPLACEHENT COST + OP
1 1
E V G- r c r e t? n L i r, e
Inp'Lit Dfits with ths Assufription of
Sh ip P r i ce? j US'f 35 hi i 1 i i on
DAILY COST FOR CON'TAINiR SHIP, '
19S5 VESSEL C0ST1N5 KODJLE FOR CONTAINERS VESSELS
TYPE Or DATA I
RECJIRED INPuE DATA 1 
CAPACITY IN TELI I
YEAR BUILT 1
DEAD'/EIEKT (
VESSEL LEILIZATION I 
NATIONALITY OF OFFICEREI 
NATICliALITV OF CF£»') I 
ENGINE/FLEL TYPE I 
LOADED SPEED I
FUEL COST i
EXPECT. KATE OF RETURN I 
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN I 
CURRENT SCRAP PRICE I 
PRICE OF CONTAINERS
'------ ASSUNED VALUES
KEPLACE«!T COST OF V’ESLI 
FZKAINIKG LIFE OF VESSLI 
RESALE VALUE OF VISEEl ! 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL!
NO. OF OFFICERS i
NO. OF RATINGS I
COST PER OFFICER I
COST PER RATING I
LEN'ETH (LCA) I
EEA1 1
E.T.NER DRAFT 1
DESIGN SPEED I
ACTUAL LOADED SPEED I 
ACTUAL SPEED IN BALLAST! 
EHP (SHIP KORSEPCil-ZR) I 
INSUR. COST (Pil + H£«)l 
REPAIR AND KAINTENANCE I
STORES I
PROVISIONS (W.ILY) I
ADNINIETRATION I
VEESa LT1LI2ATI0N f
VESSEL LIFE 1
FIEL COfo-AT SEA LOADEDI
-IN PORT 1
COST FOR NEW COK’TAIKtRB!
VALLIE ! FORM ! UNITS !
______________  .    . 1 I
I I •...........I
2725 !x>;):x !Tv.S\TY FOOT EQUIVALENT UNITS ____ I
19£A I19XX 1 .... !
AS.A IXX.X ITHOUSANDS OF DEAD2EIGHT TONNES i
SEE !XXX I DAYS PER YEAR , 1
A !X II. U.S.A. 2. EUROPE 5. GREEK i
A IX ■ !A.K0R/EIN5/Pr;iL 5.INDIA I
1 IX II. MSD 2. LSD-3. STEAM A. GAS I
20.0 IXX I KNOTS I
il2 IXXX.X \i PER TONNE I
0 IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.INFLATION I
lA IXX.X iX FINANCIAL RATE IKCl.INFLATION
115 iXXX Ie PER TONNE I
2S0D iXXXX I COST OF BOX IN $ PER TEU ----------------------------------- j I ,
ES.CO iXX.XXXIMiaiONS 0? < I AO.* I 29.B i
16 IXX lENAININS YEARS OF USE'UL LIFE 1 31 I 16 i
3S.DD IXX.XXXIMiaiONS OF I IAD.25 I2S.67 I
3:.DO IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF $ K0.25 129.75 !
7 IXX iNO. OF OFFICERS IN SrilP'S CRPH i 12 I 10 I'
10 IXX INO. A3LE-B0DIED SEAMEN IN CREW I 21 I 17 I
3A.2 IXXXXXX.-S CDD'S/YEAR FOR ONE CREN B-OT I 37.6 I 3D,E i 
3A.2 IXXXXXXIINCL. PaEFITS.ASJKi 2 F£N/ELOTi 37.6 I 30.6 i 
230 IXXXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 269 I 220 1
32 IXXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 33 I 30 I
11.6 IXX IMETIRSdF FEET THEN It./ 3.26)1 12.6 1 1C.A 1
20.5 IXX.X IKTiOTS I 23.0 I lA.O !
20.0 IXX.X IKNOTS: LOi! VALUE FOR 0EADN5IGHTI - I1A.30 I
20.0 IXX.X !KNOTS:HIGH VALLIE FOR DEAIL’EIGHT 116.20 I - I
2AD00 iXXXXX IS.H.P. FOR MAIN PROPULBION EVSTIA5A22 I1D933 I
1.0 IXX.X lANI^JAL COST AS S OF REPuAC.COSTl 1.3 I 0.7 1
2.0 IXX.X IA.NNUAL COST AS J OF REP..AC.COETI 2.5 I 1.5 1
0.5 IXX.X IWKJAL COST AS X OF REPLAC.COETl D.7 I 0.3 I
9.5 IXXX U PER CREW KENZER PER DAY I 12.5 I 7.5 I
ID.O IXX.X lANJfLiAL COST AS X OF CREW AND K£I 13.0 I 7.0 I
355 IXXX I AVERAGE N'lFSER OF DAYS PER YEAR I AD6 I 302 I
20 IXX INO. Or YEARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I 3D I 15 I
65.0 IXX.X ITDli'ZB FIR PtR’DAY (2A HOURS) I 76.0 J 55.3 I
2.0 IXX.X ITONieS FUEL PER DAY (2A HOURS) I 2.5 I 1.5 1
17.05 IXX.XX I5MN FOR 2.5 SETB:5 YR OLD BCXES113.62 I 1
1 2
Out-put
DAILY COST FOR C0.'>:7A1KER SHIP,
OUTFuiT VALLES ElrECTED 1
I
1 1 
1 !
HIGH 1
1
LON 1
1
FLEL COSTS - 1!< PORT 1 0.2 1 iTHOLE. OF 1 PER DAY 1 D.3 1 0.2 1
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.3 1 ITHOLE. OF 1 PER DAY 1 9.6 1 5.6 1
ANMiAL COST OF CREW ! 561 1 !THOLE. OF f PER YEAR 1 6AD i 523 1
A.NNL. COST OF PROVISIONl 57 1 ITHOLE. OF t PER YEAR 1 67 1 36 1
ANNL. COST OF INSURANCE 1 35D 1 ITHOLE. OF i PER YEAR 1 523 1 206 1
ANN_. COST OF R « K 1 7DD 1 ITHOJS. Or S PER YEAR I1D06 1 AA6 1
m il. COST OF STORES 1 175 1 ITHOLE. OF 5 PER YEAR 1 262 1 89 t
an:l . cost of admin, i 126 1 ITHOLE. OF * PER YEAR 1'21A 1 66 1
ANNL. NON-CAPITAL COSTS 1 1952 1 ITHOJS. OF S PER YEAR(E>:CL FUEDl 2751 11373 i
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 1 1 1 1 1
IN FINANCIAL TERMS 1 7131 1 11.FIXED DEPRECIATION-DECLIN EAll £201 16061 tI
IN THDL'SANDS OF U.B. 1 2e:o I 12.RETURN ON RESALE VALLE 13220 12070 1
DOLLARS PER YEAR ! AE73 1 I3.ANNUAL17ED RESALE VALUE 161D5 13A57 1
EASED ON THE 1 5301 i lA.ANNUALIZED REP:.ACE VALUE 1669A iA157 1
METHODS LISTED 1 AD72 1 IS.EINKING FUND-REPLACEMENT C05TI 561A 13339 1
IN COLUMN G 1 1 1 11 .. . .  - 1
1*
LAYLi? COSTS 1
- - - - - - - - - - j
29 1
I 1
1 THOUSANDS OF J FER MONTH ! 35 1 23
SCRAPPING PRICE 1 1.05 1 1 MILLIONS OF S (LESS 15X DELIVEI 1.19 10.97
RETURN O.N SALVAGE 1 
1
67 1 
1
1 THOUSANDS OF J FER YEAR 1 
1 1
167 1
1
136 1I
■ASSLiirED COKSTA\TE'
EE7 FOR CONTAINEF.SHIP, •
VESSEL COST SUJ'.MARY TA5LE 
(TnOJSANDB OF USi FER DAY AT SEA AND IK FORT)
KETHOD
--- AT SEA---- iK FORT I-------------------------
33.0 25.9 11. FIX DEFPIC. (DECLIN EAL.) + CPER. C
6.9 1.9 12. AVOIDAS.LE COSTS - LAYUP (EXCLUDES C
10.6 3.5 13. AVOIIABLE COSTS - LAYUP (INCLUDES C
12.9 5.6 lA. OPERATING COSTS
20.6 13.7 15. RETUF.N ON RESALE VALLE + OPER. COST
25.6 16.6 16. AW. RESA^  VALLC+OPER. COSTS-LAYUP
13.1 6.1 17. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALLE + OPER. COS
■ 26.6 19.6 18. ANMIALIZEO RESALE VALUE + OPER. COS
27.8 20.8 19. AWL1AL12ED REPLACE VALUE + OPER. CO
2A.A 17.3 !1D. SINKING FUND-fEPLACE®v’T COST + OP
13
Input Datci with the- AHEufiiptiori of
Ehip Price: US$ 40 Miliicn
DAILY CC'sl FOR COirAl\'tR SHIP.
■19£S VESSEL COETIK'5 POOUlE FOR COiaAItCFS VESSELS •.
TYPE OF DATA I VALLt 1 F0R:1 1 UMTS
F£OUIF£D INPLiT DATA I
CAPACITY IK Tti.i I
YEAR BUILT I
DEAIik'EIE'HT I
VESSEL LJTILIZATIOK 1 
KATlOliALITY OF OFFICEPSl 
NATIONALITY OF CREW 1 
EKEI!£/FlEL TYPE I
LOADED SPEED I
FLEL COST I
EXPECT. RATE OF P£TL'RN I
EXPECT. RATE OF F£TL'RN !
CJRF£N’T SCRAP PRICE ! 
PRICE OF CONTAINERS I
'------ A5SJNED VALUES-
REPuACENN'T COST OF VESlI 
RENAIKIK5 LIFE OF VESSLI 
F£BALE VALUE OF CESSEl I 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL I 
NO. OF OFFICERS I
NO. OF RATINGS I
COST PEP. CfFICER I 
COST PER RATING I
LENGTH (LOA) 1
BEAK I
SJNNER [/RAH I
DESIGN SPEED I
ACTLlAL LOADED SPEED I
A.CTLiAL SPEED IN BA-LAST I
SHP (SHIP HORSEPCiNER) I 
INS'JR. COET (Pfcl + KiN) 1 
P£FA.IR AND WJNTENAN-CE I
STORES I
PROVISIONS (DAILY) I
ADNIKI5TRATI0N I
VESSEL UTILIZATION I
VESSEL LIFE 1
FUEL CO*(S-AT SEA LOADED 1
-IN PORT ICOST FOR fvSN CONTAINERS!
272S IXXXX iTNENTV FOOT EOUIVALENT UNITS 
19BA I39XX I
A3.A IXX.X ITKOISANDS OF DEADk’ElCnlT TON^ O 
355 IXXX iCfA.YE PER YEAR 
A IX il. LI.S.A. 2. EUROPE 3. GREEK 
A IX lA.KOR/SING/FHIL S.INDIA
I IX il. hSD 2. LED 3. STEAK A. GAS 
2-2.0 IXX !KNOTS
112 IXXX.X !S PER TONNE •
B iXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.INFLATION 
lA IXX.X IS FINANCIAL RA.TE II-Sl.INFLATION 
liS IXXX IS PER TONS 
2SDD IXXXX ICOST OF BOX IN S PER TEU
I
1
I
i
I
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] j
AO.CD IXX.XXXIMILLIONS (4 i I A6.0 I 54.0 1
IB IXX I REMAINING SAR5 OF USEFUL LIFE I 31 I li I 
AD.Dj IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF $ lAB.DD 129.57 I
AD.DO IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF t lAi.DD I3A.DD I
. 7 iXX IND. OF OFFICERS IN SHIP'S CREH 1 12 I ID i
ID IXX IND. ASLE-EODIEO SE4SN IN CREN I 21 1 17 I
3A.2 iXXXXXXIf CuO'B/YEAR FOR ONE CP£N SlOT I 37.B i 3D.E I
3A.2 IXXXXXXIINCL. BENEFITS,ABUS 2 MEN/ELOTI 37.B 1 3D.6 I
23D IXXXX !METER5(1F FEET THEN ft./ 3.2B)! 269 I 220 I
32 IXXX ! METERS (IF FEET TSN ft./3.2S)I 33 1 3D)
11.6 IXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.2B)J 12.B I 10.A 1
2D.S IXX.X IKNOTS 1 23.0 1 lA.D 1
20.0 IXX.X IKNOTS: LOk’ VAiLlE FOR KADNEIGHTI - ilA.30 I
20.0 IXX.X IKN0TE;K1GH VALLE FOR DEADNEIGHTI1E.20 I - I 
2A0DD IXXXXX iS.H.P. FOR W.1N PROPULSION SYSTIA5A22 I1D933 I
1.0 IXX.X lAWJAi COST AS S OF REP..AC.COETi 1.3 I 0.7 I
2.0 IXX.X IA\m COST AS S OF REFLA.C.COBTi 2.5 I 1.5 I
0.5 IXX.X lANNUAL C(BT AS S OF REFLAC.COSTI 0.7 I 0.3 I
9.5 IXXX PER CREN MEMBER PER DAY ' I 12.5 1 7.5 I
ID.O IXX.X IANN.1AL COST AS I OF CREK AND Rfcl 13.0 I 7.0 I 
355 IXXX 1 AVERAGE IfJ-BER Or DAYS PER YEAR I AOS i 302 1 
2D IXX INO. OF YEARS OF ECONOMIC UFE I 30 I 15 I
65.0 IXX.X IT0IB5S FUEL PER W.Y (2A HOURS) I 76.0 I 55.3 1
2.0 IXX.X ITON'NES FLO. PER DAY (2A HOURS) I 2.5 I 1.5 I
17.05 iXX.XX l«MN FOR 2.5 SETS:5 YR K.D E0XESI13.62 I I
14
OLitpU-C
D A I L Y  COET F O R  COI-'AIKEF! EAIP,
OUTPUT VALUES EXFE-CTED 1 
1
1 i
1 I
KIG,-.
______
LON
FlEL costs - IN PORT i C.2 1 IThO'JS. OF 5 PEP [AY I 0.3 0.2
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.3 1 ITriOUS. OF t PER [AY 1 9.6 5.6
ANNUAL COET (F CREW 1 SBl 1 ITHO'US. OF ? PER YEAR 1 6A0 523
ANNL. COST OF PROVISION! 57 1 ITHOJS. OF S PER YEAR 1 67 38
ANNL. COST OF INBURAMEi ADO 1 ITHOUS. OF « PER ^ EAR 1 596 236
ANN_. COST OF R t K I EDO 1 1 THOLE. OF i PER YEAR ■ IUSD 510
ANNL. COST OF STORES 1 2DD i ITHOJS. OF S PER YEAR h 322 102
A‘,'NL. COST OF ADNIK. 1 136 1 ITriOLE. OF 1 PER YEAR 1 233 72
ANNL. NON-CAPITAL COSTS 1 2177 1 ITHOLE. OF S PER YEARCEXCL FlEDI 3029 lABA
VESSEL CAFIJAL COSTS 1 1 1 1
IN FINANCIAL TERNS 1 7671 1 11.FIXED,DEPRECIATiON-DECLlN BAL! 9051 6690
IN THO'JSA!<DS OF U.S. 1 32D:i 1 I2.RETUP1; ON RESALE VALUE 1366D 2365
D0:.LAR5 PER YEAR 1 5373 1 13.ANNUALIZED RESALE VALUE 1675E 3622
BA.SED ON THE I 5611 1 lA.ANv.'JALlZED FEPuACE VALLE 17366 A525
KiTHODS LISTED 1 A65A 1 IS.SINKING FUND-REFi.ACEMNT COSTI 66A5 3616
IN COLLMN G 1 1 1 1 
' . . . . . . . .  ...... 1 -.  __-------- ----I-
LAYUP COSTS 1
--- 1
29 1
J ■ t
1 THOUSANDS OF $ PEP. MONTH 1 35 23
SCRAPPI KG PRICE 1 1.D5 1 1 MILLIONS OF « (LESS 15X DELIVEI 1.19 0.97
RETURN ON SALVAGE 1 
1
£7 1 
I
1 THOUSANDS OF 1 PER YEAR 1 
1 1
167 136
•AEE:-J“£D COliETA'aS'
E5T FOR COinAINERE-ilF,
vessel COET S'J^“.ARY TABLE 
(THD'JSA!^DE OF LBS PER DAY AT SEA A‘ui IK PORT)
?^E'riOD
----AT ESA---- IK PORTl-------------------------
*E.6 26.5 II. FIX OEPREC. (DECL3K BAL.) + C?ER. C
9.3 2.2 12. AVOlWE^ l COSTS - LAYJP (EXCLUDES C
1D.9 3.9 13. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (IKCLUDES C
13.A tA lA. OFERATIK'5 COSTS
22.A 15.A 15. RETURK ON RESALE VAIUE + OPER. COST
27.6 Ti^ .S 16. RESALE VALUE+OPER. COSTS-LAYL'P
13.7 6.6 !7. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALUE + ORER. CDS
28.5 21.5 IS. ANNUALIZED RESALE VALLE + OFER. COS
29.6 22.7 19. ANKLIALIZED REFi.AC£ VALLE + OPER. CO
26.5 19.5 110. SINKING FUND-REPuACEKEKT COST + OP
•15
Input- Dc'.t-a with the Assumpticr-ri of
Ship Price: US$ AS Million
DAILY COET FCR CC-KTAINEF. SHIP,
19E5 VESSEL COETlNiS KOD’JuE FOR CONTAIKERB VESSELS • 
TYPE OF DA-TA VALLE 1 FORM I UNITS \
EQJIRED INPUT DATA 
CAPACITY IN TEU 2728
1
IXXXX
1
ITLEKTY FOOT EQUIVALENT UNITS
YEAR BUILT 198A I19XX 1
DEADIEIGHT A3. A IXX.X I THOUSANDS Oi^ DEADI-EIGHT TO!<NES
VESSEL UTILIZATION 3S5 IXXX I DAYS PER YEAR
NATIONALITY CF OFFICERS A IX 11. LI.9.A.'2. EUROPE 3. GREEK
NATIONALITY 0- CREW A IX IA.K0R/SIN5/PHIL 5.INDIA
ENGItE/FLEL TYPE 1 IX 11. MSD 2. LSD 3. ETEAM A. GAB
LOADED SPEED 2-0. IXX IKNOTS
FLEL COST 112 IXXX.X 15 PER TON£
EXPECT. RATE 0- RETURN 6 IXX.X 11 FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.ItfLATION
EXFECT. RATE OF FETUR-N lA IXX.X !1 FINANCIAL RA.TE INCL.IFLATION
CLIRPENT SCRAP PRICE 115 IXXX 15 PER TONNE
PRICE OF CONTAINERE 2503 ix):>:): ICOET OF BOX IN 5 PER TEU —
-ASSJMED VALLSS'
peplacekiv't cost of VEE.
SEf'.AIK'lNG LIFE OF VES5L 
RESALE VALUE OF VESSEL 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL 
NO. OF OFFICERS 
NO. OF RATINGS 
COST PER OFFICER 
COST PER RATING 
LEN'ETH (LOA)
EEAN
El'LNER DRA'^T 
DESIGN SPEED 
ACTUAL LOADED SPEED 
ACTUAL SPEED IN BALLAST 
SHF (SHIP HORSEPORER) 
INSUR. COST (Pil + KSH) 
REPAIR AND NAINTEKA.Nd 
STORES
PROVISIO!^  (DA.ILY) 
ADMINISTRATION 
VESSEL LTILI2AT10N 
VESSEL LIFE
FLEL CONS-AT SEA LOADED 
-IN PORT 
COST FOR CO!<TAIf£RS
-1 MAX 
\ SI.E 
i 31
151.75
151.75 
I 12
21
AS.CO iXX.XXXiMILLIONS OF t
IS IXX IPEMAININE YEARS OF USEFUL lIFE 
A5.DD IXX.XXX!MILLIONS OF $
AS.CO IXX.XXXIMILLION'S OF I
7 IXX I NO. OF OFFICERS IN SHIP'S CREN 
10 IXX INO. AELE-BODIED SEAMEN IN CREN I 
3A.2 IXXXXXXIl CDD'S/XEAR FOR ONE CREN S_OT I 37.6 
3A.2 IXXXXXXIiNCL. BENEFITS,A5UME 2 MEN/ELOTI 37.6 
230 iXXXX I METERS(IF FEET THEN ft./3.25)1 269 
32 IXXX IMETERS(IF FEET THEN ft./3.28)1 33
11.6 IXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28)1 12.8
• 2D.E iXX.X iKNOTS I 23.0
20.0 IXX.X IKNOTS: LON VALUE FOR DEAD’^IEIGHTI - 
2D.0 IXX.X IRNOTS:H!GH VALLE FOR DEADWE1GHT11B.2D
2ADDD IXXXXX IS.H.P. FOR MAIN PROPULSION SYST1ASA22 
.1.0 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS X OF REPLAC.COBTI 1.3
2.0 IXX.X lANNllAL COST AS J (F REPLAC.COSTI 2.5
0.5 IXX.X imjAL COET AS % OF REPLAC.COSTI 0.7
9.5 IXXX If PER CREN MEMBER PER DAY I 12.5
10.0 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS t OF CREN AND F.61 13.0 
355 IXXX lAlERAGE N'-IMBER (F DA.YS PER YEARl ADB
20 IXX INO. OF YEARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I■ 30
65.0 IXX.X ITONNES FIEL PER DAY (2A HOURS) 1 7B.0
2.0 IXX.X ITONNES FUEL PER DAY (2A HOURS) I 2.5
17.05S IXX.XX iSMTil FOR 2.5 SETS:5 YR OLD £0)15113.62
MIN 
3B.3 
16 
33.26 
3S.2E 
ID 
17 
30. £ 
3D.B 
220 , 
30 
10. A 
lA.O 
1A.30
10933
0.7
1.5 
0.3
7.5 
7.0 
302
15
55.3
1.5
■16
Output
DAILY COST FOR CON’TAINIR EHIP,
OUTPUT VALUES EXPECTED 1
1
1 1 
1
HIGH 1 LOW 1 
1 1
F'JEL COSTS - IK PORT 1 D.2 1 ITHO'JB. OF i PER DAY 1 D.3 1 0.2 1
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.3 1 ITHO'JS. OF i PER DAY 1 9.6 1 5.6 I
ANTsJAL COST OF CREW 1 SBl 1 ITKO'JS. OF t PEP. YEAR 1 6AD 1 523 1
ANi'L. COST OF FROVISIONI 57 1 ITHO'JS. OF 1 PER YEAR 1 87 1 35 1
ANNL. COST Gf JKS'JRA.KCEI A50 1 ITHDUS. OF i PER YEAR 1 673 1 266 1
ANN.. COST Of R 6 K 1 9D0 1 ITHOUS. OF t PER YEAR 112-9A 1 57A 1 1
ANNL. COST Of STORES 1 225 1 ITHOUB. OF S PER VIAR I 362 ! 115 !
ANNL. COST Of ADMIK. 1 IAS 1 ITHD'JS. OF 1 PER YEAR 1 2513306
1 77 1 '
A«L. NON-CAPITAL COSTS 1 2362 1 ITHO'JS. OF i PER YEAR(EXCL FUEDl 1 1595 i •
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 I 1 1 1;
IK FINANCIAL TER^iS 1 661D 1 !1 .FIXED DEPRECIATIC«-DECLIN BALi 9902 1 7319 !
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. 1 3600 1 i2.?£TU?.N OK RESALE VALUE iAlAO 1 2661 1
D0;.LAR5 PER YEAR 1 5672 1 I3.ANNUALI2ED PISALE VALUE 17A06 1 A1A6 i
BASED ON THE 1 6320 1 lA.AN'NUALIZED REPLACE VALUE 16036 I A912 1
NETHDDS LISTED 1 5235 1 iS.SIKKIKS FUND-F.EP..ACESEKT COSTI 7A75 1 A293 1
IN COLUMN G 1 1 1 i
J .  , . . . . . . . . .  -  - 1
1 1 
i- — i
LAYUP COSTS 1
’— 1
29 1
1 ‘ 
1 THOUSANDS OF t PER HOS'TH 1 35 I 23 !
SCF.AfPIKE PRICE 1 l.DS 1 I KILL]ONE OF « (LESS 15X DELIVEI 1.19 1 0.97 1
RETURN ON SALVAGE 1 
1
£7 1
1
1 THOUSANDS OF % PER YEAR 1 
1 __t
167 1 136 1 
1 1
•ASB'Jr'£D CONSTANTS-
EST FOR CO^ A^IKTRSHIP. '
VESSEL COST SUNNARY TASiE 
(THOLSANDS Of US? PER DAY AT SEA AND IK FORT)
rETKOD
----AT SEA---- IK PORT!-------------------------
*6.2 31.1 !1. FIX DEPREC. (DECLIK SAL.) + OPER. C
9.6 2.6 12. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (EXCLUDES C
11.3 A.2 13. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (IKCLUDEB C
13.9 6.9 !A. 0PERAT1K5 COSTS
2A.1 17.D IS. RETURK ON RESALE VALUE + OPER. COST j
29.5 22.A 16. m . RESALE VALUE+OPER. COBTS-LAYUP :
1A.2 7.1 17. RETURN ON SALVAE VALL>E + OPER. COS
30.5 23.A IE. AKK.JALI2ED RESALE VALUE + OPER. COB
31.7 2A.7 19. ANNUALIZED EPLACE VALUE + OPER. CO
28.7 21.6 I ID. B1KKIN3 FUND-REPLACEKEKT COST + OP
17
Input Date with the Assufr'ption of
Shio PrioeiUBt 50 f'^ illion
[iAlLY COET FGR CO:nAi’-;EF SHP,19ES \5S5EL C0ETIN5 KOI'UlE FOR CO'uAIt'ERs VESSELS <
TYPE OF DATA 1 VALUE i FOR.K
REQUIRED INPUT DATA 1 1
CAPACITY IN TEU 1 2726 IXXXX
YEAR BUILT 1 1964 I19XX
DEADWEIGHT 1 43.4 IXX.X
VESSEL LiTlLIIATION 1 35S IXXX
NiTIO:;iiITY OF OFFICERS! 4 IX
NATIONALITY OF CREW 1 4 IX
ENGINE/PUEL TYPE 1 1 IX
LOADED SPEED 1 20.0 IXX
FUEL COST 1 112 IXXX.X
EXPECT. RATE OF FITURN 1 6 IXX.X
EXPECT. FATE OF RETURN i 14 IXX.X
CURRENT SCRAP PRICE 1 115 IXXX
PRICE OF CONTAINERS 1 2SD3 IXXXX
UNITS
-AESU!CD VALUES
KEF'LACENN'T COST CA Y’ESL 
RE^'.AININE LIFE OF VE5SL 
RESALE VALUE OF L'ESSEL 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL 
NO. OF OFFICERS 
NO. OF RATINGS 
COST PER OFFICER 
COST PER F;ATINS 
LENGTH (LOA)
SEAM
SLiKNER DRAFT 1 11.6 IXX
DESIGN SPEED 1 20.5 IXX.X
ACTUAL LOADED SPED 1 20.0 IXX.X
ACTUAL SPEED IN BALLAST I 20.0 IXX.X
EKP (SHIP KORSEPWCR) 1 24000 IXXXXX
INSUR. COST (Pil + HSri)l 1.0 IXX.X
REPAIR AND hAINTENANCE 1 2.0 IXX.X
STORES 1 0.5 IXX.X
PROVISIONS (DAILY) 1 9.5 IXXX
ADMINISTRATION 1 10.0 IXX.X
YtSSEL L!T1LIZATI0N 1 355 IXXX
VESSEL LIFE 1 20 IXX
FLEL COIC-AT SEA LOADED 1 65.0 IXX.X
-IN PORT I 2.0 IXX.X
COST FOR NEW COfCTAJNERBl 17.C5 IXX.XX
I
I TWENTY FOOT EOUIVALDT UNITS . 
I
ITHOUSANDS OF DEADWEIGHT TONNES 
IDAYS PER YEAR
II. U.B.A. 2. EUROPE 3. GREEK 
K.KOR/SING/F^ IL 5.INDIA 
II. USD 2. LSD 3. STEAK A. GAS 
I KNOTS
IS PER TONNE ’iX FINANCIAL FATE ESCL.INFLATION 
IX FINANCIAL RATE INCl.INFLATION 
IS PER TONNE
I COST OF BOX IN S PER TEU
1
ED.OD 
IE 
SO. DO 
ED. CD 
7 
ID 
3A.2 
34.2 
230 
32
1 m
I S7.S 
1 31
IE7.SD 
iS7.ED
21
7.fc
33 I
ixx.>;>:>:iNiLLioNS of t 
iXX IREKAINING YEARS 0- UB£PUL LIFE 
IXX.XXXIKILLI0I6 OF *
IXX.XXXIKILLIONB OF %
IXX IKD. OF OFFICERS IN SKIP'S CPEW 1
IXX I NO. ABLE-BODIED EEAIEN IN CREW I
IXXXXXXIS DDD'S/YEAR FOR 0)£ CREW SlOT I 
IXXXXXXIINCl. benefits,ASLtZ 2 r£N/SLOTI 37.6 
IXXXX IKETERSQF FEET THEN ft./3.26)1 269 
IXXX iMETERBUF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)
IPETERSCIF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 12.6 
IKNOTS I 23.0
IKiWTS; LOW VALLE FOR DEADWEIGHT! - 
1KN0TS:HIGH VALLE FOR DEAIWEI6nTiiE.20 
IS.H.P. FOR hAlN PROPXEION EYBT146422 
lANM'JAL COST AS X OF RtPLAC.COSTI 1.3 
IANNUAL COST AS X OF REPLAC.COBTl 2.5 
lANI-FJAL COST AS X OF RtPLAC.COSTI D.7 
IS PER CREW tErSER PER DAY 1 12.E 
lANNUAL COST AS X OF CREW AND R&l 13.0 
IAVERA5E NLilCER OF DAYS PER YEAR! 4D5 
INO. OF YEARS OF EC0NO.1IC LIFE 1 3D 
ITONNES FIEL PER DAY (24 HOURS) 1 7B.D 
I TONICS FUEL PER DAY (24 HOURS) I 2.5 
 ISY.N FOR 2.5 BETB:5 YR O^ D E0XEBI13.82
! KIN 
I 42.5 
I 16 
136.96 
142.ED 
I ID 
1 17
1 3D.6 
I 3D.S 
I 22D 
30 
I 10.4 
I 14.D 
114.3D 
I - 
110933 
I 0.7 
I 1.5 
I 0.3 
I 7.5 
1 7.0 
i 3D2 
I 15 
1 55.3 
I 1.5 
I
1 8
Out put.
WILY COST FOK CO.U'TAIKSR SKIP,
O'JTFuT VAl'ES EXPECTED 1
1
1 i 
1 !
HIGH LOU 1 
i
fuel costs - m PORT 1 0.2 1 ITHOUS. OF f PER W.Y i D.3 D.2 1
- AT SEA loaded I 7.3 1 ITHOUS. 0- i PER DAY 1 9.6 5.6 1
ANNUAL COST OF CREv; 1 ESI 1 ITHDJB. OF i PER YEAR 1 640 513 1
AN'L. COST OF FROVlEIONi 57 1 ITHOUS. OF f PER YEAR 1 87 38 1
AN!>1. COST Or INSURANCE! SOD 1 ITHOUS. OF S PER YIAR I 74E 298 1
A.N L. COST 0= R I K 1 ICSD 1 ITHOUS. OF i PER YEAR 11435 636 1
ASM. COST OF STORES 1 2S0 1 ITHOUS, Cf i PER YEAR 1 403 128 1
AN'L. COST Or AOMIN. 1 158 1 ITHOUS. OF i PER YEAR 1 '270 61 1
AN'l. NON-CAPITAi COSTS! 2547 1 ITHOUS. OF t PER \IAP.(E>:CL FlEL) I3S84 1705 1
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS I 1 1 ' 1 I 1
IN FINANCIAL TERMS 1 9350 I 11.FIXED DEFRECIATION-DECLIN EALilG7S3 7948 I
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. 1 4DD0 1 12.RETURN ON RESALE VALUE 146D0 2957 1
DOLLARS PER YEAR 1 6371 1 13.ANNUALIZED RESALE VALUE I80S7 4474 1
BASED CN THE 1 6829 1 14.ANNUALIZED REPi.ACE VALUE 1£7-1D 5290 1
KTHODS LISTED I 5517 1 IS.SINKING FUNO-KEPWCEMENT COST! 8306 4770 i
IN CO-UMN G 1 1 1 1
1 ..... . - . . \ - ___ I-  _____ 1
— — ...............................................  r
LA"J? COSTS 1
1
29 1
. r j
1 THOUSANDS OF t PER MONTH i 35 23 1
SCFAPPIN'S PRICE 1 l.OE 1 1 MILLIONS OF t (LESS ISi DELIVEI 1.19 0.97 !
f£'Ur:v on salvage I 87 1 1 THOUSANDS OF f PER YEAR 1 167 136 1
I I
■ASSUMED CONSTANTS-
EST FOE CON’AlUcRS-lIP, '
VESSEL COST SJM>':APY TABLE 
(TriOUSAKOS OF USS PEE WY AT BE.A m'} V.i POET)
fCTH'OD
----AT SEA----m FOETi-------------------------
AD.6 33.7 II. FIX DEPREC. (OEClIM EAL.) + OPER. C
1D.D 2.9 !2. AVOlDAEtE COSTS - LAYUP (EXCLUICS C
11.6 A.6 13. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (INCLUDES C
1A.5 7.A lA. OPERATING COSTS
25.7 ’ 18.7 IS. RETURN ON P£SALE VALUE + OPER. COST
31.A 2A.A 16. ANN. RESALE VALLE+OPER. COSTS-LAYUP
1A.7 7.6 17. RETURN ON SALVAGE VALIE + OPER. COS
32.4 2E.3 16. AN'.'JAi.IZED RESALE VALIE + OPER. COS
33.7 26.6 19. AfWJALIZED REPLACE VALUE + OPER. CO
3D.6 23.8 HD. SIKTUNG FUND-REFlACDIENT COST + 0?
•19
i.npu.t Detir. wath the-: AEsu.mpt,iDn ci 
Ship Price: IJSf- 55 Million
DAILY COST FOR CONTAINER SHIP,
1SE5 VESSEL CDSTIN5 KOOLiLE FOR CONTAI.MRS VESSELS
TYPE Or DATA
F£C''JlREIi INPUT DATA !
CAPACITY IN TEU I
YEAR BUILT |
DEADNEISHT |
VESSEL LTILI2ATI0N i
NATIONALITY Or OFFICERS I 
NATIONALITY OF CREN I
EN5INE/FLEL TYPE ‘ I 
LOAiED SPEED 1
FLEL COST (
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN i 
EXPECT. PATE OF RETlIR.N' 1 
CURFEN7 SCRAP PRICE )
PRICE OF CONTAINERS I
'------ AES'JrED VALLES-
REFLACENKT COST 0- VE5LI 
REMAININS LIFE OF VESSLI 
RESALE VALLE OF VESSEL I 
ORIGINAL COST OF VESSEL I 
NO. OF 0-FICERS ! 
NO. 0- RATINGS !
COST PER OFFICER I 
COST PEP. RATING I
LENGTH (LOA) ]
KAY. 1
SJYYER DRAFT. I
DESIGN SPEED I
ACTUAL LOADED SPEED 1
ACTLAL SPEED IN BALLAST I 
SHP (SHIP KORSEPOLER) I 
2NSLIR. COST (Pil Hi«)l 
REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE I 
STORES I
PROVISIONS (DAILY) I 
ADMINISTRATION I
VESSEL UTILIZAT10.N I 
VESSEL LIFE I
FLEL COK'S-AT SEA LOADED!
-IN PORT I 
COST FOR NEN CONTAINERS!
VALUE I FORM t UNITS
2 m  W.U 1 TWENTY FOOT EC'UIVALENT UNITS >
iSSA IISXX I I
A3.A !>;>:.X 1THDU5AN0S OF KADUEIGKT TONNES i
■ 355 !XXX I DAYS PER YEAR i
A IX ii. L'.E.A. 2. EUROPE 3. GREEK j
A IX lA.KOR/EING/PHIL 5.INDIA j
1 IX II. MSD 2. LSD 3. STEAM A. GAS i2D.0 IXX IKNOTS )
1'.2 iXXX.X If PER TONNE )
£' IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE tXCL.INFLATION i
1A IXX.X IX FINANCIAL RATE INCL.INFLATION 1
115 IXXX 1$ PER TONNE j
25001XXXX !COST OF BOX IN * PER TEU -----
I MAX ! MIN i55.00 IXX.XXXIKILLIONE OF t | 43.3 \ |
18 IXX IREMAINING YEARS OF USEFUL LIFE i 31 I 15 I
55.00 IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF t I63.2A !An 6R 1
55.00 IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF * 143.25 l ib .ll I
7 IXX )N0. OF OFFICERS IN SHIP'S CREW I 12 I ID !
ID !XX UNO. ASLE-PODIED SEAMEN IK CREW I 21 I 17 I
3A.2 IXXXXXXif ODD'S/YEAR FOR ONE CREW ElOT I 37.6 I 3\8 i
3A.2 IXXXXXXIINCL. BENEFITS,ASL'ME 2 MEN/S-CTI 37.6 I 30.8 1 
230 IXXXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.25)1 26S 1 220 I
32 IXXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.28)1 33 1 30 1
11.6 IXX IMETERSdF FEET THEN ft./ 3.25)! 12.6 i 10.A I
20.5 IXX.X IKNOTS | 23.0 I lA.O I
20.0 IXX.X IKNOTS; LOW VALLE FDR DEADWEIGHT! - ilA.30 I
20.D IXX.X IKNOTB.-HIGH VALUE FOR DEADWEIGHT 116.20 1 - I
2ADDD IXXXXX IS.H.P. FOR MAIN PROPU_SION EYST1A5A22 I1D533 1
1.0 IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS I OF KPLAC.C05TI 1.3 I 0.7 I
2.0 IXX.X lAWWAL COST AS S OF REPuAC.COBTi 2.5 1 1.5 I
0.5 IXX.X 1AN:^L!AL COST AS S OF REPLAC.C05TI D.7 I D.3 I
9.5 IXXX 1$ PER CREW KEtSiR PER DAY 1 12.5 I 7.5 1
10.0 IXX.X lANN'-UAL COST AS % OF CEW AND Ril 13.0 I 7.0 I
355 IXXX lAVERAS NUfBER (F DAYS PER VEARI AOS 1 302 I
20 IXX INO. OF YEARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I 30 1 15 I
65.0 IXX.X IT01'J!«ES FLEL PER DAY (24 K-OJRS) I 76.0 I 55,3 I
2.0 IXX.X ITONNEB FUEL PER MY (24 HOURS) I 2.5 I 1.5 I
17.05 IXX.XX ItKN FOR 2.5 SETS;5 YR OLD E0XESI13.62 I I
2D
miLY COST FOR COK’TAINZR SHIP,
OUTPUT VALUES EXPECTED 1
1
! I 
1 . ....... 1.
HIGH LOW 1
FUEL COETE - IN PORT i C.2 1 iTKOUB. OF 5 PER EAV 1 D.3 D.2
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.3 1 iTHOUS. OF $ PER DAY 1 9.6
ANIOJAL COST OF CREW 1 581 1 ITHOJB. OF t FEP MA? 1 6A0 823
ANr£. COST OF PROVISION’! 57 1 ITHO'JS. OF S FER YEAR 1 87 38
AVv'L. COST OF INSURANCE 1 55D 1 ITHD'JS. OF f FER YEAR 1 822 327
A!UIl . COST OF R i M 1 HDD I ITHO'JS. OF S FER YEAR 1ISSl 7D1
ANNI. COST OF STORES 1 275 ! ITriOUB. OF t FER MAR 1 AA3 lAO
ANIL. COST Or ADMIN. 1 168 1 ITHO'JS. OF » PER YEAR 1X 239 66
ANNL. KO’J-CAPITAL COSTS! 2732 ! ITKOUS. OF J PER YEAREEXCL FUEL)i 3661 1616
VTSSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 1 1 1
IN FINANCIAL TERMS ! 1K?9D ! 11.FIXED DEPRECIATION-I'EClIN EALI116DA ES77
IN THOUSANDS OF U.B. 1 AADD ! I2.EETURN ON RESALE 'VALUE 15D60 3252
DOLLARS PER MAR 1 6S7D ! 13.ANN'Jjy.lZED RESALE W.l\x 187D7 A79?
EASED ON THE I 7338 1 iA.ANIWALlZtD REPLACE VA'JJE 19381 8667
METHODS LIETED ! 639? ! 15.BINKIKG FLi'tD-RE=..ACEKE!-:T COST! 9137 82A7
IN CO’JJMN G i ! ! t> , , - I - i
LAYUP COSTS I
1
29 1
1 * 
1 THOJSfV'iOB OF J PER MONTH 1 38 23
BCRAFPING PRICE I 1.D8 ! 1 MILLIONS OF t (LESS ISJ' DELIVEI 1.19 D.97
RETURN’ ON SALVAGE I 1
£7 ! 
!
1 THOUSANDS OF « FER YEAR 1 
1 ____  1
167 136
■ASBUHED CWSTANT5—
E5T FOR COK'TAIK'ERBHIP, 1
VEB3EL COST EUMrARY TABLE 
(THO'JBARDE OF UBS PER MY AT BEA ANO IK PORT)
FZTHOD
----AT SEA---- IN PORT I------- :-----------------
A3.A 36.3 II. FIX OEPEC. (OSaiN BAL.) + 0?ER. C
iC.3 3.3 12. AVOIMELE COSTS - LAYUP (EXCLUHES C
12.0 A.9 13. AWIDAELE COSTS - LAYU? (II.'ClL'DES C
15.0 7.9 lA. OPERATING COSTS
27.A 2D.3 15. RETURN ON RESALE VALUE CPER. COST
33.3 26.3 16. ANN. RESALE VALUE+OPER. COSTS-LAYUP
15.2 E.2 17. PrrURN ON SALVAGE VALUE + OPER. COS
3A.3 27.3 IB. Af^ NyALHEO RESALE VAilE + OFER. COS
35.6 28.6 19. AfWUALlZEO REPLACE VALUE + OFER. CO
33.0 25.9 JID. SINKING FUND-REPLACEMENT COST + 0?
Input De.ta with the? Asei-anptiC'n ci
Ship Price: US$ 60 Million
DAILY COST FOR CORiAIKER SKIP,
19£S VESSEL CDETIro KOD'JLE FOR CONTAIKORS VESSELS
TYPE OF DATA I VALUE I FOR« I L'S'ITS
FiOJIRED INPUT DATA 
CAPACITY IN TEU 
MAR SUILT 
DEADL'EIG.KT 
VESSEL LITILIZATION 
NATIONALITY OF O-FICERE 
NATIONALITY OF CREv.' 
ENEINE/FL'El TYPE 
LOADED SPEED 
FUEL COST
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN'
EXPECT. RATE OF RETURN 
CURRENT SCRAP PRICE
PPiCE OF COlTAIfiERS 
'------ ASSUMED VALUES
FEPLACEnNT COST 0= VESl 
Flr'iAlNlNS LIFE OF VEE5L 
PiSilE VALUE OF MSSEL 
CRIEIIs'AL COST OF VESSEL 
NO. OF OFFICERS 
ND. OF RATINES 
COST PER CPFiCER 
COST PER RATINE 
LENETH (LOA)
EEAM
SUMMER DRAFT 
DESIGN SPEED 
ACTUAL LOADED SPEED 
ACTUAL SPEED IN EALLA5T 
SHP (SHIP KORSEPOkER) 
INSUR. COST (P&l + m )  
REPAIR AND KA1NTENA.NCE 
STORES
PROVISIONS (DAILY) ' 
ADMINISTRATION 
VESSEL UTILIZATION 
VESSEL LIFE
rJEL CONS-AT SEA LOAICD 
-IN PORT 
COST FOR NEK CONTAINERS
I 1
2m  1 >;>:>:): itlektv fc»ot ecuivaient units ____
i9cA I19XX 1
A3.A IXX.X !THO’JEA*\DS OF DEADWEIGHT TOICMB 
SEE IXXX I DAYS PER YEAR 
A IX 11. U.B.A. '2. EUROPE 3. GPEEK 
A IX 1A.K0R/EIN5/PHIL E.INDIA 
1 IX II. MED 2. LSD. 3. STEAM A. GAS
20.D iXX !KNOTS 
112 iXXX.X \i PER TONNE 
£ IXX.X iX FINANCIAL RATE EXCL.INFlATION 
iA iXX.X I). FlNA’iCIAL RATE IND-.IN-LATIOK 
HE IXXX 1$ PER TONNE
2EC0 IXXX.X I COST OF BOX IN S PER T E U --------------------------------- ! t'AX.
iD.DD IXX.XXXIMILLION'S OF * ! £9.0
IE IXX iREMAINING YEARS OF USEFUL LIFE 1 31
£O.DD IXX.XXXIMILLIONS OF $ IE9.D0
60.DO IXX.XXXIMII-LIONS OF * !£9.00
7 IXX iNO. OF OFFICERS IN SHIP'S CREW 1 12
10 IXX INO. ABLE-BODIED SEAMEN IN CREW I 21
3A.2 IXXXXXXU DOD'S/YEAR FOR ONE CREW SLOT I 37.£
3A.2 IXXXXXXIINCL. BENEFITS,AEUHE 2 MEN/EiOTI 37.6 
230 IXXXX iKETEREdP FEET THEN It./ 3.26)1 269
32 1XXX IMETERBCIF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 33
11.6 IXX IMETERECF FEET THEN ft./ 3.26)1 12.6
2D.E IXX.X IKNOTS I 23.D
20.0 IXX.X IKNOTS: LOW VAILE FOR DEA.D^IIGHTI -
20.0 IXX.X IKN0TB;H1GH VALUE FOR DEA[iWEIGHTIlE.20 
2ADDD IXXXXX IB.K.P. FOR MAiN PROPULSION SYST1AEA22
l.D IXX.X lANNUAL COST AS J OF REFLAC.C'DBTl 1.3
2.0 IXX.X IA.NNUAL COST AS S OF REPLAC.COSTl 2.5 
D.5 IXX.X !A‘'«LW. CC6T AS S OF REPLAC.COSTl 0.7 
9.E IXXX IS PER CREW MEffiER PER DA.Y I 12.5
ID.D IXX.X lANN'JAL COST AS S OF CREW AND Ril 13.D 
2E5 IXXX I AVERAGE NUMBER Or DAYS PER MARI AD6 
20 IXX INO. OF MARS OF ECONOMIC LIFE I 30
65.0 IXX.X ITONMB FUEL PER DAY (2A HOURS) I 76.0
2.0 IXX.X ITONMS FUEL PER DAY (2A HO'JRS) I 2.5 
17.05 IXX.X): IIMN FOR 2.5 BETS:5 YR OLD B0XES113.62
MIN I 
£1.0 ! 
16 1 
AA.35 i 
51, CO 1 
10 I 
17 ! 
3D.6 I 
30.5 1 
220 I 
30 i 
iCNA 1 
lA.O I 
1A.30 I 
- I 
10933 I 
0.7 1
1.5 I 
0.3 I
7.5 I 
7.0 I 
302 I
15 I 
55.3 1
1.5 I 
1
Output
rtlLY C03T FOR COI^TAINZR SKIP, 
Ci.FTFl'T VPL'JEE EXPECTEP I
FlEL COSTS - IN PORT 1 0.2 1
- AT SEA LOADED 1 7.3 1
ANNUAL COST OF CREL' 1 5£1 1
ANN_. COST OF PROVISION 1 B7 1
ANNL. COST OF INSURANCE 1 6C3 1
AN'L. COST OF REM 1 1200 1
ANNi. COST OF STOFISS 1 300 1
ANN.. COST OF ADMIN. 1 178 1
ANiNL. KON-CAPITAL COETSI 2917 I
VESSEL CAPITAL COSTS 1 1
IN FINAIvCIAl TERMS 1 10530 1
IN TriO'JSANDS OF U.E. 1 A BOO 1
DOLLARS PER YEAR 1 73£9 1
EASED ON THE 1 78A5 1
METHODS LISTED 1 69t0 i
IN' COLUMN G 1 1 . 1. _ 1-.
LAYUP COSTS 1 29 1
SIRAPFING PRICE 1 1.05 !
RETURN ON SALVAGE 1 
1
£7 1
!
I H15-: I LOf.' I
ITHDUE. Or i PER DAY 1 0.3 i 0.2 1
ITHDUS. OF « PER DAY 1 9.6 1 5.6 1
ITHOUS. OF 5 PER YEAR 1 6A0 1 523 1
ITHO'JS. OF « PER YEAR 1 87 1 35 1
ITHOUS. OF « PER YEAR 1 897 1 357 !
ITHOUS. OF < PER YEAR 1 1725 1 765 1
ITHDUS. OF S PER YEAR 1 AB3 1 153 1
ITHOUS. OF i PER YEAR 1 307 1 9D r.
ITHO’JS. OF % PER YEAR(E>:CL FUEL)l,^'i39 i1 X I 1
1927 ! 11 ' I ' !1.FIXED DEPRECIATION-DECLIN E.AL112ASA 19205 1
12.RETURN ON' RESALE VALUE 1 S520 1 3SAS 1
!3.Ai«UAL12ED RESALE VALUE 1 9356 !512-5 1
1A.ANNJAL12ED REPLACE VALUE 110053 !60A5 1
i5.tlN:;iNG Flt>iD-PEPLACE!''£!a COETi F?t7 1 572A I
1 THOUSANDS OF S PER MONTH 1 35 ii  23
! MILLIONS OF S (LESS l51 DELlVEi 1.19 11  0.97
1 THOUSANDS OF i PER YEAR 1 
1 _____1
167 1
i
 156
i
■AEE‘Jr£D CO-£TAN’TS-
EST FOR COKTAINERBHiP.
VEESEL COST Ell",.-'ARY TABLE ]
(TriOLlEAl^OE OF UEf PER DAY AT SEA A!<D IN PORT)
hETHOD
--- AT EEA---- ]?>; POET I------------------------
. Ai.O 3B.9 il. FIX DEPREC. (DECLIN PAL.) •» OPER. C
10.7 3.6 12. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (EXCLUDES C
12.3 E.3 13. AVOIDABLE COSTS - LAYUP (INCLUDES C
15.5 E.A lA. OPERATING COSTS
29.0 22.D 15. RETURN ON RES.ALE VALUE 4 OPER. COST
35.3 2£.2 16. ANN. fSSALE VAiUE+OPER. COETS-LAYUP
15.7 E.7 17. RETURN ON SALVAE VALUE + OPER. COS
36.3 29.2 IE. AV^ WALIZED RESALE VALUE + OFER. COS ;
37.6 3D.5 19. AN.NUAL12ED REPLACE VALLE + OPER. CO ;
35.2 28.1 IlD. SINKING FUND-REPLACEMENT COST + OP j
CooiipuU-v^ Prc0ira-)ii f c r  l'cy:'/5S (o^t Qnnm\-iS(y)'\ :
C ur, i;3aT.'o-oA)J O r:rt'i prc.c.rrrM7i l-!3'/.
S o  L L i l S [ L \ 2 D  =  i ° L L \ “ ^^^ J O , ! O M W U T  " T - E X T  c r  G - R r i P l D C
0 D1 l-l Q (3.00, 4 ) : J =-1 ; F;Et1 USL 
50 FOR l\II-;:=44B. 2 TO 44B3 STEP 44S. 2 
6Q> |;:s= 3 1 /365!i' <5247+10236)
BO =I'13 2+2!{2.5^’.3 3 2-!-14/24!!2.5)^ -3 12t KP=RP/1 000
110 W1=T0T/NK: W2=TDT/ <NK!i’: 11)
130 ?F'^F$i"g " ' THEN^l 50 ^  ^ ^^  ^ t J , 4 3 -TDT: J- J +1
140 PRINT NK; W1; W2^;1000: TOT 350 NEXT NK
160 IF F«; = "T" THEN 360
lit .3=L)NE(30. 170,-,2,5. r/0) ,3
190 LINE (30+X>!‘:.05, 170)-(30+X>!'.O5, 175) 3 200 NEXT X .
230 LOCATE 23,35:PRINT "X util- ' ' •
240 LOCATE 3,10:PRINT "5;/E;DX"
250 LOCATE 4,10:PRINT "CthEl"
270 TO 3: LOCATE. LLCLI, 3; LL-LLH'2; PRINT MIDt (PP&, L, 1 ) ; N£
280 Y=170-QCl,2I)f;.5 
290 LINE (X,Y)-(X,Y) , 1 
300 FOR K=2 TO 10 
•310 X=|:;)i;25+30 
320 Y=170-QLK,2D*.5 
330 LINE -<X,Y),1 
340 fJEXT K 
350 REM hapag 
360 J=1 .
370 FOR iaK=259.4 TO 2595 STEP 259.4 
3B0 A=<27+3/24)/365 
390 KS=AJi: (3*551 + 10734)
400 KP= (17+14/24 ) t (75+NK)f:i7/2594) *112+ 3*112:KP=KP/1000 (3+11 /24) *48*112+(1+3/24) *5:! 112+(*/
410 KPOR=7 * 10+5 *15
420 KDL=(NK*300+NK*160+9.059999*NK*22+ 
430 TDT=KB+KP+KPDR+KDL 
440 W1=T0T/(NK*2)
450 W2=T0T/(NK*22)
2*NK*(3B5+335))/1000
460 DEJ,13=NK:DCJ,23=W1*100:QCJ 470 IF Ft.= "G" THEN 490 
480 PRINT NK;W1;W2*1000;TOT 490 NEXT NK
500 IF F$="T" THEN STOP 
510 X=55
520 Y=170-DC1,2I*.5 
530 LINE (X,Y)-(X,Y),2 
540 FDR K=2 TO 10
,3D=W2*1000:GCJ,4D=T0T:J=J+1 •
550 X=K*25+30 
560 Y=170-QCK,23*.5 
570 LINE -(X,Y),2 
580 NEXT K
590 LINE (200,27)-(230,27),IrLOCATE 
600 LINE (200,43)-(230,43),2:LOCATE 
610 Z$=INKEY$:IF LEN(Z«)-0 THEN 610
4,31;PRINT 
6,31;PRINT
"USL"
"HAPAG"
Coo)\^uteM - Coc>C OyiMj?^^lScOI \
( TOj Loa4ecl )
j'.) F < [-. ■ ( p 1“ C3 o r r n i I-J120 cl:-.r SCREEN C;L']DTH 00i LOCATE 30, 10: INPUT "T-EXT or e-[-..AF'HlC 
30 LL t 1 3 : LL C 23---•? : LL I 33 =--9: LL C 4 3 = 12: LL L 3 3 =■ 3 ^1: LL. L 6 3 =■--17r. LL F 7 3--19
A 0 D1M Q < 3 00, 1; RLi1 USL
50 FOR Nh:;=100 TO AAB2 STEP 3 00 
,^0 h:S=:a 1 /36'5t <52^7+10236)
70 f^;:P---9X (63H NK!f34/4^B2) ^  132+2>r2. 5>! 112+1.^/2;.^i )f:2. 5)il 12: F<F-'=F-::P/3 000
80 F'.:P0R=25
90 KDL= (NK!i: 150-! Nia:80+9. 0 5 9 9 9 9 9 + .  6>i-NFa;3B5+. .fl2!i:NK)i 335) /1 000 
100 TDT=KS+i<P+I^POR+KDL
110 W 3 =-TOT/NK: W2=---T0T/ (ivlH:;>111)
120 QCJ, lD=NK:DrJ,23=Wl>i:lOO:Qi:J,33=W2!i.lOOO:QtJ,43=TOT: J-J + 1 
130 IF F^="6" THEN 150
II
140 PRINT NF<;W1; W2>F;1000;T0T 
150 NEXT NF-:;
160 IF F3. = "T" THEN 350
170 SCREEN 1:COLOR 0,0:LINE(30,10)-(30,170),3:LINE(30,170)-<295,170),3 
180 FOR >:=500 TO 5000 STEP 500 
.90 LIME (30+X!!'. 05, 3 70) - (30+X>F.. 05, 175) , 3 
200 NEXT X
210 FOR Y=1 TO 7:LINE (25, 3 70-Y>i: 100>f. 2)-(30, 170-Y>F: 1 00>!:. 2) , 3; NEXT Y 
220 LOCATE 23,4:PRINT "0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000"
230 LOCATE 2l!.35:PRINT "BOXES": LOCATE 3,7:PRINT "i&/BOX"
,40 LOCATE 4,7:PRINT "Cthe3"
250 PP«.= "7654321 ";FOR L=3 TO 7:L0CATE LLIL3,3: LL=LL+2: PRINT MID? (PPf*, L , 1
260 X=QC 1,13 >1250/5000+30
270 Y=170-QCl,23>f:.2
2B0 LINE (X, y ')-(X, Y) , 1
290 FOR K=2 TO J-3
300 X=^ D C K, 1 3 >1250/5000+30
310 Y=170-QI:Fc:,23>F'.2
320 LINE -(X,Y),1
330 NEXT K
340 F\’EM hapeg
350 J=-l
360 FOR NK=100 TO 2594 STEP 100 
370 A = (27+1/24)/365 
380 KS=A>t: (3551 + 10734)
?0 KF- (17+14/ 24) >t; (75+NIOi. 17/2594 ) X; 112+ (3+11 /24 ) X 4SX: 1 12+ < 1 +3/24 ) >f.5X. 112-K4 - 
oX:i 12:F=;P=KP/1000 
400 i;pOR=7X 10+5X15
410 F-:DL=(N1:;X-300+NF<X: 160+9. 059999XNKX22+.2XNKX (385+335) ) /lOOO
420 t o t =k b +k p +f;p o r+i:dl
30 W1=T0T/(NKX2) 
h 40 W2=T0T/ (NFCX22)
450 0E J , 1 3 - NF-C: Q n J, 23=W1 X100: Q E J , 33=W2>t: 1000: QIJ, 4 3=TOT 
460 J=J+1
470 IF F$="G" THEN 490 
4BO PRINT NK;W1;W2X1000;TDT 
490 NEXT NK
500 IF F$="T" THEN STOP 
510 X=QE1,13X250/5000+30 
520 Y=170-QE1,23X.2 
530 LINE (X,Y)-(X,Y) ,2 
540 FOR K=2 TO J-1 
550 -X=OEK,13 X250/5000+30 
560’ Y=170-DEK,23X.2 
570 LINE -<X,Y),2 
580 NEXT K
590 LINE (200,27)-(230,27),1rLDCATE 4,31;PRINT "USL"
600 LINE (200,43)-(230,43),2;LOCATE 6,31:PRINT "HAPAG"
610 Z?=INKEY$:IF LEN(Z?)=0 THEN.610
CoT^ puTev- Pno^ ra,'n fo- Co^ t Chv\fAj-i^~c
( Clt/li3M.tic7\ , Ecfudim^ Cost )
3 0 FnFI M prc'orftm W3'iU
:;'0 CLS; SCREEN 0: WIDTH 80: LOCATE 3 0, 1 0: ] NFHT ■'T-FXT . or
30 LL r 1 3 =3: LL12 : -9: LL C 3 D =•- 3.5
A0 D ]M Q (3 00,4):J=3:REM UBL
50 FDR N1::>44B.2 TO 4^183 STEP *148.2
60 l■.:S= 1 1 /365!|: (52^ 174 10236)
70 f:;P=9)!: (63+NKtl4/4^82) 1112+2^:2. 5:!:13 2+1-1 /24)!.'2. 5:i: 112:10-' 80 KPDR=25
90 KDL=(NK*;l50+NK)!:80+9.059999:i;NK!!9) /lOOO100 t o t --f;s +k p +k p d r4 k d l
V
G-RAPH3C -
■TCP / 3 000
1 1 0  W 1 = T O T / N K : W 2 = T D T / ( W K  * 11 )
120 Q C J ,13=NK:DE J,2 D =W 3 *100:Q E J ,3D =W2* 1000: D E J , 4 D=TDT:J=J +1 lo.O IF FS^="G" THEN 150
1 4 0  P R I N T  N K ; W 1 ; W 2 * 1 0 0 0 5 T O T  '
1 5 0  N E X T  N K
160 IF F'4.=:’'T" THEN 360
170 BCREEl'l 1: COLOR 0, 0: L 1NE (30, 10), - (30, 170) , 3: L1NE (30,170) - < 295,370) 3 80 F'OR X=500 TO 5000 STEP 500 
190 LINE <30+X*.05,170)-(30+X*.05,175),3 200 NEXT X ■ . ■
230 FOR Y--1 TO 7rLlNE (25, 170-Y>!:100)! , 5) - (30, 170-Y!i:100>i.. 5) , 3; NEXT Y 2!2u LOCATE 23,4:PF\INT "0 20 40 60 BO 3 00"
230 LOCATE 21,35: PRINT "7, util"
240 LOCATE 3,10:PRINT "$/BDX"
25C) LOCATE 4,10:PRINT "EthsT"
L=1 to 3: l o c a t e LLELT,3:LL=LL+2:PR3NT M1DT(PP$ ,L,3.lI / O  X» “■ vj w*
280 Y=^  170-DE 1.2 3 *. 5 
290 LINE (X,Y)-(X, Y> , 1 
300 FOR K=2 TO 10 
330 X=K*25+30
320 Y=170-0 E K ,2 3 *. 5 
330 LINE -(X,Y),1 
340 NEXT K
350 REM hapsg 
360 J=1
370 FOR Nl'>259.4 TO 2595 STEP 259.4 
3£;0 A= (27 + 1 /24 ) /365 
"90 kS=-A*(3551 + 10734)
4 00 KP= ( 3 7+14/24) *: <75+NK* 17/2594 ) *112+ (3+11/24) *48*112+ (1+3/24 ) *5*13 3*112:KP=KP/1000 
410 KP0R=7* 10+5* 15
420 KDL=(NK*300+NK*160+9.059999*NK*22)/lOOO 
30 TDT=KS+KP+KPDR+KDL 
440 W1=T0T/(NK*2>
450 W2=T0T/(NK*22)
460 OEJ,13=NK:0EJ,23=W1*100:QEJ,33=W2*1000:QEJ, 43=T0T:J=J + 1470 IF F$="B" THEN 490
480 PRINT NK;W1;W2*1000;T0T
490 NEXT NK
500 IF F$="T" THEN STOP 
510 X=55
520 Y=170-QE1,23*.5 
530 LINE (X,Y)-(X, Y) ,2 
54Q FDR K=2 TO 10 
550 X=K*25+30 
560' Y=170-QCK,23*.5 
570 LINE -(X,Y),2 
580 NEXT K
5 9 0  L I N E  ( 2 0 0 , 2 7 ) - ( 2 3 0 , 2 7 ) , - 1 : L O C A T E  4 . 3 1 : P R I N T  " U B L "
600 LINE (200,43)-(230,43),2;LOCATE 6,31:PRINT "HAPAG"
610 2$=INKEY$:IF LEN(Z$)=0 THEN 610
pi-o^ rWii'\ i^'r Ci^sTt Q r 7 J i p A h ' S 0 ? 1  :
( _ T t U  f)Jiedn\rln^^ CcSit )
10 REM program WIN
20 a.E: SCREEN Or WIDTH SO: LOCATE 1 0, 10; IK'P UT "T-EXT -or- S-R/il-'HlC — -> 
30 LLCn=^^'1:LLi:23=--7:LLC33=--9:LLC^3=12:l.LC53 = lT:LLC63-=17:LLr73=19 
A 0 D ] M Q (3 00 j 4 ) ; J 3 : REM USL 
50 FDR NK-300 TO 4482 STEP 100 
60 l/365>!; (5247+10236)
70 f=;p=9>i; (63+NK^ 14/4402) Ji l 12+2!i'2.5>;. 112+14/24 >"2.5)i< 112: KP=I::P/1000 
BO 3-.':P0R=25
90 KDL= (NlCi; 3 50H Nia:S0+9. 059999X:NI::!|;9) /lOOO
100 t d t =i;e+k:p +k p o r +k d l
110 W1 =TOT/NK: W2=TDT/ < MKX' 11)
3 20 DEJ,13=NK:DCJ,2D=W1X100:DCJ,3D=W2X 1 000: DCJ, 4 D=TDT:J=J+1
130 IF F2;="G" THEN 150
140 PRINT nr;; W1;W2X1000;TDT
150 NEXT NK
160 IF Fi!>=''T" THEN 350
170 SCREEN 1: COLOR 0, O: LINE <30, 10) - (30. 170) , 3: LINE (30, 1 70) - (295, 170) , ■:
3 BO FOR X=500 TO 5000 STEP 500
1 90 L 1 l\'E < 30+ X X .05,170) - < 30+ X X. 05, 175) , 3
200 NEXT X • ' ■
210 FDR Y=-l TO 7:L1NE (25, 170-YX. 1OOX. 2) - (30, 3 70-YX'1OOX;. 2) , 3: NEXT Y 
220 LOCATE 23,4:PRINT "0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000"
230 LOCATE 21,35:PRINT "BOXES":LOCATE 3,7:PRINT "$/EOX"
240 LOCATE 4,7:PRINT "CthsI"
250 PP$-^"7654321":FDR L-3 TO 7; LOCATE LLCLI, 3: LL=LL+2: PRI NT M]Di'(PPX.,L
260 X=-DC1 . 13X250/5000+30 .
270 Y=170-D C1,2 3 X. 2
2B0 LI3v)E (X, Y)-(X, Y) , 1
290 FOR K=2 TO J-1
300 X=DCK,13X250/5000+30
310 Y=170-DCK,23X.2
320 LINE -(X,Y),1
330 NEXT K
340 REM hapag
350 J=1
360 FDR »v!i:=100 TO 2594 STEP 100 
j-70 A= (27+1/24)/365 
380 KS=AX(3551+10734)
390 KP= < 17+14/24) X <75+NKX 17/2594 ) XI12+ <3+11 /24 ) X4BX112+ (1+3/24) )t 5X 112- 
3X112:KP=KP/1000 
"00 KP0R=7X10+5X15
. 1 0  K D L =  ( N K X 3 0 0 - + N K X 1 6 0 + 9 .  D 5 9 9 9 9 X N K X 2 2 )  / l O O O  
4 2 0  T O T = K S + K P + K P D R + K D L  
4 3 0  W 1 = T D T / ( N K X 2 )
4 4 0  W 2 = T D T / ( N K X 2 2 )
4 5 0  D C J , 1 3 = N K : D C J , 2 3 = W 1 X 1 0 0 : D C J , 3 D = W 2 X 1 0 0 0 :  D C J , 4  3 = T O T  4 6 0  J = J + 1
4 7 0  I F  F $ = " G "  T H E N  4 9 0  
4 8 0  P R I N T  N K ; W 1 ; W 2 X 1 0 0 0 ; T O T  
4 9 0  N E X T  N K
5 0 0  I F  F $ - " T "  T H E N  S T O P  
5 1 0  X = D C 1 , 1 3 X 2 5 0 / 5 0 0 0 + 3 0  
5 2 0 : Y = 1 7 0 - D C 1 , 2 3 X . 2  
5 3 0  L I N E  ( X , Y ) - < X , Y > , 2  
5 4 0  F D R  K = 2  T D  J - 1  
5 5 0  X = D C K , 1 3 X 2 5 0 / 5 0 0 0 + 3 0  
5 6 0  Y = 1 7 0 - Q C K , 2 3 * . 2  
5 7 0  L I N E  - ( X , Y ) , 2  
5 B 0  N E X T  K
5 9 0  L I N E  ( 2 0 0 , 2 7 ) - ( 2 3 0 , 2 7 ) , 1 : L 0 C A T E  4 , 3 1 : P R I N T  " U S L "
6 0 0  L I N E  ( 2 0 0 , 4 3 ) - ( 2 3 0 , 4 3 ) , 2 : L O C A T E  6 , 3 1 : P R I N T  " H A P A G "
Hapao-Llpyd's North Atlantic Multi-Pc
Itinerary
Notes Total Distanoe--------- S,S25 kn
Numbers with Bracket---- Distance
Number without Bracket---Voyage Duration/Day
27 days for a round trip
The Plan of Senator Line to the RTW
1. Organizational and Management Aspeots
As the company is a pure management company, ini­
tiated by Mr.Karl-Heinz Saga,the management staff 
will be very limited and the management will con­
centrate mainly on marketing,chartering ships and 
containers as well as ships logistics.
The main office will be in Bremen, Germany.
The new service is to be inaugurated in next April.
2. Marketing Aspect
Marketing network will be based on agencies in the 
main calling ports. It is expected to have an own 
office in Germany (Bremen),USA and Far East.
The service will operate as an independent carrier 
in all market segments.
3. Service Configuration 
DFleet
There will be between 24 and 26 ships employed in 
the RTW service.
All ships will be on time charter.
2) General Particulars of ships
The ships will be container ships with the capaci­
ty of 1,300 TEU.
All ships are not older than 5 years with crew 
about 20. The fuel consumption is known to be about 
40 tons, mainly fuel, only a small percentage of 
■ diesel for the calling manoeuvres.
The operational speed will be between 16 and 18 
knots.
3) Calling ports
The service will operate east and westbound circum­
navigation , therefore the ports have to be called 
at in both directions such as, Bremen, Rotterdam, 
Genua or Marseille, Jeddah, Bombay, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Kaohsiung, Kobe or Pusan, Long Beach, Panama, 
Kingston, Savannah or Charlston, Norfolk, New York, 
Southampton and Bremen.
4) The service frequency is to be expected weekly,but 
in the phasing—in period of about 9 months it will 
be a fortnights and in the first stage a three week- 
service .
5) Feeder System
The cargo should be attracted directly, therefore, 
there would be limited feeder possibilities with 
independent feeder services.
30
